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The thesis consists of four chapters. They are self-contained; and can be read indepen-
dently. Each of the four chapters is connected to dynamic aspects of entrepreneurial
behavior and the eﬀects of uncertainty related to future states of the world. Current
decisions faced by entrepreneurs are usually made under uncertainty and can have long-
run implications. Therefore, intertemporal incentives underlie much of the behavior by
entrepreneurs. In this thesis, I aim contributing to an improved understanding of the im-
portance of intertemporal incentives and the role of uncertainty for the decision to become
and entrepreneur and the subsequent behavior. The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 1 presents an empirical analysis based on micro data, considering how ex-
isting earnings diﬀerentials and diﬀerences in income uncertainty can explain observed
occupational choices, i.e. the decision to become an entrepreneur or a wage worker.
Chapter 2 develops a theory of occupational choice in the presence of credit constraints.
The model developed explicitly incorporates intertemporal incentives with respect to both
the occupational choice and wealth accumulation and takes into account that future in-
come is uncertain.
Chapter 3 investigates a source of human capital accumulation that takes place via
employment in high-productivity ﬁrms, in particular, foreign-owned ﬁrms. This is hy-
pothesized to give rise to subsequent productivity transfers when workers later move to
self-employment (entrepreneurship) or alternative wage employment.
Chapter 4 develops useful models and techniques to solve and estimate dynamic struc-
tural models of discrete choices. As such, this chapter is not speciﬁc to entrepreneurial
decision making, but it was inspired by the requirement to take a more structural empirical
approach than in Chapter 1, where the link between a behavioral model and the econo-
metric speciﬁcation admittedly could be more explicit. Speciﬁcally, the original objective
of Chapter 4, was to develop a procedure to solve and estimate a dynamic structural model
for the decision to become an entrepreneur, allowing for lots of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in, e.g., individual speciﬁc skill endowments (entrepreneurial ability), and
serial correlation in the income processes faced by workers and entrepreneurs. This will
be a good stepping stone for doing a full structural estimation of the (more complicated)
model in Chapter 2. This is an interesting project that is still subject to ongoing research.
4A more detailed summary of the content of the four chapters is given below.
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Chapter 1 on earnings, uncertainty, and the self-employment choice, is co-authored with
a fellow PhD student Daniel le Maire. The main objective of this Chapter is to investi-
gate the relationship between the occupational choice and the distributions of associated
monetary gains in diﬀerent occupations. Speciﬁcally, we analyze how existing earnings dif-
ferentials and diﬀerences in income uncertainty can explain observed occupational choices.
A particular focus is on explaining why fewer women choose to become self-employed.
We use a large longitudinal data set based on Danish register data from the Integrated
Database for Labor Marker Research (IDA) covering the period 1980 to 1996. These data
provide detailed annual individual information about income, wealth, education, labor
market status (occupation), region of residence, and immigration status. Since the panel
covers more than 15 years, we can track long sequences of individual occupational choices.
To evaluate whether the self-employed are compensated for their risk-taking, individual
level information about the expected income (and the expected distribution of income) in
self-employment and wage-employment is required. To obtain this information, we esti-
mate earnings functions for both self-employment and wage-employment. These functions
are then in turn used to predict an individual’s income (and the uncertainty of this in-
come) in diﬀerent occupations. The random components of the model are partitioned into
transitory and permanent chocks, which in turn are used to create occupational and edu-
cation speciﬁc measures of income variance (uncertainty) and skewness (the risk/chance
of very low/high incomes).
This information is used to explain the observed occupational choices of the individ-
uals. Speciﬁcally, individuals are assumed to choose between three labor market states:
self-employment, wage-employment and unemployment. The underlying assumption is
that the occupational choice reﬂects an optimal trade-oﬀ between the diﬀerent (earnings)
attributes of the three occupations. Since we focus in particular on the trade-oﬀ between
expected returns and uncertainty, we include not only predicted earnings in the occupa-
tional choice model, but also the corresponding measures of income variance and skewness
in the diﬀerent occupations.
5Several interesting results emerge from our analysis on Danish longitudinal register
data. First, the (taxable) of self-emplyed displays a concentration around the kink points
in the tax system since self-employed can retain earnings and thereby transfer income
across years. Second, when comparing earnings distributions based on diﬀerent income
measures, we ﬁnd that the dispersion of incomes is in general much larger for the self-
employed. Third, our results suggest that expected income and income uncertainly are
important determinants in the choice of occupation. As expected, people are in general
risk averse, preferring high mean earnings with low variances. However, this is much
more pronounced among women and may therefore explain their limited participation in
self-employment, as this occupation displays much more income uncertainty. Finally, our
results suggest that nonwestern immigrants are marginalized into self-employment.
C
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Other dynamic considerations are likely to play an important role for the individual choice
of becoming an entrepreneur. That is, individuals do not only compare earnings proﬁles
in wage work and entrepreneurship when deciding on their occupations. For instance,
future expected earnings in the diﬀerent occupations, and — at least in entrepreneurship
— are likely to depend on both accumulated human capital and savings. In the absence
of external ﬁnancing, savings may thus determine how much the entrepreneur can invest
in the ﬁrm. This creates a complicated decision problem, in part because savings are
aﬀected by current and future income.
Chapter 2 formalize these aspects to provide a better understanding of observed oc-
cupational choices by individuals, in particular, the observed transitions between wage
work and entrepreneurship. The model in Chapter 2 is an intertemporal model of sav-
ing, consumption, human capital accumulation and occupational choice in the presence
of liquidity constraints, income uncertainty, and entry costs. Self-employment yields an
uncertain return which depends on both the human capital (labor market experience) of
the individual and the capital invested in the company. Wage employment, on the other
hand, also yields an uncertain return, but this does not depend on capital investments
and human capital. Human capital (experience) is accumulated in both wage work and
6entrepreneurship, but does only aﬀect returns in entrepreneurship. Entry into entrepre-
neurship, however, is associated with a ﬁxed, sunk start-up cost, which is lost completely
if the business must close down and the agent returns to wage work.
The individual is credit constrained which implies that the ﬁxed start-up cost must be
ﬁnanced out of her savings. Furthermore, the subsequent investments in physical capital
in the ﬁrm are also limited by the amount of individual savings — but these investments
can at least be recouped by selling the acquired capital upon closing the company and
returning to wage work. Together, these assumptions reﬂect that some investments are
irreversible (the entry costs) while others can be reversed (the physical capital) — at least
at some cost.
Thus in each period, the agent not only decides on her occupation — i.e. whether to
be wage employed or entrepreneur — but she also decides on the division of her current
resources (her wealth) between saving (which includes investments in physical capital),
consumption and possibly entry costs in each period.
A prominent feature of the model is that it generates a well-deﬁned transition pat-
tern between entrepreneurship and ordinary wage work. This feature is consistent with
empirical ﬁndings of sequential entries and exits. The model predicts that workers may
transit back and forth between wage employment and entrepreneurship. The latter occu-
pation becomes more attractive as the worker accumulates suﬃcient wealth (and human
capital) as this gives her a higher (expected) return in entrepreneurship because she can
then acquire more physical capital. Wage work, on the other hand, becomes relatively
more attractive when individual savings are depleted, e.g., following a series of negative
shocks to entrepreneurial income which forces the individual to use her savings (i.e., sell
her capital investments) to maintain consumption.
Second, the credit constraints induce entrepreneurs to accumulate savings and may thus
explain why we empirically observe a concentration of assets among the entrepreneurs.
When entrepreneurs are credit constrained, the accumulated savings determine how much
physical capital they can acquire and thus the expected pay-oﬀ from entrepreneurship.
Furthermore, entrepreneurs save to maintain their position as entrepreneurs to avoid
potential costs associated with later re-entry. A result related to policy initiatives is that
the entrepreneurial saving motive is aﬀected by the tightness of credit constraints in a
7nonmonotone way: Initially, as credit constraints become less binding, potential high-
productivity entrepreneurs with relatively low asset holdings will ﬁnd it optimal to save
more. The reason is that the perspectives for (future) entrepreneurship become better for
this particular group when it is possible to borrow for investments in larger projects. As
credit constraints are further loosened, and eventually become irrelevant, the incentive to
save for entrepreneurial reasons disappears.
Third, in the absence of entry costs, the probability of exiting entrepreneurship will
generally be declining in the age of the ﬁrm. The reason is that entrepreneurs accumu-
late assets (savings) over time, making them more resistant to negative chocks. In the
presence of entry costs, however, the probability of exit from entrepreneurship is initially
increasing in the elapsed duration and then decreasing. Entry costs alter the transition
patterns between entrepreneurship and ordinary wage work fundamentally: Due to entry
costs, individuals will never enter entrepreneurship if there is a signiﬁcant risk that they
will not be able to maintain their business in at least the following period or two. There-
fore, the exit probability is very low for short durations. For longer durations, however,
the entrepreneurs become more resistant to negative chocks due to a larger amount of
accumulated capital. When this eﬀect dominates, the probability of exit starts to decline
again.
In sum, the model in Chapter 2 has several predictions which are consistent with ob-
served behavior. Furthermore, the model adds to our understanding of the eﬀects of credit
constraints on observed entrepreneurial behavior as well as the potential consequences of
government intervention in this area.
C
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Chapter 3 on foreign owned ﬁrms, productivity transfers, and entrepreneurship is co-
authored Associate Professor Nikolaj Malchow-Møller and Professor James R. Markusen.
This Chapter follows the idea outlined in Chapter 2 that entrepreneurial skills are —
at least partly — derived through labor market experience. More precisely, it investigates
— both theoretically and empirically — a speciﬁc source of such human capital accumu-
lation; namely the accumulation that takes place via employment in high-productivity
ﬁrms, in particular, foreign-owned ﬁrms. This is hypothesized to give rise to subsequent
8productivity transfers when workers later move to self-employment/entrepreneurship or
alternative wage employment.
Why are foreign-owned ﬁrms hypothesized to be important channels of productivity
transfers? Because these ﬁrms are often believed to possess superior knowledge, pro-
duction technologies, or management techniques compared to the average domestic ﬁrm.
Empirically, it has also been documented in a number of studies that diﬀerent ﬁrms pay
diﬀerent wages. In particular, the literature has found higher wages in foreign-owned
ﬁrms and larger ﬁrms.
However, it remains an open question how these higher wages arise. Do they reﬂect
actual labor productivity diﬀerences between the ﬁrms, or are they just a premium paid
by these ﬁrms to their workers? Yet another possibility is that they merely reﬂect a better
selection of workers by these ﬁrms. And if they reﬂect productivity diﬀerences are these
then transferable to subsequent employments in other ﬁrms and/or to self-employment?
In other words, do they reﬂect a higher degree of learning/human capital accumulation
in these ﬁrms? This chapter oﬀers a theoretical explanation for these observations which
builds on Melitz’s (2003) model of an industry structure with heterogeneous ﬁrms ex-
tended with a learning-on-the-job model from Ethier and Markusen (1996). The paper
thus provides a theory of an important channel for productivity transfers to domestic ﬁrms
and self-employment which is based on human capital accumulation and worker mobility
instead of externalities. Furthermore, the paper investigates empirically the implications
of the model.
Many of the hypotheses advanced by the simple theoretical model are veriﬁed in the
estimations and point to an important role for learning and worker mobility as a channel
for productivity transfers from high-productivity ﬁrms to entrepreneurship.
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In Chapter 4, I focus on the development and implementation of a useful technique to
solve and estimate more rich and realistic dynamic structural models of discrete choices.
In turn, these models can be used to improve our understanding of dynamic aspects in
entrepreneurial decisions and the role of risk and uncertainty in the behavior of entrepre-
neurs. As mentioned above, this chapter is not speciﬁc to the analysis of entrepreneurial
choice, but it was initially motivated by the requirement to take a more structural em-
pirical approach than in Chapter 1 and eventually to perform a full structural estimation
of the model in Chapter 2. However, tractable methods dealing with suﬃcienly ﬂexible
models were not readily available.
The methods developed in Chapter 4 allow for lots of ﬂexibility in the modeling choice
that obviates many of the limitations of approachable models. Usually, unobservables
are assumed additively separable in utility, conditionally independent, and extreme value
distributed. In contrast, the suggested approach can potentially allow for random taste
variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation in unobserved state variables
over time. The strategy is to combine polynomial approximation methods and ideas from
the literature on discrete choice models with simulation.
When solving and estimating the model, I use Chebyshev polynomials to approximate
expected value functions over (observed and unobserved) continuous state variables and
simulation techniques to evaluate integrals. This strategy has several important spin-
oﬀs. First, it helps ameliorating the ’curse of dimensionality’; the well known exponential
increase in computer time and storage requirements. Second, the approach permits very
fast and accurate simulation of likelihood functions, once expected value functions are
approximated. Third, we can easily allow for lots of heterogeneity, greatly expanding the
range of models that can be considered. Fourth, data on continuous state variables do
not have to be discretized, mitigating serious problems with approximation errors.
When evaluating the approach, I ﬁnd that a ﬁfth-order polynomial provides suﬃciently
accurate approximations. The approximation errors, transmitted to conditional choice
probabilities, likelihood functions and structural parameter estimates, are practically
eliminated at this level of approximation. I also compare the approach to conventional
discretization methods and ﬁnd that discretizing data is clearly ineﬃcient and results in
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substantial approximation error and variation loss in state variables. This is transmitted
to signiﬁcant bias in parameter estimates. When comparing it to the suggested approx-
imation approach, I ﬁnd that at least 100 grid points are needed to match the precision
we obtain when solving the model with a ﬁfth order approximating Chebyshev polyno-
mial, i.e. with 6 Chebyshev nodes. Hence, Chebyshev polynomials are a powerful tool in
ameliorating the curse of dimensionality and mitigating the problem with approximation
error associated with discretization of the data.
I also provide a Monte Carlo experiment that highlights the importance of hetero-
geneity bias in dynamic programming discrete choice models and illustrate a model with
unobserved heterogeneity in utility.
Although diﬀerent in topic and methodology, each of the four chapters in the thesis, was
meant to contribute to the overall topic: Dynamic Aspects of Entrepreneurial Behavior.
R 
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EARNINGS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT
CHOICE
DANIEL LE MAIRE AND BERTEL SCHJERNING
Abstract. This paper investigates the relationship between self-employment choice,
expected earnings, and uncertainty. Several interesting results emerge from our analysis
on Danish longitudinal register data: Firstly, self-employed (taxable) personal income
bunch at kink points in the tax system since self-employed can retain earnings and
thereby transfer income across tax-years. Secondly, expected income level and income
variance are important determinants in choice of occupation. Thirdly, men put more
emphasis on expected earnings level, while women appears more risk averse, which con-
tribute to explain why fewer women are self-employed. Finally, our results suggest that
non-western immigrants are marginalized into self-employment.
Keywords: Occupational choice, self-employment, wage-di¤erentials, income uncertainty,
risk aversion, overcon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1. Introduction
Compared to wage work, self-employment is a fundamentally di¤erent occupation with
respect to the type and source of income. While wage workers receive a wage which
is subject to a relatively small level of uncertainty, self-employed individuals often face
considerably more variation in their income. Moreover, since self-employed typically use
own wealth to nance their business, they bear the risk associated with starting up the
rm. Therefore, the expected income and the uncertainty of this income are likely to be
important determinants of an individuals occupational choice.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the occupa-
tional choice and the distributions of associated monetary gains in di¤erent occupations.
Specically, we analyze how existing earnings di¤erentials and di¤erences in income un-
certainty can explain observed occupational choices. A particular focus is on explaining
why fewer women choose to become self-employed.
If individuals are risk averse, we would expect that the self-employed should be com-
pensated for facing higher income uncertainty. However, earnings-di¤erentials may arise
for other reasons than risk compensation: Hamilton (2000) argues that cross-sectional
earnings di¤erentials may arise due to i) di¤erent earnings-experience proles, ii) self-
selection, and iii) non-pecuniary benets. Hamilton nds that mean and median incomes
are lower in self-employment than in wage-employment in the US, although those in the
higher income brackets earn more in self-employment than in wage-employment. Hamil-
ton concludes that individuals choose self-employment primarily because of non-pecuniary
benets.
An alternative (or complementary) explanation is that those who choose to become
self-employed may be less risk-averse than the typical wage employed. They may even
be risk-lovers. In a recent paper by Elston, Harrison, and Rutström (2006), experiments
are used to characterize the attitudes to risk among entrepreneurs. Their main nding
is that full-time entrepreneurs are less risk-averse and exhibit a signicant joy of winning
compared to non-entrepreneurs and part-time entrepreneurs.
Yet another explanation relates to the individuals subjective assessment of the proba-
bility of success. While Coelho and de Meza (2006) provide experimental evidence that
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entrepreneurs tend to overestimate their chance of success, Elston, Harrison, and Rut-
ström (2006) do not nd systematic judgmental error of protability. However, it is
found that part-time entrepreneurs are reluctant to enter markets where protability is
based on their perception of their relative skill ability.
Evidence from existing Danish questionnaire surveys shows that men focus more on the
expected income level than women when choosing occupation, whereas women emphasize
non-pecuniary benets (Statistics Denmark, 1999; and Kjeldsen and Nielsen, 2000). Thus,
90 per cent of the women who had a child in the age of 0-2 years at the time of the business
start-up state that an important reason for becoming self-employed was to make it easier
to combine family life and work.
With respect to risk aversion, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) analyze 150 psycho-
logical studies of risk-taking behavior, and nd that in 14 out of 16 tasks, women are more
risk-averse. However, according to Croson and Gneezy (2004) the evidence of women be-
ing more risk-averse is less clear in the economics literature which has typically focused
on nancial risk.
Several studies have suggested that overcondence is part of human nature, e.g. Sven-
son (1980) reports that 90 per cent of Swedish drivers rate themselves above average.
Recently and in relation to occupational choice, Niederle and Vesterlund (2006) nd from
the conduction of experiments that more women than men prefer to work under a non-
competitive piece-rate compensation system rather than under a competitive tournament
compensation scheme even though women are found to be as productive as men. Niederle
and Vesterlund (2006) conclude that the reason for this di¤erence is that men are too
overcondent and enjoy competition more. In other words, too many low productivity
men enter the competitive tournament, while productive women do not enter enough.
To evaluate whether the self-employed actually are compensated for their risk-taking,
individual level information about the expected income (and the expected distribution
of income) in both self-employment and wage-employment is required. To obtain this
information, we estimate earnings functions for self-employed and wage-employed sep-
arately. However, individuals would be expected to select themselves into the type of
occupation where they are most productive. Therefore, we estimate earnings functions
for each occupational choice, using the dynamic panel data sample selection model of
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Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999). This also allows us to disentangle the role of unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence in the occupational choices. We nd evidence of state
dependence in the occupational choices.
The estimated earnings functions are then in turn used to predict an individuals income
(and the uncertainty of this income) in di¤erent occupations. The random components of
the model are partitioned into transitory and permanent shocks, which in turn are used
to create occupational and education specic measures of income variance (uncertainty)
and skewness (the risk/chance of very low/high incomes).
Rather that rather than characterizing the entrepreneur, we directly evaluate the impact
of earnings on the choice of becoming self-employed, wage-employed or unemployed by
examining the roles of expected earnings, risk aversion and over-condence. This is done
for each gender separately. Our results complement existing evidence from experimental
economics, providing an potential explanations for the substantial gender gap in the
probability of choosing to become self-employed.
We use a large longitudinal data set based on Danish register data from 1980 to 1996,
providing us with detailed individual information about income, wealth, education, labor
market status (occupation), region of residence, and immigration status. Since the panel
covers more than 15 years, we can track long sequences of individual occupational choices
and, thereby, appropriately investigate the dynamics of the self-employment choice.
Our results point to a large role for monetary aspects when choosing occupation. As
expected, people prefer the sector with the highest expected income and lowest expected
variance and, thus, on average appear risk-averse. We nd that men put more emphasis on
the earnings level, while women appear more risk-averse, which could be one of the crucial
reasons why fewer women are self-employed. We do not nd evidence of overcondence.
If anything, women instead seem to under-estimate their chance of success compared to
men.
The explanatory power of the occupational choice model is quite impressive considering
that we only include the predicted income level, variance and skewness. However, we
explain much less of the variation in the realized occupational choices for the group of non-
western immigrants. Immigrants are interesting with respect to occupational choice since
they are more likely to start up their own business than natives. We nd that immigrants
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put much less emphasis on the earnings level. These ndings provide additional evidence
for immigrants being marginalized into self-employment as Blume, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and
Würtz (2005) suggest. From their analysis on Danish transition data it is found that
most non-western immigrants entering self-employment come from unemployment and
that they do not use self-employment as a stepping stone for becoming wage-employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the data used
in the analysis. In section 3 we formulate the econometric specication. In section 4, we
present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
The data we use in this paper is an unbalanced panel data set for 1980-1996. The data
is a representative 10 per cent sample extract drawn from the Integrated Database for
labor market Research (IDA) and the Danish Income Registry (IKR) both maintained by
Statistics Denmark. IDA and IKR are both longitudinal data based on register data for
all individuals in Denmark. Since data originates from administrative records covering
the entire Danish population there is only natural attrition in the data, i.e. birth, death
and migration of individuals. The occupational status is observed once a year (the last
week of November). We divide the labor market status into three states; self-employed,
wage-employed, and unemployed. Since the panel covers more than 15 years, we have
the possibility to track individuals over long time periods (before, during and after self-
employment) and, thereby, appropriately control for the dynamics of the occupational
choice. These high-quality Danish data contains very detailed individual information
concerning, e.g., income, wealth, education, labor market status, region of residence, and
immigration status. Moreover, the data also includes the same information for cohabitants
allowing us to aggregate variables to the household level.
In order to avoid distortions in the results due to retirement patterns and educational
attainment we restrict the sample to include persons aged 30-55 years only. This leaves
us with 2; 424; 694 observations in total of which 1; 130; 635 are women.
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME IN 1996
-100,000 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000
Self-employed
Wage-employed
TABLE 1: INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS IN 1996, SELECTED PERCENTILES
Self-empl. Wage-empl. Self-empl. Wage-empl.
5 0 111,055 -12,529 85,848
10 7,745 135,380 12,687 99,698
25 75,980 167,222 61,119 119,634
40 120,678 190,022 88,076 133,592
50 148,590 205,274 104,021 142,430
60 183,967 221,686 121,745 151,914
75 242,834 253,018 152,229 169,066
90 345,187 325,042 202,619 202,231
95 458,649 387,028 248,060 229,819
Disposable IncomePersonal IncomePercentile
For the analysis of occupational choice we need to decide on an income measure to
use. One obvious candidate is disposable income since this measure is closely related to
current consumption possibilities and, hence, utility.1
Figure 1 shows kernel densities for the disposable income for self-employed and for wage-
employed in 1996. Both distributions are right-skewed with the distribution of incomes
from self-employed being most right skewed. From both Figure 1 and Table 1 it can be
seen that the mean disposable income for self-employed is considerably below the mean
income for wage-employed. However, due to the skewness the 90th percentile earns more
in self-employment than the equivalent in wage-employment.
1We compute the gross income including wage-income, capital income, labor market contributions
(since 1994), taxable and non-taxable benets. In order to obtain the disposable income we subtract the
tax payments.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN 1996
-200,000 0 200,000 400,000 600,000
Self-employed
Wage-employed
Figure 1 and Table 1 conrm the US evidence presented in Hamilton (2000), who also
nds that mean and median incomes are lower in self-employment, but that those in the
higher percentiles earn more in self-employment relative to wage-employment.
In Figure 2 we have depicted the (taxable) personal income for respectively wage-
employed and self-employed together with two dotted vertical lines indicating where the
medium and upper tax brackets set in. In contrast to wage-employed, self-employed tend
to bunch just below where the tax brackets set in. This can be due to self-employed
being in charge of their own working time, but it may also reect that self-employed are
building up inventories and capital stocks or have other means of extracting income from
their rm (possibly also in the grey area between rm economics and personal economics).
Finally, an institutional feature ("Virksomhedsordningen") allows self-employed to retain
earnings in the rm.
The bunching at the tax brackets suggests that adding retained earnings (less of taxes)
to the disposable income constitutes a better income measure for self-employed and we
only use this income measure in the rest of the paper. As shown in Figure 3 we nd
that the unconditional mean and median incomes are larger in self-employment than in
wage-employment in contrast to the US evidence in Hamilton (2000) and in contrast to
when applying the narrow income measure.
3. Econometric Specification
The organization of this section, can be summarized as follows: First, we consider the
estimation of conditional earnings functions using Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) sample
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FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME PLUS RETAINED EARNINGS
-100,000 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000
Self-Employed
Wage_employed
selection model for panel data. Hereafter, we construct income uncertainty and skewness
measures. Finally, using measures for expected income, uncertainty and skewness, we
model the occupational choice in a conditional logit model.
3.1. Earnings Conditional on Occupational Choice. For each person we separately
predict the disposable income including retained earnings from being self-employed and
being wage employed. The chosen income measure is disposable income including re-
tained earnings. We use unemployment benets for the group of unemployed. For each
occupation we model earnings as a simple log-linear mincer earnings equation
(3.1) ln ynt = xnt + n + "nt
where n indexes individuals (n = 1; ::; N) and t indexes time (t = 1; ::::; T ); ynt is annual
disposable income plus retained earnings,  is a vector of unknown coe¢ cients to be
estimated, xnt is a vector covariates, n represents unobserved heterogeneity and "nt is a
normally distributed disturbance.
Since we observe earnings for the chosen occupational status only, the conditional earn-
ings functions will in general be estimated on a non-random selected sample. There are
several arguments, why self-selection may be an issue in the present context. In the Roy
(1951) model the individual ex-ante knows her sector-specic productivity, and will select
herself into the sector, where she is most productive. Furthermore, if the incomes in the
two sectors are highly correlated, the most productive persons will select the sector with
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the largest dispersion of sector specic abilities, while the least productive will select the
sector with the smallest dispersion.
The Danish labor market is characterized by a compressed wage structure as a con-
sequence of the generous unemployment benet level and a high degree of organization
on both employer and worker sides. As argued by Malchow-Møller, Markusen, and Skak-
sen (2006) such institutional arrangement may well imply that the most productive are
not paid according to their marginal product and, therefore, the most able may select
themselves into self-employment. On the other hand, the least productive may not have
a su¢ ciently high productivity to earn the minimum wage in paid employment. Conse-
quently, marginalization may also push the least productive into self-employment. Blume,
Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2005) argue that this indeed is the case for non-western im-
migrants in the Danish labor market.
Yet another type of selection, ex-post self-selection, arises in leaning models such as
Jovanovic (1979) and Jovanovic (1984), where persons have no ex-ante knowledge of their
productivity, but consecutively observe output realizations. Persons experiencing poor
output realizations will quit and search for a new match.
To control for the selection problem we use the Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) dynamic
panel data application of Heckmans two-step sample selection model. The selection is
modelled as a dynamic random e¤ects probit, which allows us to separate two sources of
persistence in the occupational choice: Persistence as a result of unobserved heterogeneity
and (true) state dependence. Since we do not observe the rst occupational choice, we
cannot assume that the initial observation of the occupational is truly exogenous. We use
the Wooldridge (2005) way of handling the initial conditions problem and, thus, allow the
unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the initial dependent variable.
We will now briey explain the model.2 We consider a model consisting of two equations,
where the parameters of equation (3.1) are of primary interest, while the selection equation
below is a reduced form equation for the occupational choice. The selection part of the
2For a detailed treatment of the model see Vella and Verbeek (1999).
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model can be summarized as
dnt = xnt + dnt 1 + n + nt(3.2)
dnt = 1 (d

nt > 0)(3.3)
ln ynt = ln y

nt if dnt = 1(3.4)
= 0 (unobserved) otherwise
where ynt and d

nt are latent endogenous variables with observed counterparts ynt and dnt.
The equation of interest is assumed to have the usual error component structure, where
n  iN (0; 2) and "nt  iN (0; 2"). For the selection equation we allow for unobserved
heterogeneity through random individual e¤ects, such that the selection equation has
the following two-component error structure n  iN
 
0; 2

and nt  iN
 
0; 2

. We
allow for correlation between the individual e¤ects as well as correlation between the
idiosyncratic disturbances, that is cov(n; n) =  6= 0 and cov("nt; nt) = " 6= 0.
Finally, denote nt = n + "nt , nt = n + nt , xn = [xn1; :::; xnT ]
0 and let n be a T
vector of nt:
Assume now
njxn  iN
 
0; 2ii
0 + 2I

(3.5)
E [ntjxn; n] =  1nt +  2n(3.6)
where n = T 1
PT
t=1 nt and where  1 = "=
2
" and  2 = T
 
   "2=2"

=
 
2 + T
2


are constants to be estimated and i is a column of ones. Note that equation (3.6) imposes
strict exogeneity of xnt, such that errors are assumed to be independent of future and
lagged values of xnt. To estimate the conditional mean for the dependent variable in the
equation of interest, we condition on the chosen occupation
E [ln yntjxn; dn0; dn] = xnt + E [ntjxn; dn0; dn]
where E [ntjxn; dn0; dn] is the selection bias induced by correlation between the errors in
the two equations.
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Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the conditional mean of the error-term
from the selection equation; E [ntjxn; dn0; dn] can be estimated by the following expression
(3.7) ~nt =
1R
f (dnjxn; n) f (n) dn
Z
(n + E [ntjxn; n]) f (dnjxn; n) f (n) dn
This expression can be approximated by quadrature methods or simulation. Once we have
estimated the reduced form parameters for the selection equation, we can easily simulate
the conditional error ~nt.3
After computing ~nt and the individual specic means n = 1Tn
PTn
t ~nt we can estimate
the following equation by the simple linear random e¤ects model
ln ynt = xnt + ~nt1 + n2 + n + "nt
3.2. Uncertainty and Skewness Measures. For each category in our disaggregated
education breakdown shown in Table A.1 we estimate the occupational-specic measures
of variance and skewness of the income processes. This is done separately for men and
women.
We divide the uncertainty into a permanent part relating to the variance of the indi-
vidual time-constant n and into a transitory uncertainty relating to the time-varying
error-term.4 Among the covariates in xnt we have included 28 educational dummies.5 We
dene an = exp (n) and ent = exp ("nt) and compute the variance R and the skewness
K for each education type l by
Rl =
1
Nl
PNl
n=1 (anl   al)2 Kl = 1Nl
PNl
n=1 (anl   al)3
R"l =
1
T
1
Nl
PNj
n=1 (enlt   el)2 K"l = 1T 1Nl
PNl
n=1 (enlt   el)3
By averaging the residuals only on education groups, we e¤ectively assume that the
income uncertainty does not depend on for example experience, which is obviously an
3The procedure is summarized in algorithm 1 in the appendix.
4Recently, Diaz-Serrano, Hartog, and Nielsen (2003) have used a similar approach in the context of
educational choice.
5In the IDA database there are 1,750 di¤erent educations, but in order to secure representativity
we operate with 28 education groups only (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). We have aimed at securing
representativity by not making a too disaggregated educational break-down, but on the other hand aimed
at selecting as homogeneous groups as possible.
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approximation. Averaging the incomes on other variables as well is not feasible with the
detailed education break-down used.
For an unemployed there is no or very little uncertainty regarding income. Conse-
quently, we set the variance and skewness equal to zero.
3.3. A Model of Occupational Choice. The behavioral framework underlying the
occupational choice model is simple: We assume that individuals each period associate
each occupation with a continuous random utility function, Unit , where each occupation is
indexed by i 2 [se; we; ue]. Each period individuals choose between self-employment (se),
wage-employment (we) and unemployment (ue) to maximize the Unit.6 Random utility is
assumed to be a linear function of occupational specic earnings, and the variance and
skewness of permanent and transitory income shocks. Hence, the random utility function
can be written as
Unit = xnit + i + nit with n = 1; :::; N and t = 1; ::; T
where i is a choice-specic constant, xnit =
h
Y^nit; R

l ; K

l ; R
"
l ; K
"
l
i
denotes the set of
attributes associated with each occupation,  is a vector of coe¢ cients related to the
the choice specic attributes xint. The error component nit is assumed to be individual-,
choice,- and time specic and distributed according to a Type I extreme value distribution.
With this distributional assumption, we end up with McFaddens well known Conditional
Logit model for discrete choices.
4. Results
4.1. Self-selection and Earnings Di¤erentials. In this section, we investigate the
extent to which earnings di¤erentials can be explained by individuals self-selecting them-
selves into the di¤erent occupations. To account for the potentially important selection
problems, we estimate the model sample selection model of Vella and Verbeek (1998,1999).
First, we estimate the selection equation given by equation (3.2) and equation (3.3) by a
6Even though each individual maximizes utility each period by choosing occupations this need not be
equivalent to maximization of life-time utility given by a discounted sum of period utility. However, this
simplication is needed to make the model operational.
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dynamic random e¤ects probit. Hereafter, we estimate the parameters in the conditional
earnings function in equation (3.1).
Since the choice of labor market state di¤ers considerably between the genders, the
sample correction and the prediction of incomes are done separately for men and women.
Additionally, the existence of wage di¤erentials between the genders suggests that it would
be appropriate to run the wage equations separately.
The results from the selection equations given in table A.2 suggest that the impact
of the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly signicant, indicating the pres-
ence of substantial state dependence. State dependence can be a result of cost of and
uncertainty of labor market transitions and is likely to be amplied for transitions into
self-employment in the presence of start-up costs. In an intertemporal model of occupa-
tional choice Schjerning (2005) shows that the combination of irreversible start-up costs
and income uncertainty introduces an option value of being self-employed. To avoid po-
tential start-up costs associated with later re-entry, the self-employed is willing to wait
until good times occur rather than temporarily leaving self-employment. This introduces
a value of waiting and consequently we will see later entry and later exit.
The magnitude of state dependence for the self-employed is substansial: Being self-
employed in the previous period increases the probability of being self-employed in the
current period from 1.2 to 41.5 per cent for females and from 4.0 per cent to 48.7 per cent
for men. As a comparison, the marginal e¤ect from previous wage-employment is 19.9
per cent for females and 24.0 per cent for men.
The results from the selection equation suggest that, in general, the probability of
being self-employed varies much between the educational categories both with respect to
length and type of education. Although the picture is quite mixed, it seems to be the
case that unskilled and some groups of highest education are the most likely to become
self-employed. The latter is due to the fact that the self-employed include professionals
such as practitioner doctors, dentists, lawyers and accountants.
The estimated earnings equations are given in table A.3. As dependent variable we use
the disposable income including retained earnings. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in the form of random e¤ects, and we control for the usual socio-demographic variables.
We nd positive coe¢ cients on marriage for men, while they are negative for women. The
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origin variables have the expected signs and magnitudes, i.e., non-western immigrants earn
considerably less than western immigrants, second generation immigrants and natives. It
is striking that non-western immigrants are more likely to become self-employed even
though they should expect a much lower income in self-employment compared to wage-
employment.
We nd the usual hump-shaped e¤ect of age, which obviously captures labor market
experience. We have included dummies for each education from our detailed educational
break-down shown in the appendix. The general picture is as expected that the longer
education, the higher disposable income. As one would presume, the returns to education
di¤er remarkably between the educations. For example, the returns to humanities are
lower compared to social sciences at each length of education reecting the relatively
higher unemployment rate that may lead to accepting jobs below the educational level.
If education is a signal, so that employers use education to screen potential workers,
we would expect lower returns to education in self-employment. There does not seem to
be much evidence for the signalling hypothesis.
Since we do not wish to rely on the non-linearity of the selection equation to identify the
selection e¤ects in the income equations we need to exclude at least one variable. We use
the lagged dependent variable, household wealth, dummies for children in the household
and a dummy for the spouse being self-employed.
The inclusion of the correction terms account for the selection bias induced by the
correlation between unobservables in the selection model and earnings equations. The
coe¢ cients to the correction terms nt and n are statistically signicant in all four re-
gressions. In the case of men, the coe¢ cient on both correction terms are negative,
implying that the marginalization on average dominates. Taken literally, we have that
those in wage-employment will tend to earn more in self-employment than those already
self-employed.
In contrast to this, the coe¢ cient on the individual specic correction term, n is
positive in the self-employment earnings equation for women implying that those in wage-
employment have a lower self-employment potential than the currently self-employed.
Since the income is measured on a yearly basis a possible explanation for the positive
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selection into self-employment relates to di¤erences in the hours of work between wage-
employed and self-employed. About 20 per cent of female wage-employed work part-time
and if this fraction is larger than the corresponding for women in self-selection a positive
selection into self-employment will, on average, emerge. In recent work by Carrasco and
Ejrnæs (2003) it is in fact argued that the relative low share of female self-employed
in Denmark can be explained by the relative high level of exibility in the Danish labor
market providing the possibility to work part time in paid employment. Similar arguments
apply to women planning to have children, as the opportunities for paid maternity leave
are better in wage-employment. Another explanation might be glass-ceiling e¤ects in
wage-employment, see e.g. Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman (2003) for Swedish evidence.
4.2. The Occupational Choice. The occupational choice model is estimated for a sev-
eral di¤erent subsamples. The results from these estimations are shown in Table 2. Each
row in the Table corresponds to the results for a di¤erent subsample. The gures in the
Table show the e¤ects of the mean, variance (uncertainty) and skewness (i.e., in this case
the chance of very high incomes) of predicted earnings conditional on the occupational
choice. Note that in the estimations, variance and skewness of both transitory and per-
manent shocks are included in the model. For expositional purposes, however, we only
report variance and skewness of the permanent income component in the Table.7
The coe¢ cients to mean earnings gives the marginal utility of expected income, while
the (negative of the) coe¢ cient to the variance can be interpreted as the marginal (dis-
) utility of income uncertainty. To give an example, a positive coe¢ cient to expected
income is associated with individuals consistently choosing occupations with higher levels
of expected earnings, while a negative coe¢ cient to variance emerges when individuals
choose occupations with little income uncertainty.
7Since the earnings equations were estimated with age variables and time-dummies there is no aggregate
time variation left in the error-terms, but still individual specic variation occurs. Alvarez, Browning, and
Ejrnæs (2002) nd that Danish income processes are particularly heterogenous. Steep income-experience
proles imply a large variance, but when controlling for the income level, we should due to income
smoothing expect that a at income-tenure prole is preferred. However, a steeper wage-experience
prole may indicate greater possibilities such as promotion for wage-employed and business expansion for
self-employed, which may explain the positice coe¢ cient to the variance of the temporary income shocks.
The skewness of the time-varying part does not seem to play any role.
26 DANIEL LE MAIRE AND BERTEL SCHJERNING
TABLE 2: CHOICE OF LABOR MARKET STATUS
(CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODEL)
Subsample Mean Earnings
Variance/
Mean
Skewnes/
Mean Sample size R2
All 1.58 (0.007)** -0.15 (0.004)** -0.02 (0.001)** -0.10 -0.010 7,274,082 51.0
Non-western immigrants 1.08 (0.044)** 0.05 (0.025) -0.02 (0.005)** 0.04 -0.016 119,412 23.5
Women 0.40 (0.017)** -0.22 (0.011)** -0.04 (0.001)** -0.56 -0.091 3,391,905 59.7
Non-western immigrants 0.81 (0.095)** -0.34 (0.070)** 0.02 (0.009)* -0.42 0.022 45,564 29.8
Married 1.00 (0.023)** -0.27 (0.014)** -0.03 (0.002)** -0.27 -0.032 2,514,129 61.6
HH. Wealth(t-1)>500.000 0.85 (0.048)** -0.14 (0.022)** -0.01 (0.003)** -0.16 -0.013 493,101 64.5
Father self-employed 1.29 (0.148)** 0.20 (0.030)** -0.06 (0.009)** 0.16 -0.043 64,728 64.2
age<40 0.40 (0.026)** -0.11 (0.013)** -0.05 (0.002)** -0.27 -0.118 1,353,195 60.5
age>45 0.58 (0.030)** -0.37 (0.025)** -0.02 (0.002)** -0.63 -0.038 1,148,580 57.6
Men 2.81 (0.016)** -0.10 (0.005)** 0.00 (0.001) -0.04 -0.001 3,882,177 44.8
Non-western immigrants 1.81 (0.088)** 0.14 (0.027)** -0.03 (0.006)** 0.08 -0.018 73,848 20.3
Married 2.39 (0.020)** -0.15 (0.006)** 0.01 (0.001)** -0.06 0.003 2,761,398 48.2
HH. Wealth(t-1)>500.000 1.42 (0.044)** -0.18 (0.012)** 0.06 (0.002)** -0.13 0.045 474,390 43.5
Father self-employed 3.77 (0.110)** -0.10 (0.023)** -0.02 (0.007)** -0.03 -0.006 91,098 40.5
age<40 3.33 (0.027)** -0.07 (0.007)** -0.02 (0.002)** -0.02 -0.006 1,538,208 50.0
age>45 2.53 (0.027)** -0.10 (0.009)** 0.01 (0.002)** -0.04 0.004 1,348,191 39.6
SkewnessVariance
Distribution of Permanent Chock's MRS
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Other controls: Occupational specific constants
and measures of the temporary components of estimated chocks (skewness and variance)
To make results comparable across di¤erent subsamples, we compute the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) between the variance and mean earnings and between the skewness
and mean earnings. The MRS can be interpreted as the rate at which you are willing to
trade o¤ more uncertainty for higher income.8 These results are shown in the right part
of the Table.
Considering the full sample (the rst row in the Table), the results point to a large
role for monetary aspects when choosing occupation. As expected, peoples choice of
occupation is positively a¤ected by expected (mean) earnings and negatively by a higher
variance of the income. Thus, on average, people appear risk averse. These ndings are
found to be robust to various sample decompositions.
Turning to the di¤erences between the genders, we nd that men put more emphasis
on the earnings level, while women appear more risk averse. This is reected in the much
lower value of the MRS estimate for women. This could be one of the main reasons why
fewer women choose to become self-employed.
8This normalization is important since estimates from two di¤erent subsamples are not directly com-
parable due to di¤erences in the variances of the unobserved factors.
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Women seem to be behaving in a less risk averse manner when household wealth exceeds
DKK 500,000. This is perfectly consistent with standard models of intertemporal behavior
that nd that the degree of e¤ective risk aversion is decreasing in wealth; see, e.g., Deaton
(1991), Carroll (1997), and Schjerning (2005).
The nding that married women appear less risk averse than other women is also fully
consistent with models from the literature on family economics that point to risk sharing
as being a potentially important economic gain from marriage, see e.g. Hess (2004).
A similar variation in mens attitudes towards risk is not found. An interesting nding,
however, is that the MRS between income uncertainty and expected earnings is virtually
zero compared to females. This conrms the evidence fromDanish questionnaires, referred
to above, which pointed to men putting much more emphasis on monetary gains (expected
income) than women.
Finally, a positive coe¢ cient to skewness is interpreted as being consistent with evi-
dence of overcondence. If people systematically prefer occupations with a high degree
of skewness (a chance of very high incomes) it may be due unrealistic, strong beliefs in
their own ability.
For the full sample, a negative coe¢ cient to skewness is found. Hence, on average,
there is no evidence of overcondence. The more detailed results with respect to this
behavioral hypothesis are mixed and inconclusive. If anything, men behave somewhat
more overcondently than females. This result match those found from experimental
studies.
It is striking that we in the model for immigrants only can explain 17 per cent compared
to 50 per cent in the other models. Moreover, the coe¢ cient to income is much lower than
in the other conditional logit models. Hence, other important (unobserved) factors, such
as lack of opportunities in the ordinary labor market and non-pecuniary benets may be
much more relevant in explaining their occupational choice. Hence, the low explanatory
power, and the lower coe¢ cient to income points to self-employment being the last resort
due to marginalization in wage-employment. We also nd that non-western immigrants
appear less risk averse. This may be due to marginalization forcing immigrants to accept
insecure and low paid occupations, but it can also be a consequence of cultural di¤erences
in the attitudes towards self-employment.
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5. Conclusions
This paper uses high quality Danish longitudinal register data, to investigate the rela-
tionship between self-employment choice, expected earnings and income uncertainty. We
proceed in the following steps: Firstly, we estimate of conditional earnings functions using
the sample selection model of Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999). Secondly, using measures
for expected income, uncertainty and skewness, we model the occupational choice in a
conditional logit model.
Comparing earnings distributions based on di¤erent income measures, we nd that i)
the dispersion of incomes is in general much larger for the self-employed and ii) Danish
self-employed earn more than wage-employed when retained earnings are included in the
income measure. Contrary to wage-workers, self-employed (taxable) personal income
bunch at kink points in the tax system since self-employed (unlike wage workers) has the
possibility to retain earnings and thereby transfer income across years. The progressive
Danish income tax system provides strong incentives to make such transfers.
Several experimental studies have found that while men are more competitive, women
are more risk averse. In the context of occupational choice, we nd that men put more
emphasis on the income level, while women seem to be more risk-averse. This result is
found to be robust to various sample decompositions.
Linking the behavioral results from the experimental literature with income distribu-
tions in self-employment and wage-employment may explain why fewer women become
self-employed. We nd that part of the gender gap can be explained by gender di¤erences
in the trade-o¤s between income level and the variance of incomes. However, we nd no
e¤ect of skewness of incomes.
Non-western immigrants are overrepresented in self-employment. The occupational
choice model performs considerably worse for this group and we nd smaller e¤ects of
income level and variance. Furthermore, the sample selection model shows that non-
western are more likely to become self-employed even though they should expect a much
lower income in self-employment than native Danes. This suggests that non-western
immigrants are marginalized into self-employment
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6. Appendix
Algorithm 1. Estimation of conditional error-term from the selection equation; E [ntjxnt; dn0; dnt]
(1) For a given set of parameter values 1 = (; ; ) take a draw from rn from
f (nj) = N (0; ) and calculate the likelihood for individual i conditional on
the draw
f (dn; di0jxn;rn) =
TnY
t=1
f (dntjxnt;rn) f (dn0jxnt;rn)
where f (dntjxnt;rn) = ntdnt+(1  nt) (1  dnt) and where nt   (xnt + dnt 1 + rn)
(2) Repeat many times and average the results to obtain the Simulated Log Likelihood
function (SLL)
SLL = ln
1
R
RX
r
f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
(3) Choose MSL1 so that SLL is maximized
(4) Given the MSL estimates from the st stage regression MSL1 , we can easily simu-
late ^nt: Take R draws from f
 
njMSL

and calculate the simulated counterpart
of ^nt
~nt =
1
1
R
PR
r f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
1
R
RX
r
(rn + E [ntjxn; rn]) f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
where E [ntjxn; rn] =
dntnt
nt
-
(1  dnt)nt
1  nt is the cross-sectional generalized resid-
ual for the probit model and where nt   (xnt + dnt 1 + rn)
To improve coverage of the integrals and reduce simulation noise, we use Halton Draws.9
.
9Halton draws provides a superior coverage as it induces negative correlation across individuals. In
the context of discrete choice models, Bhat (2001) found in a Mixed Logit Model, that 100 Halton
draws provided more precise results than 1000 standard pseudo random draw. Train (2003) provide a
comprehensive and excellent treatment of several variance reduction techniques.
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TABLE A.1: MEAN, VARIANCE AND SKEWNESS
(EDUCATIONAL BREAKDOWN)
se we se we se we se we se we se we
Missing education 3,867 29,167 209,691 163,169 35.633 0.049 2.196 0.224 47.9 11.8 6.1 3.9
Primary School Basic school 80,596 657,151 217,842 133,278 35.476 0.037 2.296 0.099 236.9 36.9 25.8 7.5
Secondary school General 4,509 43,962 267,294 166,541 0.660 0.039 3.216 0.223 25.5 2.1 6.9 3.6
Commercial and technical 1,362 12,906 353,176 218,601 1.062 0.100 6.970 0.806 11.9 20.8 6.9 13.1
Vocational training Shop assistents 24,343 345,545 232,634 151,299 2.342 0.034 0.974 0.122 104.9 9.8 5.3 6.2
Building and construction 18,769 113,541 225,676 170,977 0.571 0.024 0.554 0.072 28.6 5.1 7.5 4.4
Metal 17,887 147,347 240,837 177,130 0.219 0.028 0.784 0.075 11.2 19.9 5.7 4.5
Graphic 2,061 18,304 277,758 202,616 3.609 0.029 2.278 0.161 22.1 4.5 7.2 8.3
Technical 2,606 33,878 158,173 129,978 1.342 0.035 1.147 0.097 18.8 14.5 3.0 2.7
Service and transport 10,725 23,617 124,194 131,480 1.225 0.051 0.478 0.095 42.1 22.1 1.7 1.5
Food 20,383 49,809 314,211 170,244 1.155 0.032 0.764 0.091 83.8 5.1 5.3 4.7
Health care 2,254 67,273 138,455 117,762 0.659 0.026 0.896 0.052 14.2 5.2 3.3 1.2
Post secondary Humanities and social sciences 1,576 18,953 185,609 153,600 0.224 0.039 2.013 0.141 2.1 2.5 3.6 4.5
Technical 3,847 32,146 246,378 181,377 0.202 0.040 0.594 0.112 3.7 15.2 3.0 6.7
Agriculture 917 8,504 306,245 157,736 0.218 0.039 0.697 0.066 3.2 5.1 1.1 1.1
Health care 206 10,378 114,543 129,392 1.163 0.024 0.812 0.051 4.5 2.0 0.3 0.9
Police and defence 327 15,524 234,734 202,600 0.194 0.020 0.621 0.079 3.7 6.2 3.2 3.8
Higher education Humanities 3,033 157,352 174,274 156,319 7.537 0.021 0.893 0.054 48.4 2.6 3.1 1.5
short cycle Social sciences 1,780 22,332 491,580 251,898 0.251 0.073 1.292 0.270 3.2 15.7 2.5 3.8
Technical 3,338 40,915 308,715 246,404 0.483 0.041 1.327 0.126 17.3 8.7 8.4 10.5
Health care 1,962 65,014 168,011 137,621 0.095 0.026 0.659 0.057 2.0 2.7 4.8 4.7
Food, agriculture and transport 730 15,661 276,414 216,992 0.883 0.032 2.391 0.073 19.7 2.4 5.1 1.7
BA 469 5,205 336,057 251,710 0.828 0.087 1.234 0.320 8.4 11.9 1.5 2.4
Higher education Humanities 578 22,592 209,513 190,457 0.162 0.038 0.868 0.068 2.3 26.6 1.7 1.5
MA level Natural sciences 159 9,727 226,141 217,852 0.179 0.023 1.104 0.070 2.8 1.2 4.0 3.8
Social sciences 3,589 25,269 476,302 251,683 0.321 0.047 0.778 0.190 19.3 6.9 3.5 5.4
Technical 1,912 18,252 334,441 255,821 0.553 0.048 2.193 0.161 7.1 17.9 10.3 7.0
Food 1,431 5,250 358,845 228,455 0.122 0.024 0.446 0.073 5.8 2.1 7.6 2.4
Health care 7,069 18,412 441,567 260,069 0.074 0.038 0.199 0.085 2.4 13.1 3.0 1.3
# observations
Variance Skewness
Transitory effect Permanent effect Transitory effect Permanent effect
Mean disposable
income
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TABLE A.2: SELECTION EQUATIONS
(RESULTS FROM A BINARY PROBIT WITH RANDOM EFFECTS)
Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.
Lagged dependent, y(t-1) 2.590 0.007 1.415 0.004 2.651 0.010 1.226 0.005
Initial dependent, y(0) 1.962 0.018 1.918 0.010 1.641 0.023 1.540 0.011
Age 0.705 0.071 -0.157 0.044 0.731 0.096 0.974 0.047
Age squared -0.827 0.082 0.067 0.050 -0.822 0.110 -1.231 0.053
Wealth (in mio dkr, 1996 prices) 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.001
No. of children aged 0-6 0.049 0.006 -0.019 0.004 0.049 0.010 -0.098 0.006
No. of children aged 7-17 0.030 0.004 -0.011 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.001 0.003
Married -0.006 0.009 0.112 0.007 -0.047 0.011 0.064 0.007
Immigrant (western) 0.043 0.030 -0.155 0.023 0.132 0.032 -0.159 0.021
Immigrant (non-western) 0.230 0.028 -0.481 0.020 0.124 0.037 -0.529 0.024
Second generation immigrants 0.092 0.084 -0.111 0.070 0.132 0.109 0.037 0.079
Spouse self-employed 0.453 0.013 0.137 0.005 0.399 0.011 0.152 0.005
Regional Copenhagen 0.009 0.017 -0.131 0.012 0.033 0.022 -0.097 0.013
 dummies Large city 0.012 0.016 -0.096 0.012 0.022 0.020 -0.161 0.012
Rural 0.097 0.013 -0.123 0.009 0.120 0.015 -0.197 0.009
Missing education 0.066 0.029 -0.030 0.023 0.152 0.037 -0.109 0.025
Secondary General 0.061 0.026 0.073 0.020 0.133 0.034 0.093 0.022
school Commercial and technical 0.070 0.043 0.153 0.038 0.002 0.070 0.190 0.042
Vocational Shop assistents -0.038 0.014 0.176 0.012 -0.023 0.013 0.155 0.008
training Building and construction -0.025 0.014 0.067 0.011 0.180 0.084 -0.011 0.067
Metal -0.072 0.014 0.152 0.011 0.403 0.139 0.063 0.103
Graphic -0.025 0.036 0.041 0.028 0.252 0.082 -0.182 0.055
Technical -0.010 0.046 0.087 0.033 0.071 0.029 0.000 0.019
Service and transport 0.188 0.041 -0.145 0.032 0.500 0.025 -0.370 0.020
Food 0.175 0.018 -0.156 0.015 0.110 0.057 0.051 0.037
Health care -0.143 0.086 0.418 0.066 -0.099 0.022 0.351 0.013
Post Humanities and social sciences 0.171 0.069 0.007 0.059 0.176 0.036 0.063 0.023
secondary Technical -0.056 0.026 0.191 0.021 0.057 0.054 0.223 0.035
Agriculture -0.050 0.060 0.126 0.047 -0.172 0.084 0.439 0.054
Health care -0.751 0.361 0.478 0.153 -0.204 0.064 0.443 0.038
Police and defence -0.425 0.053 0.763 0.039 -0.422 0.322 0.532 0.122
Higher Humanities -0.365 0.026 0.587 0.018 -0.221 0.019 0.552 0.012
education Social sciences 0.003 0.035 0.256 0.029 -0.097 0.057 0.418 0.037
short cycle Technical -0.048 0.024 0.302 0.019 0.139 0.118 0.073 0.078
Health care 0.153 0.077 0.285 0.065 -0.177 0.024 0.785 0.016
Food, agriculture and transportation -0.258 0.043 0.478 0.033 -0.095 0.114 0.277 0.073
BA 0.043 0.067 0.170 0.054 -0.238 0.189 0.324 0.094
Higher Humanities -0.358 0.047 0.510 0.032 -0.044 0.055 0.297 0.032
education Natural sciences -0.390 0.069 0.616 0.051 -0.221 0.122 0.352 0.065
MA level Social sciences 0.198 0.029 0.073 0.023 0.195 0.051 0.218 0.034
Technical 0.021 0.033 0.264 0.027 0.112 0.101 0.110 0.072
Food 0.223 0.053 0.034 0.042 0.395 0.094 -0.008 0.062
Health care 0.587 0.031 -0.333 0.027 0.563 0.039 0.048 0.029
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.327 0.153 -0.661 0.098 -4.627 0.208 -2.555 0.104
s µ 0.760 0.009 0.838 0.005 0.626 0.011 0.730 0.005
Number of observations 1288888 1288888 1126960 1126960
Number of individuals 136990 136990 122749 122749
Log-likelihood -116985.808 -287641.544 -59297.355 -243222.453
Males Females
Self-employment Wage-employment Self-employment Wage-employment
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TABLE A.3: EARNINGS EQUATIONS
(CORRECTED FOR SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS AND UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY)
Coefficient Std.Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.Coefficient Std.
Age (divided by 10) 0.707 0.030 0.323 0.004 0.282 0.081 0.069 0.005
Age squared (divided by 1000) -0.834 0.034 -0.350 0.005 -0.410 0.092 -0.111 0.005
Married 0.110 0.006 0.063 0.001 -0.285 0.015 -0.101 0.001
Immigrant (western) -0.278 0.031 -0.081 0.006 -0.264 0.062 -0.046 0.006
Immigrant (non-western) -0.608 0.029 -0.187 0.006 -0.543 0.071 -0.065 0.008
Second generation immigrants 0.008 0.086 -0.027 0.014 -0.098 0.230 0.009 0.018
Regional Copenhagen -0.239 0.015 -0.085 0.002 -0.141 0.034 -0.044 0.002
dummies Large city 0.019 0.016 -0.039 0.002 -0.033 0.036 -0.062 0.002
Rural 0.041 0.012 0.014 0.002 -0.072 0.027 -0.042 0.002
Missing education -0.068 0.031 0.086 0.006 -0.098 0.072 0.063 0.007
SecondaryGeneral 0.079 0.029 0.017 0.005 0.093 0.062 0.009 0.005
school Commercial and technical 0.258 0.047 0.238 0.009 -0.056 0.131 0.114 0.010
VocationalShop assistents 0.196 0.016 0.185 0.003 0.107 0.029 0.093 0.002
training Building and construction 0.025 0.015 0.066 0.003 -0.152 0.194 0.052 0.017
Metal 0.071 0.015 0.087 0.003 0.175 0.288 0.101 0.027
Graphic 0.148 0.041 0.223 0.007 0.276 0.172 0.171 0.017
Technical 0.038 0.051 0.042 0.009 -0.113 0.061 0.036 0.005
Service and transport 0.002 0.036 0.084 0.009 -0.013 0.038 -0.028 0.007
Food 0.319 0.016 0.085 0.004 0.182 0.099 0.051 0.008
Health care 0.144 0.112 0.043 0.012 0.049 0.051 0.039 0.003
Post Humanities and social sciences 0.086 0.072 0.209 0.013 0.219 0.067 0.189 0.006
secondary Technical 0.139 0.030 0.178 0.005 0.098 0.121 0.073 0.009
Agriculture 0.316 0.064 0.218 0.013 0.071 0.171 0.135 0.013
Health care 0.141 0.452 -0.021 0.027 -0.044 0.149 0.113 0.009
Police and defence 0.242 0.076 0.208 0.007 0.215 0.755 0.086 0.022
Higher Humanities 0.133 0.040 0.189 0.004 0.122 0.052 0.224 0.003
education Social sciences 0.660 0.041 0.426 0.006 0.443 0.151 0.276 0.008
short cycleTechnical 0.300 0.029 0.401 0.005 0.324 0.207 0.385 0.020
Health care 0.279 0.097 0.180 0.014 0.468 0.058 0.219 0.004
Food, agriculture and transport 0.181 0.061 0.341 0.008 0.299 0.255 0.191 0.017
BA 0.127 0.068 0.314 0.011 0.484 0.313 0.163 0.015
Higher Humanities 0.233 0.080 0.336 0.007 0.247 0.109 0.445 0.007
education Natural sciences 0.354 0.114 0.387 0.009 -0.066 0.378 0.476 0.015
MA level Social sciences 0.773 0.034 0.486 0.006 0.719 0.109 0.476 0.007
Technical 0.376 0.039 0.477 0.007 0.564 0.198 0.435 0.020
Food 0.634 0.054 0.428 0.013 0.613 0.200 0.420 0.023
Health care 0.959 0.028 0.663 0.008 1.257 0.069 0.627 0.010
s aµ -0.062 0.003 -0.112 0.001 -0.024 0.005 -0.076 0.002
s e? -0.012 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.092 0.008 0.013 0.001
Constant 15.109 0.068 15.783 0.010 15.779 0.180 16.323 0.011
Number of observations
Number of individuals
s a
s e
Fraction of variance due to
individual specific error
R-squared 0.230.12 0.20 0.11
Males Females
Self-employment Wage-employment Self-employment Wage-employment
Summary Statistics
168782 1037089 47496 994058
27544 122754 10456 117511
0.6656 0.2929 0.9831 0.3092
0.4557 0.1737 0.5914 0.1869
0.68 0.74 0.73 0.73
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1. Introduction
Over the past couple of decades, a substantial literature on entrepreneurship has de-
veloped. In this literature, the individual decision to become entrepreneur is probably
the issue that has received most attention.
The existing theoretical models explaining the decision to become an entrepreneur
have focused on the importance of: i) individual di¤erences, including di¤erences in risk
aversion (Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979); Cramer and Praag (2001)); di¤erences in proba-
bility assessments (de Meza and Southey (1996)) and di¤erences in entrepreneurial ability
(Brock and Evans (1986); Holmes and Schmitz (1990), and Fonseca, Lopez-Garzia, and
Pissarides (2001)); and ii) institutional features such as tax schemes, set-up costs and
labour market institutions (Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1983); Fonseca, Lopez-Garzia, and
Pissarides (2001); and Malchow-Møller, Markusen, and Skaksen (2005)).
A particular focus, however, has been on the importance of credit constraints and how
these interact with wealth, risk aversion and entrepreneurial ability (Evans and Jovanovic
(1989); Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994); Blanchower and Oswald (1998); and
Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000)).
In the large empirical literature the relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship
has received an equal amount of attention. We can identify at least two competing
explanations for the observed concentration of wealth among entrepreneurs. First, it
may just be due to higher incomes earned by entrepreneurs. Second, it may be that
at least part of it reects that entrepreneurs are selected mainly from richer families
because credit constraints prevent low-wealth individuals from entering entrepreneurship
(see Hurst and Lusardi (2004) for a recent contribution and a critical discussion of this
literature).
From a policy point of view, disentangling the relative powers of these explanations
is extremely important as they have quite di¤erent policy implications. Thus, if credit
constraints are to blame for the observed concentration of wealth, this could potentially
justify intervention in credit markets. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) seek to quantify the
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importance of credit constraints in a static structural model. In this model, liquidity
constraints discourage some people from starting up a business and those who become
entrepreneurs after all use less capital. Individuals with relatively high entrepreneurial
ability are most likely to be credit constrained, since they are assumed to require the
highest level of capital for their businesses. The key empirical nding in Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) is that credit constraints are quantitatively important and have very
large welfare costs.
However, successful policy intervention in this area requires a better understating of
the mechanisms at work here. While previous studies have enhanced our knowledge
about the decision to become entrepreneur, most of this work seems to neglect impor-
tant dynamic/intertemporal aspects of entrepreneurial behavior. One example is the
structural model in Evans and Jovanovic (1989). Since the model is static, it ignores the
possibility of saving to overcome liquidity constraints and the accumulation of entrepre-
neurial human capital. In a dynamic context, high ability individuals facing borrowing
constraints will make an e¤ort to overcome these constraints by saving. This illustrates
the importance of allowing for intertemporal incentives when analyzing entrepreneurial
behavior.
Economic decisions faced by entrepreneurs have long-run implications and intertem-
poral incentives are therefore likely to underlie much of the observed behavior by entre-
preneurs. As an example, decisions to accumulate wealth and to set up a business are
typically founded in expectations about the future. Due consideration of such intertem-
poral aspects is thus crucial for an improved understanding of what makes people become
entrepreneurs, their behavior and in turn the optimal design of policies regarding, e.g.,
bankruptcy laws, business start-up schemes, and public loan guarantees.
In the more recent literature, there has been an increasing recognition of the im-
portance of intertemporal aspects in entrepreneurial decision making. Quadrini (2000) ,
Cagetti and DeNardi (2006) and Buera (2003) have thus developed intertemporal models
of entrepreneurship in the presence of credit constraints. Despite these recent advances in
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entrepreneurship literature, the theoretical understanding of dynamic behavior of entre-
preneurs is still very limited. In terms of analyzing the dynamics of the entrepreneurial
choice, the main limitation of Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and DeNardi (2006) is that
they only analyze the equilibrium around a steady state - not the individual saving and
transition behavior. The model in Buera (2003) generates well dened transition pattern
of individuals moving from wage work to entrepreneurship. However, this model cannot
explain that workers may transit back and forth between wage employment and entre-
preneurship in part because he do not appropriately account for the e¤ects of income
and demand uncertainty.
This paper develops a theory of occupational choice, i.e. the decision to become
entrepreneur, in the presence of credit constraints and set-up costs. It extends the
existing literature to provide a better explanation of observed saving and transition
behavior. This is done by including the e¤ects of income/demand uncertainty, which not
only is an empirically relevant extension, but also a¤ects both wealth accumulation and
transitions, as it may cause entrepreneurs to close down their businesses and return to
wage employment. I end up with an intertemporal model for saving, consumption, human
capital accumulation and occupational choice in the presence of liquidity constraints,
income uncertainty, and set-up/entry costs. More specically, I assume that an innitely
lived individual maximizes a time-separable utility function by each period choosing
between entrepreneurship and wage work, where transitions between occupations are
associated with a cost, and by dividing his resources between consumption, savings
and transition costs. Hence, the model developed explicitly incorporates intertemporal
incentives with respect to both the occupational choice and wealth accumulation and
takes into account that future income is uncertain.
The paper addresses a number of unresolved questions in relation to the dynamic be-
havior of entrepreneurs: i) Can we rationalize observed transition patterns, characterized
by continuous cycling between occupations? ii) How do start-up costs inuence entrepre-
neurial saving incentives and decisions to entry and exit?, iii) What are the implications
of set-up costs for the dynamics of the occupational choice? iv) How are entrepreneurial
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saving incentives and transition patterns a¤ected by the tightness of credit constrains,
and how do these e¤ects vary across individuals with di¤erent levels of entrepreneurial
ability, entrepreneurial human capital, and asset holdings? v) How does human capital
accumulation a¤ect entrepreneurial behavior?
This paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship by delivering a plausible
explanation of observed transition patterns and an improved understanding of the in-
tertemporal incentives. The model is interesting in its own right as it may provide an
explanation for observed transitions between occupations and since it holds quite di¤er-
ent implications for optimal consumption and saving behavior than the existing papers
within the consumption saving literature (see e.g., Caroll (1997) and Deaton (1991)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic decision
problem faced by the individual. In this section, I also give an analytical characterization
of the solution and specify the individual optimization problem as a stochastic dynamic
programming problem. Section 3 presents the numerical solution of a simple version
of the model without human capital accumulation, where I focus on the implications
of entry costs and credit constrains. Section 4 presents numerical solutions of the full
model. In this section, I discuss the implications of two polar cases of human capital
accumulation: i) when accumulation takes place only in entrepreneurship, and ii) when
accumulation takes place only in wage work. Section 5 concludes and discuss directions
for future research.
2. A Dynamic Model of Occupational Choice
2.1. The Model. We begin with a basic framework that builds on the intertemporal
model introduced by Deaton (1991) of saving and consumption under liquidity con-
straints. The new feature is that income is not exogenous, but depends crucially on
wealth and occupational choice.
In each period, individuals choose a level of consumption that maximizes a time-
separable innite-horizon utility function
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Et
 1X
=t
(1 + )t  u (c )
!
where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate, ct is consumption at time t, Et summarizes
expectations given the information available at time t and u () is an instantaneous utility
function dened over current consumption. The instantaneous utility is assumed to be
of the CRRA form: u (c ) = (1  ) 1 c1  , with  > 0
At the end of period t; the individual has assets at and receives income yt. The sum
xt = at+yt, "cash on hand", is then divided between consumption in period t, ct, savings,
st = (1+r)
 1at+1 and possibly costs of switching occupation,  (it; it+1) :Savings, st earn
interest, r, which become assets in the following period.
Hence, the evolution of liquid assets at is governed by
at+1 = (1 + r) (at + yt   ct    (it; it+1))
It is assumed that individuals are liquidity constrained, implying that liquid wealth can
never fall below zero
(2.1) at  0; 8 t
To make the model a model of occupational choice, individuals choose among two mu-
tually exclusive work alternatives: Entrepreneurship, e, or wage-employment, we. Com-
pared to wage work, entrepreneurship is a fundamentally di¤erent occupational choice
with respect to the source of income. Wage-workers inelastically supply one unit of la-
bor at an uncertain market wage,w"wet , where "
we
t summarizes the uncertainty in wage
income and is distributed according to a truncated normal with mean 1 and variance
2we. To ensure a bounded state space, "
we
t is dened on the bounded support ["
we; "we].
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, derive income from production. Hence, the state
dependent income is given by:
yt (it; ht; at; "t (it)) =
8<:  (ht; at; "et) if it = wew"wet if it = w
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where  (ht; at; "et)denotes the entrepreneurs prot function given the level of entrepre-
neurial human capital, ht, liquid assets at and the productivity chock, "et :The chock, "
e
t
and entrepreneurial human capital,ht are assumed to a¤ect the productivity of the entre-
preneur directly, while liquid assets operate indirectly through possibly binding capital
constraints. If entrepreneurs are capital constrained, they must use own wealth to -
nance their investments. Therefore the wealth the of entrepreneur a¤ects the e¢ ciency
scale of the business.
The model also allows for an explicit role for business start-up costs. This feature has
previously been analyzed in Fonseca, Lopez-Garzia, and Pissarides (2001) where a stan-
dard matching model with matching between workers and managers is used to shed light
on the general equilibrium e¤ects of start-up costs on employment and entrepreneurial
activity in the economy. To my knowledge, however, this paper is the rst to provide an
analysis of how entry costs alter the intertemporal incentives that underlie the decision
to become entrepreneur. The transition costs function,  (it; it+1) ; is specied as:
 (it; it+1) =
8>>><>>>:
entry if it = we and it+1 = e
exit if it = e and it+1 = we
0 otherwise
Hence if an individual switches from wage work to entrepreneurship, transition costs
equals entry. Conversely, exit are transition cost associated with closing down a busi-
ness.
The model also has a specic role for human capital accumulation. While previous
(empirical) studies have treated entrepreneurial experience and work experience as ex-
ogenously assigned to individuals, see e.g. Hamilton (2000), in this paper, experience (or
learning by doing) will be treated as a behaviorally determined investment decision. In
the spirit of the human capital literature, see e.g. Ben-Porath (1967), Blinder and Weiss
(1976), and Keane and Wolpin (1997), human capital accumulation is determined jointly
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with occupational choice decisions.1 In the present context, I think of human capital as
being productive only in entrepreneurship, to capture the idea that while individuals
can acquire managerial/entrepreneurial skills in both wage work and entrepreneurship
activities, they are only useful in the latter activity. Entrepreneurial human capital, ht;
is assumed to evolve according to
ht+1 = ht +(it)
where  < 1 is the depreciation rate of experience and (it) is the amount of entrepre-
neurial human capital gained in occupation it
If individuals choose to run their own business, they must devote their entire labor
endowment to operate the business and have to decide how much capital to invest in the
business. As soon as the occupational choice is made, the investment decision is purely
static. Entrepreneurs derive income from the production of a single homogeneous good
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function f (ht; kt) = k
k
t h
h
t "t, dened over
two production factors - entrepreneurial human capital, ht and the amount of capital
invested in the business, kt. Individuals are assumed to di¤er with respect to their initial
level of assets a0 and their entrepreneurial ability, .
Once the investment decision is made, the entrepreneur receives a realization of the
stochastic element of production; "e. The disturbance "" summarizes the uncertainty
in entrepreneurial income. "e is assumed to be independent and identically distributed
with bounded support ["; "], mean, " = 1; and variance, 
2
". As we shall see later, the
assumption about boundedness is necessary to ensure a compact state space.
If kt > at, the entrepreneur is a net borrower and must rent the remaining capital
at a xed interest rate, r. However, in line with Evans and Jovanovic (1989), it is
assumed that entrepreneurs can only borrow up to an amount proportional to the stock
1Keane and Wolpin (1997) study the career decisions of young men in a nite horizon model, where
individuals can choose between schooling, three work alternatives, and retirement. While early contri-
butions for simplicity assumed that human capital is homogeneous, in Keane and Wolpin (1997) skills
are assumed to be occupational specic and their returns vary across occupations.
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of liquid assets at. Letting the factor of proportion being   1,where   1, a potential
entrepreneur faces the credit constraint
(2.2) kt  (  1) at + at, 8 t
or:
kt  at, 8 t
If  = 1, the entrepreneur must nance all activities in the business from the holding of
liquid assets, at, while there are no liquidity constraints when !1.
This assumption can be motivated by an underlying market friction, where loan con-
tracts are imperfectly enforceable. Cagetti and DeNardi (2006) explicitly model this type
market friction, and nd that it generates endogenous entrepreneurial borrowing con-
straints. In this setup, own wealth act as a collateral to reduce the incentive to default:
The larger the amount, the entrepreneur is able to nance from own wealth, the larger
the amount the creditor is able to recover. Therefore, the amount the entrepreneur is
able to borrow increases with liquid asset holdings, at
At the tome when the investment is made, the entrepreneur cannot observe or foretell
the value of the idiosyncratic income chock "et . Thus, the investment decision is taken
conditional on the level of entrepreneurial ability, , human capital, ht, and liquid assets,
at. In each period, the entrepreneur therefore derives his optimal investment by solving
the following maximization problem
(2.3) E" (ht; at; "et ) = max
ktat
(kkt h
h
t   rkt)
At an interior maximum, the rst order condition is
kh
h
t k
k 1
t   r = 0
By the concavity of (2:3), the optimal level of capital can thus be written as
kt = min
(
at;

k
r
hht
1=(1 k))
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For entrepreneurs to be unconstrained we must have
kt < at )
 < (at)
1 k r
kh
h
t
(2.4)
Since marginal productivity of capital is increasing in entrepreneurial ability,  more able
individuals are more likely to be credit constrained.
In sum, the prot function for entrepreneurs can be written as
 (ht; at) = min
(
 (at)
k hht "t   rat ; 

k
r
hht
 k
1 k
hht "t   r

k
r
hht
1=(1 k))
If entrepreneurs are credit constrained, entrepreneurial earnings depend on individual
wealth, t, while earnings is independent of the level of assets if they are not, i.e. if
kt < at.
To summarize: Given current occupation, it, cash on hand, xt and entrepreneurial
human capital, ht and the state dependent income function, yt (it; ht; at; "t (it)) ; individ-
uals optimally choose i) assets to carry over for the following period, at+1 and ii) future
occupation it+1 to maximize a discounted stream of utility.
2.2. Characterization of the Solution. I start by characterizing the solution of the
model by inspecting the rst order conditions for the intertemporal allocation - the
Euler equation. Even though it is not possible to derive a complete analytical solution
for the model, the Euler equation provide a convenient way to characterize some of the
mechanisms in the model - analytically.
Since the occupational choice is discrete, individuals face only one continuous intertem-
poral choice, the savings decision. Therefore we can only derive one state dependent
Euler equation originating from the rst order condition with respect to assets in the
following period, at+1
(2.5)
u0 (ct) =
1 + r
1 + 
Et

u0 (ct+1)

1 +
dyt+1 (it+1; ht+1; at+1; "t+1 (it+1))
dat+1

+ (1 + r)at+1
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where at+1  0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing restriction in
(2:1).
The rst order condition in (2:5) states that in optimum, it should not be possible to
increase utility through a reallocation of consumption via at+1. Hence, marginal utility
of consumption today (the left hand side) should equal the sum of i) the discounted
expected marginal utility consumption in the next period, corrected for the change in
future income due to the change in assets and the di¤erence between the subjective and
the objective discount rate; and ii) the shadow price of the liquidity constraint.
To identify the di¤erent savings motives is important to distinguish between the two
types of borrowing constraints.
(1) The liquidity constraint faced by all individuals, preventing individuals to smooth
consumption perfectly if income uctuations occur.
(2) The credit constraint faced by entrepreneurs with a relatively low level of initial
assets.
In the absence of these borrowing constraints, individuals would smooth out consump-
tion so that discounted expected marginal utility is equalized across time periods. This
results in the well known consumption/income divergence, which can be explained with
essentially the same logic Friedman used long time ago (see Friedman (1957)): consump-
tion does not respond one-for-one to transitory shocks to income because assets are used
to bu¤er consumption against such shocks. This is referred to as the life-cycle saving
motive.
However, in the presence of borrowing constraints, individuals reduce consumption
today to overcome the expected utility loss induced by either of the two borrowing
constraints This leads to two additional saving motives in the model: i) a precautionary
saving motive and ii) a entrepreneurial saving motive2.
2As pointed out in Kimball (1990) a key theoretical requirement to produce precautionary savings is
prudence of the value function, V (x). Formally, Kimball (1990) denes prudence of the value function
as  V 000 (x) =V 00 (x) or equivalently the convexity of the marginal value function at x. The precautionary
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In the present model, u (:) is CRRA, with coe¢ cient  > 1. Thereby, Etu0 (ct+1) 
u0 (ct+1) and therefore individuals reduce consumption today to overcome the expected
utility loss induced by the binding liquidity constraint. In other words, individuals save
to bu¤er against future negative income shocks.
Note that in periods where none of the liquidity constraints are binding at+1 = 0
and kt+1 > at+1 the rst order condition collapses to a standard Euler equation, where
discounted expected marginal utility is equalized over time. However, as pointed out
by Deaton (1991), even when liquidity constraints do not bind in a given period, this
does not imply that the optimal saving policy coincides with the policy function from
the problem without liquidity constraints. The reason is that individuals anticipate
that liquidity constraints could be binding in the future. This illustrates that the Euler
equation is not a su¢ cient condition for optimal behavior. Rather, it puts restrictions
on the allocation of resources between two successive periods.
With respect to the entrepreneurial motive, credit constraints have an additional e¤ect.
Due to the presence of credit constraints, a reallocation of current consumption into
future assets, at+1 adds additionally to future consumption through an expected increase
in future income
dyt+1t (it; ht; at; "t (it))
dat+1
=
8<:
dt(;ht;at;"et )
dat+1
> 0 if it+1 = e and kt+1 = at+1
0 if it+1 = we or kt+1 < at+1
The reason for the additional saving motive is that entrepreneurs who operate at a
suboptimal level of capital due to binding credit constraints can expect an increase
in prots if they save more, d(ht;at+1)
dat+1
> 0. Just like the precautionary motive, if an
individual knows that it will ever be optimal to enter entrepreneurship, this savings
motive is relevant at all times (due to the recursive nature of the rst order condition).
The entrepreneurial saving motive depends crucially on the factor of proportion   
1; at which entrepreneurs can borrow. The following proposition states how saving
incentives are a¤ected by changes in 
motive is present only if individuals are prudent,. i.e. if the marginal value function at xt is convex.
This is the case if the marginal instant utility is convex, i.e. u000 (c) > 0:
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Proposition 1. The entrepreneurial saving motive is a¤ected by  in a non-monotone
way: For small values of , relatively productive individuals with relatively low asset
holdings will increase their savings when  increases. On the other hand, for  large
enough, i.e. when credit constraints become less binding, the expected return to increased
savings approaches zero.
Proof. See appendix 
The intuition behind proposition 1 goes as follows: Initially, as  increases some highly
productive individuals will nd it optimal to save more as the perspectives for (future)
entrepreneurship becomes better. As  is further increased, credit constraints eventually
become irrelevant, thereby lowering the incentive to save.
Proposition 1 has important implications for the understanding the e¤ect of changes
in credit policy, e.g. government loan guaranties. According to proposition 1, relatively
productive individuals will increase savings, while less productive individuals decrease
savings. On the one hand, this kind of policy will increase wealth inequality in the econ-
omy and could be associated with increased probability of default. On the other hand,
increasing  also increases the probability of entry relatively more for productive indi-
viduals - due to the increased willingness to use savings to overcome credit constraints.
2.3. The Dynamic Programming Problem. In specifying this as a dynamic pro-
gramming problem, note that the state variables xt; st; ht summarize all information
about the past that bears on current and future decisions. Since yt is assumed to be
iid distributed conditional of ht; at and it, only the sum xt = at + yt "cash on hand" is
relevant for current and future saving decisions and occupational choice. Note also that
the problem is stationary in the sense that optimal choices do not depend on time per se.
Hence, time subscripts can be dropped. To discriminate between the current and future
periods, I therefore denote next period variables with a prime. The resulting Bellman
equation can thus be formulated as
(2.6) V (x; h; i) = max
i0;a02(x;i;h)
u (x; i; a0; i0) + Et [V (x0; h0; i0) jx; h; i]
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where Et summarizes expectations give the information available at the time the decision
is made and the value function,V (x; h; i) ; is the maximum expected discounted utility
obtainable by the agent in the given state (x; h; i). The Bellman equation express the
recursive relationship between the value function in the current period, V (x; h; i), current
utility, u (x; i; a0; i0), and expectations over the value function in the following period,
Et [V (x
0; h0; i0) jx; h; i]. Hence, individuals choose i0; a0 2  (x; i; h) to maximize the sum
of current utility and discounted expected future utility.
Current utility is
(2.7) u (x; i; a0; i0) = u
 
x  (1 + r) 1 a0    (i; i0)
and  (x; i; h) : S! D is a correspondence that summarizes the feasible choice set
(2.8)  (x; i; h) =
8>>><>>>:(a
0; i0) 2 D :
0  a0  (1 + r) (x   (i; i0))
h0 = h+(i)
i0 2 I = fe; weg
9>>>=>>>;
To make notation a bit more compact, let D denote the set of controls and let S denote
the state space, such that
(2.9)
d = (a; i) 2 D
s = (h; x; i) 2 S
Furthermore,  (s)  D is the non-epmty set of feasible controls that summarizes the
contingent constraints on the controls d0 in state s and u : S D ! R is the current
pay-o¤ function in given the current state s 2 S and given the control d0 2 D is applied
in the following period. Finally let f (s0js; d0) be the probability density that s0 2 S, i.e.
the conditional density that future state s0 occurs given current state and control d0. We
can now express the innite horizon, discounted, time separable dynamic programming
problem in more compact notation
V (s) = sup
d02(s)
u (s; d0) + 
Z
V (s0) f (s0js; d0) ds0
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Solving the model is equivalent to nding a xed point of the Bellman equation (2.6).
Under certain conditions, a unique solution exists and successive iterations on the Bell-
man equation will guarantee global convergence to this solution. Roughly speaking,
these condition will be met if the subjective discount factor is less than unity,  < 1, the
state space, S is a compact set and the value function is bounded on this set.
I start by formulating two propositions, stating that is possible to restrict attention
to a compact subset of the state space S3.
Proposition 2. There exists hhigh < 1 such that if ht  hhigh then h0 satises h0 
hhigh
Proof. See appendix. 
In other words, there exists an upper level of h, where the depreciation of experience
exceeds the human capital gain in any occupation. Therefore ht is bounded above.
Proposition 3. Given h  hhigh where hhigh satises the proposition 2, there exists an
ahigh <1 such that if a  ahigh then the optimal choice of a0 satises a0  ahigh
Proof. See appendix. 
Hence, there exists some (nite) upper level of assets, ahigh; where individuals who for
some reason own more than this level, will stop saving.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 goes as follows: Since marginal productivity of
capital is decreasing and since shocks to production has bounded support, marginal
returns to savings will approach the interest rate, r as a increases, and earnings, y will
be bounded from above and below. Since individuals are impatient, in the sense that
 > r, for a large enough, it will be optimal to stop saving as the life-cycle motive will
dominate both precautionary and entrepreneurial saving motives.
3The compactness of state space for the discrete occupational choice it is trivial as it can only take
two values.
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We are now ready to formulate conditions that guarantee that the considered dynamic
programming has the contraction mapping property. I formalize this in the following
proposition which is stated without a formal proof
Proposition 4. Let S be dened by (2:9) with values of hhigh and ahigh satisfying propo-
sitions (2) and (3). Let u : S D! R and  : S! D be given by (2:7) and (2:8) respec-
tively. Furthermore, let f (s0js; d0) = f (x0js; d0) be a continuous density function dened
on a bounded support [xlow; xhigh] such that clow = xlow   (1 + r) 1 ahigh    (i; i0) > 0.
Then the mapping dened by
(2.10)   (V ) (s)  sup
d02(s)
u (s; d0) + 
Z
V (s0) f (s0js; d0) ds0
is a contraction mapping   : B ! B taking a complete normed vector space (i.e. a
Banach space) of functions from S ! R. The nonlinear operator   has a unique xed
point V =   (V ) and for any V0 2 B
(2.11)
 kV0   V   k kV0   V k ; k = 1; 2; :::
Under the conditions stated in the proposition above, the dynamic programming prob-
lem has a unique xed point and successive value function iterations will converge to the
unique solution.
As mentioned, a rigorous proof will not be given here. Instead I will try to give an
intuitive reasoning: First, u is bounded from below as long as c = x   (1 + r) 1 a0  
 (i; i0) > 0 and bounded above if s = (h; x; i) 2 S is bounded. With values of hhigh and
ahigh satisfying propositions (2) and (3), it is necessarily the case that s = (x; h; i) stays
within a compact set. Secondly, since the continuous density f (x0js; d0) has bounded
support [xlow; xhigh] with xlow = ylow > 0; consumption can always be sustained above
zero.
I.e. for all values of x 2 [xlow; xhigh] it is always feasible to chose a0 such that c > 0 and
consequently u is bounded from above and below and the integral
R
V (s0) f (s0js; d0) ds0
is therefore well-dened. Third, the correspondence  (s)  D is non-epmty and com-
pact valued. Finally, the e¤ective discount factor is below one  = 1= (1 + ) < 1 (by
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assumption). To get the intuition clear: it is necessary to bound the support of the dis-
tribution of the disturbance, " from below such that income, and thereby consumption,
are bounded from below too. Otherwise the expectation of the value function may not
be well-dened. Under these assumptions plus some regularity conditions, it follows that
  satises the contraction mapping theorem, see Stokey and Lucas (1989)4
To solve the model, we have to nd a xed point of the functional equation in (2.6).
I use chebyshecv polynomials to represent the value function over the continuous state
space. Since the value function has discontinuous rst derivatives in the swiching point,
I use piecewise Chebyshev polynomials to approximate the value function with an edoge-
nously determined join point at the kink of the value function. The use of Chebyshev
polynomials to approximate the value function has one important spin-o¤. Once the
model has been solved, Chebyshev approximation of the value function can be utilized
to express the policy function in any point of the state space, at almost zero computa-
tional cost. .
In line with Rust (1987) a combination of successive contraction iterations and the
Newton-Kantorowich algorithm will be used. While contraction iterations guarantee
convergence due to the contraction mapping property, the procedure slows down when
the approximation errors kVk   V k become small.5 In contrast, Newton-Kantorowich it-
erations are not guaranteed to converge, but converge in a quadratic rate in the neighbor-
hood of the solution6. The resulting xed point algorithm known as the poly-algorithm,
4It actually turns out that one of the conditions is violated in the present context. Since one of
the state variables is discrete, the requirement that the state space is a convex set - is obviously not
satised. However, the conditions stated in Stokey and Lucas (1989) are su¢ cient conditions and thus
too restrictive in the present model. A more general version of the theorem is available in Denardo
(1967)
5It follows directly from equation (2:11) in proposition 4 that the upper bound on the approximation
error  kVk   V k dcreases linearily in kVk   V k (making convergence particular slow for  close to 1).
6Kantorovichs Theorem guarantees that given a starting point V0 in a domain of attraction of the
xed point V of   the Newton Kantorovich iterations will converge to V at a quadratic rate (see Rust
(1996))
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Table 1. Baseline Parameter Values
r    h k e"  w 
we
"   
exit entry
0:04 1:5 0:07 0:8 0 0:33 0:3 1 1 0:1     0 0
combines these two algorithms in order to balance robustness versus speed of conver-
gence.
3. Numerical Results - The case without Human Capital Accumulation
In this section, I present numerical solutions of the model. For the purpose of exposi-
tion, I will rst consider a simpler version of the model where I assume that (i) = 0
and ht = 1. The model without human capital accumulation will serve as a useful start-
ing point, when explaining some of the key features of the model: In particular, I will
discuss: i) how highly productive potential entrepreneurs can use savings to overcome
binding liquidity constraints; ii) how entry and exit costs a¤ects savings decisions and
the transition between the two occupations; and iii) how individuals depending on their
initial wealth and entrepreneurial productivity approach two di¤erent equilibria in the
long run.
3.1. Baseline Calibration. Rather than trying to calibrate the model to observed
data in order to give quantitative predictions about behavior, the baseline parameters
are chosen to identify the mechanisms of the model. The baseline values used in the
numerical simulations are listed in Table 3.1.
Utility parameters: The rst two parameters will be set with little controversy. Taking
the time period to be one year, I let the real interest rate of r = 0:05 reect the average
market return to wealth. I choose  = 1:5 as a reasonable value of the the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (see e.g. Caroll (1997) and Deaton (1991)). Due
to the functional form of the instantaneous utility function, the relative risk aversion and
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the intertemporal rate of substitution are inversely related.7 A choice of  = 1:5 therefore
implies that agents are risk averse and slightly prudent - which seems empirically sensible.
Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2004) estimate individual risk attitudes using controlled
eld experiments in Denmark. Their results indicate that the average Dane is risk averse,
and that risk neutrality is an inappropriate assumption to apply. They also nd that
risk attitudes vary signicantly in the population roughly within a range of  2 [0; 2].
I set the time preference rate  = 0:07 to be larger than the real interest rate to
reect relatively impatient agents. In the empirical savings literature, the rate of time
preference has been estimated much higher. This also applies for the recent literature on
experimental economics: Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) estimate annual individual
discount rates with respect to time to be around 0:258. Deaton (1991) used  = 0:1 in
the simulations of his model. Quadrini (2000) used  = 0:9 in a dynamic model with
entrepreneurial savings calibrated to the US wealth distribution. However, if  is very
high relative to r agents become very impatient and the incentives to accumulate assets
will be almost zero. Therefore, in order to better illustrate the savings incentives in the
model, I set  = 0:07.
Income parameters: For convenience, mean wages are normalized to one, w = 1 with
a standard deviation of we" = 0:1. I set 
k = 0:33 approximately equal to the structural
estimates of return to capital in Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and e" = 0:3 is chosen in
7Note that this is only the case if we think of households preferences over consumption gambles
in a static context. This interpretation of  has been subject to much criticism (see e.g. Flavin and
Nakagawa (2005)) In a dynamic context, it is more relevant to think of relative risk aversion as the
change in the curvature of the value function, i.e.
RRA =
@2V (x; h) =@x2
@V (x; h) =@x
x > 0
Because the households degree of risk aversion depends on the curvature of the value function, behavior
towards income risks will not only depend on the curvature of the instantaneous utility function - also
the state variables. In particular, very wealthy individuals will tend to be less risk averse. Therefore 
is sometimes referred to as the curvature parameter.
8These estimates may reect attitudes to risk also.
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accordance with their structural estimates of the dispersion in entrepreneurial earnings.
Contrary to the estimates of Evans and Jovanovic (1989), I choose we" < 
e
" to reect
the very compressed wage structure in Denmark (see e.g. Malchow-Møller, Markusen,
and Skaksen (2005)).
Framework conditions: In the baseline scenario, I set  = 1 to reect binding credit
constraints. Hence it is not possible to borrow any funds for starting up a business.
Entry and exit costs are set equal to zero, entry = exit = 0. In what follows, we shall
see how changes in these parameters inuence savings incentives, occupational choice,
income etc.
Figure 1 displays the numerical solution of the value function in the baseline scenario.
Two vertical lines mark two threshold levels of cash on hand: The leftmost line marks
the reservation value of cash on hand, xr, where individuals will choose to enter entre-
preneurship. The rightmost line marks the level of cash on hands where entrepreneurs
will be unconstrained, xu. To the right of this line, the real interest rate would exceed
the marginal product of capital - if all available funds were invested.
It should be apparent from Figure 1, that the value function, does not display the
standard properties of concavity and di¤erentiability. The value function is the upper
envelope of two underlying value functions associated with each of the two occupa-
tional choices. In the crossing point, the indi¤erent individual switches occupation. The
convexity around the kink of the value function is induced by the introduction of the
investment opportunities in the model. This investment option ads an extra component
to the marginal returns to savings and therefore individuals facing this option will have
an entrepreneurial saving motive.
As we have discussed earlier, the value function has a kink in the crossing point. This
is precisely what makes the model solution nontrivial and what causes the Chebyshev
approximation method to perform poorly. Therefore I use piecewise Chebyshev poly-
nomials with a single join point in xr, which is continuously updated at each iteration.
This e¤ectively avoids numerically unstable and imprecise solutions with occilirations in
the policy functions and occasionally breakdowns in algorithm.
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Figure 1. Value Function
3.1.1. Policy functions. Figure 2 present the policy function for optimal consumption.
Again, the two vertical lines mark the threshold values xr and xu. Starting from the left,
we see that consumption equals cash on hands as long as liquidity constraints are binding
i.e. at+1 = 0. The individual would actually like to consume more today at the expense
of tomorrows consumption. But since liquid assets can never fall below zero, this is
impossible. Due to the precautionary savings motive, the consumption policy function
starts to bend o¤ in a slightly concave way around xt = 1. The segment below x = 1:5 on
the policy function coincides with the saving behavior implied by the model in Deaton
(1991): Precautionary saving arises from the possibility that constraints might bind
in the future. Therefore individuals use precautionary savings as an insurance against
future negative shocks.
At some point, before the switching point, xr, optimal consumption drops signicantly:
Individuals with this level of cash on hands starts to save to become entrepreneurs. In the
absence of credit constraints, these individuals would have been entrepreneurs (In fact all
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Figure 2. Optimal Consumption
individuals would be entrepreneurs at the baseline parameter values). Instead, they use
savings to overcome binding liquidity constraints thereby seeking opportunities for higher
future income. At the point where the individual chooses to enter entrepreneurship, the
consumption policy function drops discretely to a local minimum. Since the entrepreneur
is credit constrained and therefore have to operate at a suboptimal level of capital, the
e¤ective return to savings will exceed the market interest rate. Therefore, the individual
will save more and consume less.
Figure 3 displays the relationship between wealth (cash on hand) and expected future
gross income, E [yt+1jxt]+rat+1 which is the sum of expected earnings in the next period
and interest on liquid assets. The individual earns the xed wage, w = 1 until he chooses
to become entrepreneur at the switching point, xr. For low values of xt; individuals are
liquidity constrained, and will therefore not save any assets for the following period, i.e.
at+1 = 0. Hence, expected future gross earnings equals w = 1. Hereafter, individuals
rst start to save for precautionary reasons (around xt = 1), then for entrepreneurial
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Figure 3. Expected Future Gross Income
reasons (around xt = 1:8). Correspondingly, asset returns, rat+1 starts to increase. Be-
tween the two vertical lines, i.e. when xt 2 [xr; xu] the entrepreneur is credit constrained
and operates at a suboptimal level of capital. As we move towards xu; the business be-
comes more capital intensive and the marginal product drops until the business reaches
its unconstrained scale, where marginal product equals the real interest rate. Below the
point xu, entrepreneurs chose to invest all available assets in their business, therefore
entrepreneurial earnings increase with cash on hand until the entrepreneur is uncon-
strained with respect to capital, i.e. when xt = xu. At this point, the entrepreneur is
able to self-nance the investments needed to operate the business at the optimal scale
and entrepreneurial income (net of interest) is independent of cash on hands.
3.1.2. Simulated Sequences. Using the same set of baseline parameter values, stochastic
model simulations are used to characterize the evolution of the state dependent variables:
liquid assets, consumption and gross income. In order to characterize individual saving
incentives, rst note that there exists a threshold level of cash on hand, such that the
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Figure 4. Simulations of ct; yt + rt and t; a0 = 0:5
individuals with cash below this threshold, xt < xns 2 [0; xr] will not save to become
entrepreneurs. Unless a sequence of unanticipated positive income chocks occurs, these
individuals will instead follow a path that converges to a stationary equilibrium, where
the individual remains a wage worker and keeps small levels of precautionary savings
as a bu¤er against negative income shocks. Thus, the entrepreneurial saving motive is
dominated by the incentive to smooth consumption over time and relative impatience
induced by the relatively high discounting of utility,  > r.
Individuals with cash on hand above this level, i.e. xt  xns, expect to become
entrepreneurs at some point in their carrier. Depending on their current level of available
funds, these individual will either save or dis-save to reach an equilibrium level of cash
on hands, xss 2 [xns; x] where they will stop saving.
To illustrate how the evolution in individual income, wealth and consumption are
a¤ected by the level of initial assets, I simulate sequences of these variables for two
di¤erent levels of initial assets. The sequences are displayed in Figures 4 and 5.
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Consider rst the sequences displayed in Figure 4. The individual enters the labor
market as wage worker with a relatively low level of initial assets, a0 = 0:5. These initial
conditions result in a realized level of cash on hands below the threshold, xns. Hence,
rather than saving to become entrepreneur, this individual nd it optimal to remain
a wage worker unless an unanticipated sequence of positive income chocks is realized.
After a couple of periods, the simulated sequence of at has decreased to the stationary
equilibrium, where precautionary savings are used as a bu¤er against negative income
chocks. This individual behaves very much like the consumers in Deaton (1991). Hence,
the following characteristics apply: First, consumption is notably smoother than income.
Secondly, the downward spikes in consumption when liquid wealth stock-outs occur,
are generally larger that the corresponding upward peaks. Consumption is therefore
asymmetric, in the sense that mainly negative shocks are transmitted into consumption,
whereas savings are used to smooth out positive shocks.
The displayed sequences in Figure 5 are associated with an individual entering the
labor market as a wage worker with an intermediate level of initial wealth, a0 = 0:75.
Several things are worth noting. First, wage workers with an intermediate level of cash on
hands, xt 2 [xns; xu] will have to save for several periods before entry to entrepreneurship
is protable. In fact, the wage worker associated with the simulated sequence in Figure
5 does not enter entrepreneurship until after seven periods of wage work. Hereafter,
the entrepreneur keeps saving until the entrepreneurial saving motive is dominated by
impatience, i.e. the incentive to smooth consumption over the life-time.
Secondly, as the business becomes more protable, consumption increases gradually
over time to reach a higher equilibrium level.
Third, despite a very uctuating entrepreneurial income, consumption is remarkably
smoother for entrepreneurs than for wage-workers due to the higher stock of assets. This
is due to the simplifying assumption that investments undertaken by the entrepreneur
are fully reversible. Since invested assets are perfectly liquid, savings have a dual role:
As working capital and to smooth out consumption.
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Figure 5. Simulations of ct; yt + rt and t; a0 = 0:75
This is opposed to Fafchamps and Pender (1997), where poor households fail to un-
dertake a protable investment that they could, in principle, self-nance because non-
divisibility and irreversibility of the investment put it out of their reach. In the literature
of investment under uncertainty, (see Dixit and Pendyck (1994)) it is emphasized that
uncertainty works to decrease investments when investments are irreversible. I expect
similar results would be found in this paper if entrepreneurial investments were (partly)
irreversible. I.e. entrepreneurs would postpone some of the investments in the business
and keep a bu¤er of liquid assets to smooth out consumption. In that sense, the combi-
nation of irreversibility and uncertainty introduces a value of waiting. A specic analysis
of this phenomenon would require an additional state variable (invested capital) and is
therefore not pursued here.
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3.1.3. Transition Patterns. The model also generates well-dened transition patterns
between entrepreneurship and ordinary wage work. To illustrate this aspect of the dy-
namics in the occupational choice, consider a population of individuals who enter the
labor market as wage workers at an intermediate level of individual wealth, a0 = 0:75.
Initially, these individuals will start saving to become entrepreneurs. Depending on
the realized sequence of stochastic wages, some will fall into a poverty trapand remain
wage workers; others will save and enter entrepreneurship within a couple of periods. As
soon as they become entrepreneurs, they accumulate capital to make the business more
protable and more resistant to negative shocks. Hence, individuals cyclebetween the
two occupational alternatives until they either fall into a poverty trap or accumulate
enough assets to run a protable business.
The implied transition behavior for these initially homogeneous agents can be analyzed
by inspecting the occupational specic hazard functions displayed in Figure 6. The
hazard functions are calculated as follows: The conditional probability that an individual
exits a given initial state after a duration of  periods, given  periods of survival. Hence,
the hazard function by construction will sum to one over  .
Consider rst the hazard out of entrepreneurship (the solid curve). Since, all indi-
viduals are initially wage workers saving to become entrepreneurs, the hazard function
for entrepreneurs, is based on individuals that voluntarily entered entrepreneurship with
a relatively low level of assets. Depending on the realized sequence of stochastic pro-
duction shocks, some individuals will succeed in accumulating enough capital to resist
negative shocks to production. In addition to the primary function as working capital,
these assets serve as a bu¤er stock against the poverty trap. Therefore, the probability
of exit to wage work will decrease with duration in entrepreneurship, i.e. the hazard
function exhibits true negative duration dependence.
Now turn to the hazard function for wage workers (the dashed curve). Individuals
who enter entrepreneurship will on average need 3 or 4 periods in wage employment to
accumulate enough assets to start a business. If a wage worker receives a poor sequence
of incomes for a longer period, available cash on hands falls below the threshold where it
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Figure 6. Simulated Hazard Functions, 0 = 0:75
is no longer optimal to save to become an entrepreneur. Therefore, the exit probability
decreases with duration. Note also that some individuals who re-entry wage work after
a short duration in entrepreneurship, will relatively quickly re-exit to entrepreneurship9.
Therefore an increased concentration around  = 1:
One important insight from the baseline scenario is that some individuals who expect
to become entrepreneurs in the future, will save for several periods and accumulate a
considerable amount of assets. As a back drop, note that precautionary savings models
in Deaton (1991) and Caroll (1997) suggest that higher income uncertainty should lead
to a higher level of precautionary savings. Previous authors has used this feature of the
model to identify the level of precautionary savings from the cross sectional correlation
between income risk measures and wealth holdings, in order to quantify the importance
9Of course, this is not immediately evident from the hazard function. However, as closer inspection
of the simulated sequence reveals this pattern
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of precautionary savings (see Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a survey of empirical ap-
plications of the intertemporal consumption model). The conclusions from these studies
are very heterogeneous and consensus on the importance of precautionary savings has
not yet been reached. For example, based on PSID data, Caroll and Samwick (1998)
nd that precautionary savings can account for as much as 40 pct. of the total wealth
accumulation, while others nd limited or no evidence for precautionary savings. As
pointed out by Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell, and Torrealba (2005), the observed corre-
lation between wealth and income risk is spurious: Since entrepreneurs generally face
higher income risks and may hold larger proportions of wealth for other reasons than
precautionary savings, the correlation between wealth and income risk are simply an
artifact of pooling together wage workers and entrepreneurs. In fact, controlling for en-
trepreneurial status, Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell, and Torrealba (2005) nd much lower
levels of precautionary savings.
The results in this paper highlights the importance of conditioning on occupational
status as entrepreneurial savings may constitute a signicant share of total wealth for
entrepreneurs. However, as we have seen potential entrepreneurs will start to save sev-
eral periods prior to entry. Therefore, not only the current occupation is important for
wealth accumulation also expected future occupations. Hence to mitigate a potential
heterogeneity bias, we must appropriately control for expectations about future occupa-
tions too. Since these expectations are generally unobserved (and time varying), such
conditioning is in general very di¢ cult. Hence, to appropriately account for the compo-
sition of household savings, a full structural estimation of the present model can be a
useful and perhaps necessary identication strategy.
3.2. The Case with Business Start-up Costs. The purpose of this section is to study
how the presence of start up costs inuence occupational choice and saving incentives.
Figure 7 displays the numerical solution of the value function under the following model
specication: Wage-workers deciding to become entrepreneurs incur an entry cost in the
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Figure 7. Value Function, entry = 0:2
order of 20 pct, of expected wage income, i.e. entry = 0:2. The parameters of the model
are otherwise identical to the baseline specication.
To analyze the impact of entry cost, it is instructive to provide a few comparative
remarks: First, in absence of transition costs (and human capital accumulation), wage
workers and entrepreneurs with the same values of cash on hand; face the exact same
future opportunities. Since, the state variable xt, summarizes all information about the
past that bears on current and future decisions, only the variable xt is relevant for current
and future saving decisions and occupational choices. Therefore, the value functions for
wage-workers and entrepreneurs are identical equal in the absence of transition costs.
Contrary to this, in the presence of start up costs, the value function is specic to the
current occupation. In the following remark an important implication of this nding is
formulated
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Remark 1. A sequence of occupational choices will not exhibit true state dependence
unless transition costs exist. Hence, in the absence of transition costs, choosing a
given occupation today, does not alter conditional choice probabilities in the future, i.e.
P (it+1; xt+1jxt; it) = P (it+1; xt+1jxt)
Not only is the reservation value of cash on hand, xr higher for wage workers compared
to entrepreneurs, xwer > x
e
r. The di¤erence is larger than the entry cost, i.e. x
we
r   xer >
entry = 0:2. The explanation of this phenomenon is two-fold: In order to avoid losing
invested entry costs, wage workers will postpone entry until they have accumulated
enough assets to resist negative production chocks. Entrepreneurs, however, are willing
to postpone exit to avoid paying the entry cost associated with potential re-entry to
entrepreneurship. Consequently, being an entrepreneur represents an option value in
terms of a wait-and-see option. If entry costs are large, the value of this option is
important enough to make entrepreneurs willing to accept temporary income losses to
keep their position and mitigate expected future entry payments. Therefore, compared
to the case of no entry costs the reservation values xer decreases. I summarize these
ndings, in the follow in remark
Remark 2. In the presence of entry costs, we will se later entry and later exit. Due to
the indivisibility and irreversibility of the entry costs, wage workers wish postpone invest-
ments in a business, whereas entrepreneurs are willing to cut consumption temporarily
to keep their position as entrepreneurs. The combination of irreversibility, indivisibility
and uncertainty introduces a value of waiting.10
Figures 8 and 9 displays the policy function for consumption and the implied expected
future gross income, E (yt+1) + rat+1. Notice that the policy function for wage workers
and entrepreneurs coincide for xt < xer. Regardless of the current occupation, the deci-
sion maker knows that he will be wage worker in the following period. Therefore, the
10This results is a common nd in models of investment under uncertainty; see e.g., Dixit and Pendyck
(1994), Fafchamps and Pender (1997), and Malchow-Møller and Thorsen (2005).
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Figure 8. Optimal Consumption, entry = 0:2
same saving motives apply in both occupations and thus the division of cash on hand be-
tween savings and consumption is with equally identical. At xt = xer consumption drops
discretely for entrepreneurs. In fact, entrepreneurs are willing to reduce consumption
with 0:34 to maintain the business (corresponding to 34 pct of expected annual income
as a wage worker or 70 pct more than the start-up cost)
The discontinuity in the policy function is due to the fact that the return to sav-
ing changes discretely at the switching point, xer. If xt > x
e
r entrepreneurs know
with certainty that they will be entrepreneurial the following period too. Therefore
dyt+1=dat+1 = dt+1=dat+1 > 0. If, on the other hand, xt < xer, they will exit entrepre-
neurship and become wage workers, dyt+1=dat+1 = 0 for xt < xer.
Contrary to entrepreneurs, consumption decreases smoothly for wage workers right
before the switching point xwer . As xt approaches x
we
r the probability of future entry
increases. Therefore, expected future returns to savings increase gradually. This is not
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Figure 9. Expected Future Gross Income, entry = 0:2
the case for entrepreneurs with xt 2 [xer; xwer ], since the entrepreneur knows with certainty
that he will be an entrepreneur in the following period.
Again, it is evident from the consumption function for both entrepreneurs and wage
workers, that saving incentives are very strong when xt > xer. In fact, the more liquid-
ity constrained, the stronger the saving incentive. Note nally that entrepreneurs can
consume more, since they have paid the entry cost already. Therefore, as xt increases,
the two policy functions converges due to increased ability to smooth out the entry cost
over several periods.
To summarize how start up costs inuence saving incentives and aspects of occupa-
tional choice, I formulate the following remark:
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Figure 10. Simulated Hazard Function,  = 0:2 and a0 = 1:25
Remark 3. Start up costs give an extra savings motive when credit constraints are
binding: Wage workers who expect to enter entrepreneurship save to overcome entry-
costs and the corresponding risk associated with entry. Entrepreneurs save to maintain
their position as entrepreneurs to avoid potential costs associated with later re-entry.
Figure 10 shows occupational specic hazard functions, for a population of individu-
als who enter the labor market as wage workers at an intermediate level of individual
wealth, a0 = 1:25 2 [xns; xewe]11. The presence of entry cost alters the transition pat-
terns between entrepreneurship and ordinary wage work fundamentally: Due to start
up costs, individuals will never enter entrepreneurship if there is a signicant risk that
they will not be able to maintain their business in the following periods. Therefore, the
11The hazard is not directly comparable with the hazard from the previous section, since two di¤erent
populations are considered. Due to increased reservation values for wage workers, xwer , none of the
wage workers from the previous simulation would ever enter entrepreneurship. Therefore we consider a
di¤erent population with a higher level of cash on hand.
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hazard initially increases with duration. This nding has two immediate implications
for empirical analysis
Remark 4. The transition pattern depends signicantly on the type of the agent, whether
he faces credit constraints or not, whether he faces transitions cost etc. This suggests
that estimation procedures in duration analysis should incorporate lots of heterogeneity.
Not only in the intercept or scale of the hazard, but also the shape.
Remark 5. Entrepreneurial hazard functions which are initially increasing followed by
negative duration dependence are consistent with the presence of start-up costs or any
other phenomenon, that generates an option value for the entrepreneur.
Jørgensen (2005) provide a careful duration analysis of Danish start-ups. Using a large
and comprehensive longitudinal rm database, he is able to identify all new start-up rms
in 1994 and 1998 and the entrepreneur bind the rm. After carefully conditioning rm-
and individual level characteristics, he nd quite robust evidence that the hazard out
of entrepreneurship, is initially increasing followed by a downward sloping hazard. As
predicted by the model, these results are consistent with the existence of start-up cost.
4. Numerical Results - Entrepreneurial Human Capital Model
Until now we have we have treated entrepreneurial human ability as exogenously
assigned to individuals and constant through time. In this section, however, I study
how intertemporal incentives are altered when individuals accumulate entrepreneurial
human capital. We shall consider two extreme cases: In the st case, ht is assumed
to measure pure entrepreneurial experience. Each period, the entrepreneur gains one
unit of entrepreneurial human capital while wage workers gain enough human capital
to precisely o¤set the depreciation in human capital, when ht = 1, i.e. (e) = 1 and
(we) = 1 .12 Since individuals accumulate entrepreneurial human capital only when
they are entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial experience (or learning by doing) is treated as a
12This is done for numerical convenience: Since the assumption ensures that ht can never fall below
1, we can restrict attention to a compact subset of the states pace, hi 2 [1; 1= (1  )].
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behaviorally determined investment decision: Some individuals may nd it optimal to
incur a temporary income loss in exchange for increased future returns to their business.
At the other extreme, ht measures pure work experience such that productivity is
assumed only to increase during wage work, i.e. (we) = 1 and (e) = 1  . Knowl-
edge spill-overs are thus assumed to be more important within rms than between rms.
Admittedly, this assumptions is somewhat stylized, but it captures the idea that people
learn more by working with and for other people.
When human capital accumulation does not di¤er across occupations, i.e. when
(we) =  (e), human capital, ht, is deterministic. Thereby, ht is exogenous in the
sense, that the occupational choice does not alter human capital accumulation. The
implications of the model under this parametrization are not very di¤erent from the case
without human capital accumulation, except that the hazard out of entrepreneurship
exhibits a higher degree of negative duration dependence due to the trending produc-
tivity. When duration in entrepreneurship increases, productivity increases as well. But
not due to duration in entrepreneurship, due to the course of time. Since the primary
focus of this section is how saving and occupational choice is altered by human capital
investment, I will not pursue the case of deterministic accumulation any further
The rest of the parameter values are chosen to be similar to the baseline parameters in
the simple model with no transition costs, although with a few modications. I let h =
0:06 such that the expected increase in productivity is 6 pct. for a percentage increase in
ht. I let  = 0:95, i.e. ht depreciates with 5 pct. each period. I choose  = 0:80 such that
the limit of haht approximately equals the baseline parameter value of  in the simple
model without human capital accumulation, i.e. max =  [maxi ( (i)) = (1  )]k =
0:96. The baseline parameter values used in the numerical simulations of the human
capital model are listed in Table 4
4.1. Learning by doing. Consider rst the scenario where individuals accumulate
human capital only while they are entrepreneurs. Since entrepreneurial earnings are
monotonely increasing in human capital, ht, the reservation value of cash on hand, xr,
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Table 2. Baseline Parameter Values
r    h k e"  w 
we
"  (e)  (we) 
exit entry
0:05 1:5 0:07 0:80 0:06 0:33 0:3 1 1 0:1 0:95
1
0
0
1
0 0
Figure 11. Reservation Value of Cash on Hand, xr
is decreasing in ht. This relationship between xr and ht is displayed in Figure 11 for
wage workers and entrepreneurs respectively. First note that the reservation value of
cash on hand depends not only on the level of human capital, but also on the current
occupation. In general, wage workers have larger reservation values of cash, since human
capital in the following period is lower. One can say that the exit from entrepreneurship
is associated with an indirect cost due to the forgone opportunity to accumulate human
capital. As a result the occupational choice is state dependent. Due to the diminishing
return to human capital, the gab between the two reservation values xwer  xer diminishes
with human capital.
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Figure 12. Expected Future Gross Income - Wage Workers
Figure 12 displays the relationship between wealth and expected future gross income
for di¤erent values of human capital. Contrary to the case without human capital in-
vestments, individuals with a low level of human capital are willing to incur a temporary
income loss, in exchange for an increase in expected future entrepreneurial earnings.
Wage workers with a relatively low level of human capital and capital less than xwer (ht)
earns the xed wage, w = 1 plus interest of liquid assets holdings until he chooses to
become entrepreneur at the switching point, xwer (ht).
Figure 13 displays the policy function for consumption and occupational choice for
entrepreneurs and wage workers respectively. The graphs are plotted for two di¤erent
level of human capital, ht = 1 and ht = 20. It is evident from Figure 13 that individuals
with a high level of human capital have much stronger saving incentives due to the higher
return to investments. Indeed, for low levels of wealth, individuals with a high level of
human capital will save more out of current wealth. In contrast, individuals with a low
level of human capital have relatively low returns to investments in physical capital. As
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Figure 13. Optimal Consumption
a consequence, individuals with relatively low levels of human capital have a additional
incentive to entry: To gain more human capital.
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Figure 14. Simulated Hazard Function, a0 = 0:75
There is one important thing to note about the gab between the two reservation values
xwer   xer. The fact that individuals can only accumulate human capital in entrepreneur-
ship creates a wedge between the two occupations: Not only is the reservation values
of cash much higher for wage workers with no entrepreneurial experience, the saving
incentives for constrained wage workers are weaker too. This combination reinforces
signicantly the impact of existing liquidity constraints on entry behavior .
In Figure 14 simulated hazard functions are displayed for entrepreneurs and wage
workers respectively: The transition pattern is not qualitatively di¤erent from the case
without human capital accumulation. However, the negative duration dependence for
the hazard out of entrepreneurship is amplied by human capital accumulation in entre-
preneurship: Since ht increases with duration in entrepreneurship, the reservation value
of cash, xer (ht) will decrease with duration. As a consequence, the exit probability for
entrepreneurs decreases rapidly with duration. A nal thing to note is that wage workers
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Figure 15. Simulated Sequence of Income, Assets and Con-
sumption, 0 = 0:75
enter entrepreneurship later: On average, they will have to save for about 6-7 periods
before entry.
Figure 15 graphs simulated sequences of assets, at, consumption, ct, gross income, yt+
rat, and the implied value of entrepreneurial productivity multiplied by 10, 10h
h
t :The
simulation is done for an individual that enters the labor market with an initial level of
assets of a0 = 0:75.
4.2. Human Capital Accumulation in Wage Work. Now turn to the opposite ex-
treme, where human capital accumulation primarily takes place during wage work. As
seen in Figure 16, this accumulation scheme holds qualitatively di¤erent implications
for the implied transition pattern between the two occupations. The rst thing to note
is that the dependence of the current occupation is reversed relative to the picture in
Figure 11. Since individuals can enhance their future entrepreneurial productivity only
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Figure 16. Reservation Value of Cash on Hand
during wage work, human capital will be lower for entrepreneurs in the following period.
As a result, entrepreneurs will have larger reservation values of cash on hand.
Figure 17 depicts expected future gross income for wage workers for di¤erent values
of ht (the solid lines) along with expected gross income if an individual (inoptimally)
chooses to remain wage worker for all values of cash on hand (the dashed line). The pic-
ture is again reversed: Individuals are willing to stay wage workers although expected
entrepreneurial earnings are higher. Hence, to balance the return to investments in
human capital and physical capital, wage workers accept a temporary income loss in ex-
change for an increase in expected future entrepreneurial earnings. In fact, the expected
income function jumps discretely in the switching point. The size of this jump represents
the amount that individuals are willing to trade for an additional unit of human capital.
Due to the decreasing returns to ht; this amount decreases with ht:
Figure 18 displays the policy functions for consumption and occupational choice for
entrepreneurs and wage workers for two di¤erent levels of human capital, ht = 1 and
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Figure 17. Expected Future Gross Income - Wage Workers
ht = 20. The rst thing to note is that entrepreneurs with ht = 1, will switch to wage
work regardless of their current level of wealth. Despite this transition to wage work, the
entrepreneurial saving incentive remains since individuals with low levels of ht expect
entry (or re-entry) to entrepreneurship after a couple of periods in wage work.
Figure 19 graphs simulated sequences of assets, at consumption, ct gross income, yt +
rat, and the implied value of entrepreneurial productivity multiplied by 10, 10h
h
t . The
simulation is done for an individual that enters the labor market with an initial level
of assets of a0 = 0:75. Initially, the wage worker accumulates assets and human capital
for a couple of periods. Hereafter, he switches to entrepreneurship to reap the benets
of his investments. At this point, the entrepreneur keeps saving to overcome binding
liquidity constraints. However, since entrepreneurial human capital depreciates while
access to nancial assets simultaneously increases, the return to reinvestments in human
capital will eventually become large enough to make the entrepreneur switch to wage
work and thereby being able to accumulate more human capital. Note that the wage
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Figure 18. Optimal Consumption
workers re-entry entrepreneurship relatively fast (after only one period in wage work).
Even more, the accumulated level of human capital is lower compared to the rst entry.
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Figure 19. Simulated Sequence of Income, Assets and Con-
sumption, 0 = 0:75
The reason is, that this agent faces a very large opportunity cost in terms of forgone
entrepreneurial earnings, since accumulated assets are now much higher.
Figure 20 displays simulated hazard functions for a population that enters the labor
market with an initial level of assets a0 = 0:75. Consider rst the hazard out of entre-
preneurship. Again, we observe a decreasing hazard, although with one modication.
After approximately 20 periods, the exit probability starts to increase again. At this
point entrepreneurs have been exposed to human capital depreciation for several pe-
riods. Since the business is very capital intensive at this point, the return to human
capital investments is high enough to induce a shift to wage work. From the hazard out
of wage work, it is evident that these re-entries to wage work have a duration of only
one period (the left peak). The hazard function has a second peak around 6-8 periods
of wage work. The concentration here is due to the initial spell in wage work. Hence, on
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Figure 20. Simulated Hazard Function, 0 = 0:75
average, wage workers will need around 7 periods of wage work, before entrepreneurial
activity is undertaken
If entrepreneurial human capital is primarily accumulated in entrepreneurship impor-
tance of credit constraints is amplied signicantly, whereas the opposite is the case if
individuals primarily acquire entrepreneurial skills in wage employment. If the former is
the case, the entrepreneur will have to accept longer sequences of relatively low returns,
before the business really becomes protable. Due to the desire to smooth consumption
and the lack of ability to borrow, this will in fact deter entry. If on the other hand human
capital is primarily acquired as wage worker, it will be optimal to postpone entry until
a su¢ ciently high amount of human capital is accumulated. This will be optimal even
when credit constraints are not binding.
Whether human capital accumulation is in fact most pronounced in wage work or
entrepreneurship is still an unresolved issue - and basically it is an empirical question.
As we have seen above it has important policy implications. In particular for credit
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market intervensions, business start-up schemes and policies that help entrepreneurs to
circumvent binding credit constraints. The answer to this question may be complicated
by entrepreneurial human capital generally being unobserved and by the existence dif-
ferences between e.g. industries and educational groups. However, a full estimation of
the present structural model can actually be used to answer this question. This is a very
intersing project, however, which I will try address in future work.
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
To get a better understanding of the intertemporal incentives that underlie much
of the behavior by entrepreneurs, I have developed an intertemporal model for saving,
consumption, human capital accumulation and occupational choice in the presence of
liquidity constraints, income uncertainty, and entry costs. I have done this by merging
the set-up from the existing static models of entrepreneurship with the approach taken
in the literature on intertemporal saving and consumption. Furthermore, I incorporate
aspects from the literature on investment under uncertainty and the literature on human
capital formation.
Using this model, I provide a theoretical foundation for analyzing a number of unre-
solved issues. I here summarize the seven key ndings:
First, a prominent feature of the model is that it generates a well-dened transition
pattern between entrepreneurship and ordinary wage work. The model predicts that
workers may transit back and forth between wage employment and entrepreneurship.
The latter occupation becomes more attractive as the worker accumulates su¢ cient
wealth (and human capital) as this gives her a higher (expected) return in entrepreneur-
ship because she can then acquire more physical capital. Wage work, on the other hand,
becomes relatively more attractive when individual savings are depleted, e.g., following
a series of negative shocks to entrepreneurial income which forces the individual to use
her savings (i.e. sell her capital investments) to maintain consumption. As a result,
the model predicts continued cycling between these occupations. This is an important
feature of the model, as these sequential entry and exits is a phenomenon frequently
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observed in the data. In fact, more than 25 per cent of the self-employed in Denmark
have multiple completed spells of self-employment.
Second, the start-up costs provide an extra savings motive for wage workers in the
presence of credit constraints. Wage workers who wish to (or expect to) enter entrepre-
neurship save to be able to nance these entry costs and to overcome the subsequent
risk of losing the paid entry costs if she has to return to wage work.
Third, the credit constraints also induce entrepreneurs to accumulate savings and may
thus explain why we empirically observe a concentration of assets among the entrepre-
neurs. When entrepreneurs are credit constrained, the accumulated savings determine
how much physical capital they can acquire and thus the expected pay-o¤ from entrepre-
neurship. Furthermore, entrepreneurs save to maintain their position as entrepreneurs
to avoid potential costs associated with later re-entry.
Fourth, the xed cost of entering entrepreneurship introduces a so-called option value
into the model. Entrepreneurs are willing to cut consumption temporarily to keep their
position as entrepreneurs, because they know that if they exit and wish to return to wage
employment at a later stage, they will have to incur the sunk entry cost again. Similarly,
wage workers wish to postpone investments in a business until they have enough savings
to not only nance the entry cost but also to resist several subsequent negative shocks
to income in entrepreneurship without existing. As a result, we will see both later entry
and later exit in the presence of entry costs.
In an international comparison, we should expect Danish entrepreneurs to face rela-
tively small entry costs, as the red tape connected with setting up a business is relatively
limited in Denmark (see Fonseca, Lopez-Garzia, and Pissarides (2001)). This is also
fully consistent with the relatively high entry and exit rates in Denmark.
Fifth, in the absence of transition costs and human capital accumulation in entrepre-
neurship, the probability of exiting entrepreneurship (the hazard function) will generally
be declining in the elapsed duration of the entrepreneurship spell (the age of the rm).
The reason is that entrepreneurs accumulate more assets and more human capital
while running a rm, making them more resistant to negative chocks. If individuals
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that enter with a relatively low level of initial assets (or human capital), they will be
vulnerable to negative demand chocks. Depending on the realized sequence of demand
chocks, entrepreneurs will succeed in accumulating enough capital to resist future nega-
tive shocks. Hence, in addition to the primary function as working capital, assets serve
as a bu¤er stock during downturns. Therefore, the probability of exit to wage work will
decrease with duration in entrepreneurship, i.e. the hazard function is said to exhibit
true negative duration dependence. This conclusion is strengthening in the presence of
human capital accumulation in entrepreneurship.
In the presence of entry costs, however, the probability of exit from entrepreneurship
is initially increasing in the elapsed duration and then decreasing. The entry cost alters
the transition patterns between entrepreneurship and ordinary wage work fundamentally:
Due to start up costs, individuals will never enter entrepreneurship if there is a signicant
risk that they will not be able to maintain their business in at least the following period
or two. Therefore exit probability is very low for short durations. For longer durations,
however, the entrepreneurs become more resistant to negative chocks due to a larger
amount of accumulated capital (and possibly also human capital). When this e¤ect
dominates, hazards start to decline again.
The prediction that the hazard function is initially increasing is largely consistent with
what we observe in the Danish register data on rm start-ups. Hence, the model provides
a plausible explanation of observed exit behavior for Danish entrepreneurs.
Sixth, if entrepreneurial human capital is primarily accumulated in entrepreneurship,
the consequences of credit constraints are amplied. Due to the lack of ability to borrow,
individuals will have to accept long sequences of relatively low returns, before the business
really becomes protable. This will deter entry, if individuals have a desire to smooth
consumption.
Seventh, the entrepreneurial saving motive is a¤ected by the tightness of credit con-
straints in a non-monotone way: Initially, as credit constraints become less binding,
potential highly productive entrepreneurs with relatively low asset holdings will nd it
optimal to save more. The reason is that the perspectives for (future) entrepreneurship
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become better for this particular group when it is possible to borrow for investments in
larger projects. As credit constraints is further loosened, and eventually become irrele-
vant, the incentive to save for entrepreneurial reasons disappears. This has important
implications for an understanding of the e¤ects of changes in credit policy, e.g. govern-
ment loan guaranties. While such a policy would induce relatively productive individuals
to increase their savings, less productive individuals will decrease their savings. Thus,
such a policy would increase wealth inequality in the economy and could be associated
with increased probability of default. On the other hand, relaxing the credit constraints
increases the probability of entry relatively more for productive individuals - due to the
increased willingness to use savings to overcome credit constraints.
The insight of the model also has important implications for future research: First,
analysis of precautionary savings using the cross sectional correlation between income un-
certainty and wealth must take into account that households may hold large proportions
of wealth which is related to expectations about the decision to become entrepreneurs in
the future. Hence, to mitigate a potential heterogeneity bias it is not su¢ cient to control
for the current occupation, we must appropriately control for expectations about future
occupations too. Since these expectations are generally unobserved (and time varying),
such conditioning is in general very di¢ cult. Therefore, to appropriately account for the
composition of household savings, a full structural estimation of the present model can
be a useful and perhaps necessary identication strategy.
Moreover, since transition patterns depend signicantly on the type of the agent,
i.e. whether he faces credit constraints or not, whether he faces transitions cost etc.,
estimation procedures in duration analysis should incorporate lots of heterogeneity; not
only in the intercept or scale of the hazard, but also in the shape.
To fully understand the importance of credit constraints, entry costs and entrepre-
neurial risks for the importance of di¤erent saving motives it is necessary to estimate
the distribution of entrepreneurial ability in the population, the signicance of di¤erent
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human capital accumulation schemes, returns to factors of production, preference para-
meters, etc. Hence, a full structural estimation of the model is needed. This is a very
interesting project that is subject to ongoing research.
However, a full estimation of the present model on micro data is a non-trivial task.
For each evaluation of the likelihood function or the moments used for identication, we
will have to solve a complex dynamic programming problem. Therefore, algorithms used
to solve to the model must be developed further to make the estimation feasible.
In sum, the model this paper has several predictions which are consistent with ob-
served behavior. Furthermore, the model adds considerably to our understanding of the
e¤ects of credit constraints on observed behavior as well as the potential consequences
of government intervention in this area.
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6. Appendix - Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an individual who chooses to become entrepreneur in
the following period but is constrained by capital, i.e. it+1 = e and kt+1 = at+1. For a
marginal increase in future assets, this individual can expect to increase entrepreneurial
earnings with the following amount
  E

dyt+1 (it+1; ht+1; at+1; "t+1 (it+1))
dat+1

= ka
k 1
t+1 h
h
t+1
k   r > 0
Note that,  is concave in  since k 2]0; 1[ and positive if the individual is credit
constrained. For unconstrained entrepreneurs  = 0.
Furthermore,  is increasing in  if hht+1
2
ka
k 1
t+1 
k 1 > r. For a given value of r; at+1
and ; this condition hold for large enough hht+1:Hence, relatively productive individuals
with a relatively low asset holdings, will increase their savings when  increases.
On the other hand,  is decreasing in  if hht+1
2
ka
k 1
t+1 
k 1 < r. For a given value of
r; hht+1 and at+1; this condition holds for large enough :Hence, when credit constraints
become less binding, the expected return to increased savings approaches zero. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Since ht+1 (ht) is monotone increasing with slope h0t+1 (ht) =  <
1, then ht+1 (ht) will cross the 45 degree line from above in a unique xed point ~h Thereby
for any hhigh  ~h <1 we must have that ht+1 (hhigh)  hhigh (since ht+1 (hhigh) is below
the 45 degree line for all hhigh  ~h <1 ) 
Proof of Proposition 3. We wish to show that there exists a a <1 such that if at  a
then at+1  a. Hence it is su¢ cient to prove that exists a a < 1 such that at  at+1
holds for all at  a. That is,
at  at+1 = (1 + r) (at + yt   ct    (st; s)))(6.1)
ct  r
1 + r
at + yt    (st; st+1)
should hold for all at  a.
Since yt is bounded from above by ymax and  (st; st+1) is bounded from below by
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zero, a su¢ cient condition for the inequality (6:1) can be formulated as
c  r
1 + r
a+ ymax
where
ymax = max
8>>><>>>:
w;
 (at)
k
 
hhigh
h "max   rat;


k
r
 
hhigh
h k1 k  hhighh "max   r  k
r
 
hhigh
h1=(1 k)
9>>>=>>>;
is a nite since k < 1 and r > 0
Consider for a moment the corresponding deterministic model, where individuals are
endowed with initial assets At. In this case, optimal consumption can be expressed as
(see Caroll (1997))
cdett =
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Since income is bounded from below by zero and  (st; st+1) is bounded from above by
 Consumption in the stochastic model can newer fall below
~cdett =
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Therefore we must have that c > ~cdet and we can therefore formulate a su¢ cient condition
for (6:1) given by 
1 + r
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 1
 1
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1
r
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Since the left hand side is constant and the right hand side is increasing in at there must
exist some a such that for at  a, the inequality is a true statement. Or equally true,
there must exist some a <1 such that such that at  at+1 holds for all at  a. This
completes the proof 
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Abstract
Foreign-owned firms are often hypothesized to generate productivity “spillovers” to the host
country, but both theoretical micro-foundations and empirical evidence for this are limited. 
We develop a heterogeneous-firm model in which ex-ante identical workers learn from their
employers in proportion to the firm’s productivity. Foreign-owned firms have, on average,
higher productivity in equilibrium due to entry costs, which means that low-productivity
foreign firms cannot enter.  Foreign firms have higher wage growth and, with some
exceptions, pay higher average wages, but not when compared to similarly large domestic
firms.  The empirical implications of the model are tested on matched employer-employee data
from Denmark. Consistent with the theory, we find considerable evidence of higher wages and
wage growth in large and/or foreign-owned firms. These effects survive controlling for
individual characteristics, but, as expected, are reduced significantly when controlling for
unobservable firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, acquired skills in foreign-owned and large
firms appear to be transferable to both subsequent wage work and self-employment.
Acknowledgments: The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this project
from the Danish National Agency for Enterprise and Construction.
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1. Introduction
The last decades have witnessed a significant increase in the amount of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs).  This has led to
considerable academic and political interest in the role of FDI and MNEs for both source and
host countries.  One aspect of this concerns the potential for FDI and MNEs as important
channels for productivity transfers to host countries.  MNEs are hypothesized to possess
superior knowledge, better production technology or better management techniques compared
to the average domestic firm.
However, the microeconomic foundations of these ideas are weak, and empirical
analysis is limited and indirect.  In this paper, the productivity advantages of foreign firms are
assumed to affect domestic workers directly.  We assume that firms have different productivity
levels, and that workers learn more (increase their productivity more) when they are employed
by higher productivity firms.  Similarly, they earn more in subsequent wage employment and
self-employment if they have previously worked for a high-productivity firm.  
Our model builds on Melitz’s (2003) (also Helpman et al., 2004) model of industry
structure with heterogeneous firms, and blends this with the learning-on-the-job models of
Ethier and Markusen (1996), Markusen (2001), Fosfuri et. al. (2001), and Glass and Saggi
(2002).  Small numbers of domestic and foreign firms get high productivity “draws” and a
potentially unlimited number of other domestic and foreign firms get low productivity draws. 
Foreign firms of both types face higher fixed costs of entry.  All high-productivity firms can
enter, but only low-productivity domestic firms can enter: they enter until profits are zero,
which excludes the foreign low-productivity firms due to the latter’s higher fixed costs.  
The consequence of this is that foreign firms on average are larger and have higher
productivity than domestic firms.  But it also provides the hypothesis that, corrected for firm
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size, foreign firms are not more productive than domestic firms.
Our model does not rely on externalities or on foreign firms identifying and hiring
better workers.  All workers are ex ante identical and earn the same present value of income
over a two-period working lifetime.  Skills learned in the first period when employed by a
high-productivity firm are transferable to other high-productivity firms and, to a less degree, to
low-productivity firms.    There is thus no ex post hold-up problem as in Antrás (2003):
workers in the second period of their career are paid their full productivity, but first period
workers joining high-productivity firms receive a discounted wage reflecting their later higher
earnings in wage work or self-employment. 
The model allows us to solve for outputs, wage levels and wage growth in high and
low-productivity firms, and in domestic and foreign firms.  In the base case, workers joining
high-productivity firms receive a higher average wage and higher wage growth over their
careers, but a lower initial wage.  The foreign-firm effect disappears when correcting for firm
size.
Then we conduct some experiments.  Increasing the productivity of a worker who
transits from a high- to a low-productivity firm or increasing the probability of getting a
favorable draw on suitability for self-employment lowers the average wage premium for
workers in high-productivity firms and that premium can go negative.  Thus the model does
not trivially produce a result that workers in high-productivity or foreign firms earn more.
Imposing a minimum wage which prevents high-productivity firms from capturing
rents on inexperienced workers or imposing a progressive income tax raises the average
earnings of workers in high-productivity (larger) and foreign firms relative to those for low-
productivity (smaller) and domestic firms.
A number of empirical implications concerning wages and wage growth can be derived
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from the theory model.  Some of these are tested on matched employer-employee data from
Denmark in the final part of the paper.
Specifically, both wage levels and wage growth are higher in foreign-owned and large
firms. Also subsequent earnings as wage worker or self-employed increase with experience
from large and foreign-owned firms. As consistent with our theory, these effects survive
controlling for both observable and unobservable worker differences, but, as expected, they
disappear when controlling for unobservable firm characteristics which proxy for the
unobservable firm type.
In summary, most of the hypotheses advanced by the simple model are verified in the
estimations.  One difference is that empirically, wage levels and self-employment earnings in
foreign firms are still greater than in domestic firms when controlling for firm size, though the
difference is greatly reduced compared to estimates that do not control for firm size. 
Consistent with the simple model, however, wage growth in foreign firms is not greater when
controlling for firm size.   We comment on this residual positive effect of foreign firms in the
concluding section.
2. Some Relevant Literature
Empirically, it is a well-established fact that foreign-owned firms (or MNEs more
generally) pay higher wages on average than domestically-owned firms. Existing studies can
be grouped under two headings: (i) studies based on firm-level data, as in, e.g., Feliciano and
Lipsey (1999) and Aitken et al. (1996); and (ii) studies based on matched employer-employee
data, as in Martins (2004) and Heyman et al. (2004). The advantage of using matched
employer-employee data is that it can be explicitly analyzed whether part of the wage
differential is due to individual differences among the employees.
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While a number of studies have shown that part of the overall “wage-gap” between
foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms can be attributed to a higher average quality of
workers in foreign-owned firms, a considerable part can only be explained by different firm
characteristics than the average domestically-owned firm. Hence, the existing evidence points
to a productivity advantage in foreign-owned firms which is somehow transformed into higher
wages of the employees; see Lipsey (2002) for a recent review.
A number of studies have also analyzed how these productivity and wage advantages
have influenced the productivity and/or wages of other firms, see, e.g., Haddad and Harrison
(1993), Haskel et al. (2002), Almeida (2003), and Javorcik (2004) (see Keller 2004 for a more
general approach). While we consider the productivity transfers that occur from
foreign-owned firms to domestic firms via worker mobility and entrepreneurship, the empirical
literature has to a large extent concentrated on wage and productivity  spillovers (and
transfers) between firms; see Lipsey (2002) for a review. While a positive effect has been
found in the case of firm-to-market spillovers (higher average wages), the evidence is more
mixed when it comes to firm-to-firm spillovers. However, studies of productivity spillovers
between plants within industries have generally found positive effects of foreign-owned
companies; see Lipsey (2002).
Only few empirical studies have analyzed productivity transfers via worker mobility;
see Martins (2005) and Görg and Strobel (2005), where the latter, using data from Ghana,
considers transfers via worker mobility to self-employment.  We return to these studies in the
empirical part of the paper.
Similarly, very few studies have tried to provide a theoretical foundation for such
productivity transfers. Glass and Saggi (2002) thus build a model where workers employed by
MNEs immediately get access to their superior technology. Hence, MNEs must pay a wage
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premium to prevent workers from moving to other companies bringing along information
about this technology. In Fosfuri et al. (2001), Ethier and Markusen (1996), and Markusen
(2001) on the other hand, workers only get access to the superior technology following a
period of training by the MNE. Hence, workers are not immediately paid a higher wage in
MNEs. In both types of  models, however, productivity transfers arise when workers
employed (and trained) by MNEs move to domestic firms. Markusen and Trofimenko (2006)
provides a more explicit model of skill transfer from foreign experts to domestic workers.
Specifically, they assume that working with foreign experts is an alternative to studying as a
means of obtaining skills. 
As a final point, we should mention Yeaple (2005) who provides an alternative to the
Meltiz framework that we borrow here.  Yeaple assumes that firms are ex ante identical while
workers are not (both opposite to the present paper) and that there are alternative
technologies to choose from.  In general equilibrium, some firms choose technologies that
make them larger and they pay higher wages because they hire more skilled workers.  These
larger firms are also the exporters (easy generalized to establishing subsidiaries).  It strikes us
that this alternative approach generates at least some predictions close to ours, and clearly
deserves empirical investigation.
3. A model of entry, productivity, and industry structure
 A principal objective of this theory section is to develop a plausible model that, at
least in some circumstances, generates (1) higher average earnings in larger and/or foreign-
owned firms, (2) a steeper earnings profile for the average worker in larger or foreign-owned
firms, and (c) wage workers and newly self-employed workers (entrepreneurs) earn more, on
average, if they previously worked in a large and/or foreign-owned firm.  But we want to
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1We originally called the MP firms LP for low productivity.  But a lower-case L is confused
with the number 1 in the notation, so we switched.  The MP terminology is consistent with the Lake
Woebegone principle that “all children are above average”.
generate these results while assuming that (a) all workers are ex ante identical (foreign firms
are not merely selecting the best workers) and (b) foreign firms are not arbitrarily more
productive than domestic firms.   The model will draw heavily on the contribution of Melitz’s
(2003) model of industry structure with heterogeneous firms with monopolistic competition. 
This is combined with a learn-on-the-job model of Markusen (2001).
We are attempting to keep the model relatively simple, and so will make a number of
restrictive assumptions. 
(1) There are two types of domestic and foreign firms: high-productivity (HP) firms
and low- or moderate-productivity (MP) firms that produce differentiated goods, denoted X. 
Foreign firms face an added fixed cost of entering a foreign market with a subsidiary.1
(2) An unlimited number of domestic and foreign firms take productivity draws.   A
small number in each country draw high productivity, the rest all draw moderate productivity. 
Note that this avoids a more ad hoc assumption that foreign firms are inherently better.
(3) The number of high-productivity firms is sufficiently small and/or the domestic
market is sufficiently large, such that all high-productivity foreign and domestic firms can enter
the domestic market.    
(4) The “residual” demand is then satisfied by a limited number of moderate-
productivity domestic firms entering up to the point where a zero-profit condition holds for
moderate-productivity domestic firms.  Foreign MP firms cannot enter in competition with the
domestic MP firms: the former face a higher fixed cost.
(7) The model is quasi-dynamic.  Firms are long lived, but fixed costs are per period,
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and demand is stationary.  There are no investment or borrowing decision or any other
intertemporal features except that MP firms decide whether or not to enter in a given period. 
Thus, we can analyse a single period in this “steady-state” environment.
(8) The model also has a quasi-overlapping-generations feature.   Each worker has a
two-period career, and all workers begin their careers as identical inexperienced workers. 
Workers who join MP firms do not improve their productivity over time while workers who
join HP firms have both higher productivity in their first period and learning results in an even
higher productivity in the second period of their career.  Skills are assumed not to be firm-
specific, so experienced workers are priced in a competitive market, and their wage path is
such that new workers are indifferent between joining MP and HP firms.
(9) We allow workers to transit from an HP to an MP firm (the opposite transition
possibility did not seem to add anything interesting so we dropped it).  These transiting
workers have a lower productivity than if they stay in the HP firm but a higher productivity
than new workers or workers with one period in an MP firm (who do not learn).  
(10) In the second period of their careers, workers take a draw which determines
whether they will be good or bad as self-employed entrepreneurs in period 2.  Among workers
who get favorable draws, those who worked in HP firms will have a higher productivity than
those who worked in MP firms.
(11) Finally, the model is largely partial equilibrium.  There is an unlimited supply of
new workers available at a fixed wage, and a given worker disappears after two periods. 
Expenditure on X goods is fixed, and those who go to self-employment disappear off to
another industry.  Both the exogenous number of HP and the endogenous number of MP firms
hire experienced and inexperienced workers in a competitive market.  The steady-state or
stationarity assumption is that the number of experienced workers available is equal to the
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number of inexperienced workers hired by HP firms.
Our notation is as follows.
- labor productivity (in physical units of X output) in HP firms, where i = 1 is an
inexperienced worker and i = 2 is an experienced worker.  Workers in MP
firms do not learn and their productivity in both periods is normalized to
.
a worker with one-period of experience in an HP firm can transit to an MP
firm, with  denoting that worker’s productivity.  We assume that
.  In other words, a worker transiting from an HP firm to an LP
firm carries only part of the HP firm’s productivity advantage with him/her.  
This will be a variable and discussed more below.
 - wage of an inexperienced worker (i = 1) and an experienced worker (i = 2) in
an HP firm.  If there are transiting workers, they are indifferent in equilibrium
to transiting and so a worker employed by an HP firm in period 1 earns in
period 2 regardless of whether the worker is in an HP firm or transits to an MP
firm.
- number of HP firms of domestic (d) and foreign (f) origin respectively.  These
are constants (all existing HP firms can enter).
- number of MP firms, determined by free entry.  This is a variable.
- price of a representative differentiated good produced by an HP firm.
- price of a representative good produced by an MP firm.
outputs of an HP firm produced by inexperienced and experienced workers,
respectively. 
outputs of an MP firm produced by (first or second period) inexperienced
workers and produced by transit workers from HP firms, respectively.
α - the share of workers who, at the beginning of period 2 of their career, learn
that they have a higher productivity as self-employed
- multiplier on the wage of an experienced worker that gives self-employment
earings in period 2 for workers who get a favourable draw on self-employment
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productivity (e.g., self-employment earnings are  for a worker from an
HP firm).  
δ - the discount factor, 0 < δ = 1/(1+r) < 1, where r is some rate of
interest/discount
Consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over an endogenous number of
differentiated goods, and spend a fixed amount of income I on X sector goods.  σ denotes the
elasticity of substitution between varieties.  Each period’s demands do not depend on prices in
the other period.  Demand for good i (k) is given by
(1)
Under the so-called “large-group” assumption, individual firms are assumed to be too small to
influence the price index term in square brackets, and hence each firm’s perceived elasticity of
demand is just σ and the optimal markup is 1/σ.
The equilibrium output of each high-productivity firm, whether foreign or domestic, is
determined by marginal revenue product equal to the wage.  Outputs by experienced and
inexperienced workers are identical (homogeneous), but these worker types differ by
productivity. There are two first-order conditions for output from inexperienced workers
( ) and for output from experienced workers ( ).  We adopt a complementarity
representation of our model in which all equations are written as weak inequalities each with
an associated non-negative complementary variable.  The pricing inequalities for output from
inexperienced and experienced workers followed by associated complementary variables are
given by
(2)
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2The reason that MP firms may employ transit workers at wage  even though they have
lower productivity than when continuing to work in HP firms is that the latter are larger and hence have
lower equilibrium prices .  
(3)
MP firms can hire inexperienced workers, including those who have already been
employed by an MP firm for one period (no productivity increase) and transit workers from
HP firms.  The latter must be paid the wage .2  Similar to equations (2) and (3), the two
pricing equations and complementary quantity variables are
(4)
(5)
Assume that the fixed costs for domestic MP firms require   number of
inexperienced workers at wage = 1 or  number of transit workers at wage .  When
there are transit workers in equilibrium, (4) and (5) imply that   and so fixed costs
for MP firms are always given by   regardless of whether or not there are transit workers,
and the firm is indifferent between the two types.  Given this indifference, we assume that
different worker types are used in proportion to their overall contributions to the output of the
firm.
Fixed costs for domestic and foreign HP firms require and  units of
inexperienced workers, respectively, at a wage of , or and  units of
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experienced workers at a wage of .  By virtue of (2) and (3), the firm is indifferent between
using inexperienced and experienced workers and, given this indifference, we assume that the
two types are used in proportion to their overall contributions to output of the firm. 
Furthermore, we assume that .
Turning now to wages of HP workers, the wage of second period experienced workers
will be determined by a supply = demand relationship.  Stationarity requires that the number of
workers used in HP firms in the first period of their careers, minus losses to self-employment,
equal the demand for experienced (second period) HP workers by HP firms and by MP firms
hiring transit workers.  To incorporate our assumptions about fixed costs, let
  (6)
be the proportion of output by transit workers in the total employment of MP firms.  Similarly,
let
    (7)
be the shares (in output) of inexperienced and experienced workers in HP firms.  The
stationarity relationship determining  is     
(8)
where the left-hand side is the use of inexperienced workers by HP firms minus losses to self-
employment and hence “supply” of second-period experienced workers.  The right-hand side
is demand for second-period experienced workers by HP and MP firms.
Working backwards, the first-period wage for workers hired by HP firms will be given
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by a condition that the entering worker is indifferent over his or her two-period career to being
hired by an HP firm or an MP firm.  Note that if  > 1, this in turn implies that the first-
period HP workers will accept a wage  < 1 = .  The resulting indifference condition
takes into account the expected value of a good self-employment draw (probability α):
(9)
As noted earlier, we assume free entry and exit of MP firms. This gives us a zero-profit
condition, where the complementary variable is the number of firms active in equilibrium.  
(10)
Finally, there are supply-demand equations for X output with complementary variables
being the X prices.  Because of symmetry within firm types, we can reduce  (1) to the supply-
demand equalities for a representative good for each firm type.  These two equations have
prices as complementary variables:
(11)
(12)
Finally, consider the productivity of a transit worker, .  If this is fixed, the model
has a bang-bang property with respect to the productivity of transiting workers (at some
critical value all experienced workers go to MP firms and HP firms employ only inexperienced
workers).  In order to smooth this, we assume that  is a decreasing function of the share of
transit workers in the workforce of MP firms.  The idea is that the first HP worker hired has a
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big effect on productivity, but subsequent workers are less able to exploit their skills in low-
tech production.  Our final equation thus gives the productivity of a transit worker as
(13)
 is then the minimum productivity of a transit worker, taken on if all workers in MP firms are
transit workers (this never happens in our simulations).  is the maximum productivity,
attained for the first transit worker employed, assumed strictly greater than one as noted
earlier, the latter being the productivity of an inexperienced worker.
Our model given by (2)-(13) thus constitutes thirteen non-linear inequalities (there are
two equations in (7)) in thirteen non-negative variables.  We solve this model analytically in
Appendix A to this paper.   But in what follows from this point, we will just report some
simulation results using the non-linear complementarity solver in GAMS, working directly
with (2) - (13).
Before looking at some numerical outcomes, let us quickly summarize some general
results.  We do not think that these depend on the specific parameter values chosen (except of
course they do depend on the inequality assumptions among parameters), but we can have no
general proof in this regard.  Most of these are shown analytically in the appendix.
(1) HP firms are bigger than MP firms in equilibrium both in terms of physical output
and in value terms; the value difference is smaller, since the HP firm’s higher output
commands a lower price in equilibrium.  Productivity differences are amplified in output and
value difference, so a 75% productivity advantage generates about 350% more output and
about 175% more value (revenue) depending on other parameters.
(2) HP firms pay a lower wage in the first period and a higher wage in the second
period relative to MP firms.  Obviously, the wage profile over time is steeper in an HP firm
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than in an MP firm.  Higher wages paid to experienced workers in HP firms are not due to
selection, but to higher learning within the HP firm.
(3) In our base cases, HP firms pay a higher average wage to its work force than MP
firms, due to discounting.   (In our numerical solutions, we use a high discount rate motivated
by the view that one-period of the worker’s career may be at least ten years.)  However, this is
not a general result, and it can be reversed by high equilibrium transit rates and high self-
employment opportunities.  These alter the composition of experienced and inexperienced
workers in HP firms and so alter the average wage.
(4) Foreign firms will be observed to pay a higher average wage than domestic firms. 
However, this is due to the composition of the two groups, with domestic firms’ wages being
an average of those in low and high-productivity firms.  
(5) Combining this with finding (1), it follows that, corrected for firm size, foreign
firms do not pay experienced workers more than (large) domestic firms.  Similarly, the higher
wage to experienced workers in large firms is not due to selection, but to the fact that firm
size is just a reflection of productivity.
(6) It follows directly from the assumption that self-employment earnings are greater
for a worker previously employed by an HP firm than by an MP firm that self-employed
workers with a background in larger or (uncorrected for size) foreign firms earn more.
We now turn to some simulations, first presenting a “base” case, in which there is no
self-employment and no transiting workers.  Key parameter values are as follows:  
Self-employment probability: α = 0.0
Discount factor: δ = 0.5
Elasticity of substitution among varieties: σ = 3.0
Income level (picked to give nm = 50): I = 116.6667
Fixed costs:
Exogenous number of HP firms:
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3
 = 0.94 + 0.25 is then the initial calibrated value of the transit productivity.
Productivity multiplier in self-employment:
Normalized wages in MP firms:
Productivities: 
3
Tables 3.1-3.4 present results.  The first column is identical in all simulations, and this
is our benchmark solution.  HP firms have a higher average wage and higher wage growth
(calibrated to zero growth for MP firms).   The higher average wage is due entirely to
discounting in this case.  The output of an HP firm is 4.63 times the output of an MP firm. 
Income was picked so that the benchmark number of MP firms is 50.  
Table 3.1 presents simulations that gradually increase  with the initial (endogenous
value) of  given by 1.19 from (13), where ρ is set at 0.25.  Raising   makes it more
attractive for MP firms to hire workers who have spent one period in HP firms.  Fixed values
of MP wages, income and so forth give the model a critical value of  = 1.2 at which
workers start to “defect” to MP firms.  They would all jump at a higher value, and hence our
formulation in (13) above “smooths” this.  As indicated in the top two lines of Table 3.1,
increases in    are just offset by a falling share of continuing MP workers (rising share of
transiting workers) and so   stays constant at 1.2 until all experienced HP workers are hired
away (we don’t run the values out that far in the table, but it can happen).  
Table 3.1 shows that the increased productivity of transit workers does not affect
wages in HP firms or wage growth of a given worker.  However, it does affect the average
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4In order to get this to happen, we had to use a very large value of v = 6; so those that do get a
favorable draw are very well off indeed.
wage paid by HP firms, because there are a lower and lower proportion of experienced
workers in these firms. The bottom row of the Table indicates the share of first-period HP
workers who transit to MP firms.  At some point, the average wage paid by foreign firms falls
below the wage (=1) paid by domestic firms.  HP firms become “nurseries” where
inexperienced workers learn skills that they take to MP firms.  These results emphasize that
the model by no means trivially produces an outcome in which average wages are higher in HP
or foreign firms versus domestic firms, but wage growth and wages corrected for experience
continue to be higher in HP firms (and hence the average foreign firm). 
Table 3.2 conducts an experiment in which the probability of a favorable draw on self-
employment, α,  is increased, starting at the benchmark value of 0.  While α is the same for
workers who chose HP and MP firms in the first period of their careers, the HP workers get a
bigger absolute bonus (bonus is a proportion of what would have been their second-period
wage).  In equilibrium, this forces down the wages in HP firms proportionately in both periods
of a worker’s career: higher expected self-employment earnings reduce the wages needed to
make workers indifferent to joining HP firms.  While wage growth of HP workers is
unaffected, the average wage in HP firms decreases and can fall below that in MP firms, and
this is also true in this case corrected for experience as just noted.    Similar comments then
apply to foreign versus domestic firms.
Because of this fall in HP firm wages, MP firms can hire away workers.  For the
parameters we use, this begins to happen at α = 0.06 in Table 3.2.4  Employment in HP firms
shifts toward inexperienced workers, but total output per firm rises due to the lower wages.
Table 3.3 considers a minimum wage.  We begin the simulations with this
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unconstrained and equal to the free-market wage of 0.90 for HP workers in their first period,
so these two are of course the same solution.  Then we gradually raise the minimum until it
hits w = 1 in the right-hand column, the wage of inexperienced workers available to the
industry.  In addition to having the obvious effect of raising the wages of inexperienced
workers in HP firms, it cuts output by HP firms (price rises), and so has the equilibrium effect
of raising the wages of experienced workers in HP firms as well.  Wage growth is in fact
unaffected, but the average wage paid in HP firms is considerably higher in the right-hand
column of Table 3.3.   HP workers collect pure rents.  There is no transit of workers to MP
firms, which cannot afford these pricey experienced workers.  Thus, minimum wages is a
reason to expect to observe both higher wages and higher wage growth in high-productivity
firms.  The HP firms remain large, but less so.
Table 3.4 imposes a progressive income tax.  We keep this very simple by assuming
that the tax rate on wages less than or equal to one is zero, and that there is a constant tax rate
t on wages in excess of one (the so-called “flat tax”).  Table 3.4 shows that this acts somewhat
like the minimum wage, but by making experienced rather than inexperienced labor more
expensive for HP firms.  The resulting fall in demand pushes up (before tax) wages for both
experienced and inexperienced workers, although the growth rate remains the same.  The
average wage in HP firms is significantly higher than in MP firms and hence similarly much
higher in foreign than in domestic firms.  
However, care must be taken in the presence of income or payroll taxes.  Results
depend very much on which wage is reported in the data: the producer (before tax) cost or the
household (take-home) wage.  If it is the producer cost, then the income tax increases the
average wage paid in HP firms relative to MP firms as we have just indicated.  If it is the
consumer (take home) wage that is measured, the difference in the average wage between HP
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 A firm is classified as foreign owned by Statistics Denmark if foreigners ultimately own more
than 50% of the firm, and the foreign direct investment amounts to more than DKK 10 million.
and MP firms is smaller.  The growth in take-home wage is reduced by the tax.  The growth
rate in the take-home wage is reported in the fourth row of Table 3.4, and so we see that the
profile of the take-home wage is flatter (higher initial wage, lower take-home wage) than in
the base case.
We suspect that data is generally reporting producer cost of labor, or gross wage
before tax, and hence here we have another reason why the average wage and wage growth is
higher in HP firms and hence higher in foreign than in domestic firms. In the following
sections, we use gross wages before taxes.
4. Data and Empirical Strategy
In this and the following section, we confront the empirical predictions of our
theoretical model with the real world using matched employer-employee data from Denmark. 
The data come from the Integrated Data Base (IDA) for Labor Market Research compiled by
Statistics Denmark, combined with firm level information about foreign ownership, size,
turnover, and exports.  IDA contains register based annual data since 1980 on all individuals
with Danish residence.  It provides detailed information on individual background variables
such as education and family characteristics as well as detailed records of previous labor
market performance, including occupations and income. 
All workers are linked to workplaces (plants) which in turn can be linked to firm level
information, which, e.g., allows us to identify all employees in foreign-owned firms in
Denmark.  Information about foreign ownership is currently available only for the years 2000-
2002.5  As a consequence, in the regressions including foreign ownership, we have to rely on a
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panel for the years 2000 to 2002, while for the regressions without foreign ownership, we can
extend the panel to the period 1981-2003.  Note that information about occupation in a given
year is based on the individual’s occupation in the last week of November.  Hence, we cannot
observe worker flows within a given year.
Our theoretical model implies that the firm type (HP or MP) affects (a) the current
wage level; (b) the current wage growth; and (c) the wage level in future occupations, since
acquired skills are, at least partly, transferable.  However, as we cannot directly observe
whether a firm is an HP or an MP firm, we use the following two additional implications of
our theory to derive our testable hypotheses: (d) All foreign-owned firms are of type HP; and
(e) HP firms are larger than MP firms.  Combining these five predictions results in the
following three sets of empirical hypotheses: 
First, with respect to the relationship between the current firm type and the wage
level, our model predicts that in a cross section, we should observe higher wages for workers
in foreign-owned and/or large firms, as these firms should all be HP firms.  Furthermore, the
effect of foreign-ownership should disappear (or at least be reduced) when controlling for firm
size, as all HP firms are large but not necessarily foreign-owned.  In other words, size should
be a better proxy for HP than foreign ownership.
Furthermore, as a positive relationship between firm size (or foreign ownership) and
wages is hypothesised to reflect unobservable firm productivity differences and not just an
accumulation of more able workers by larger (or foreign-owned) firms, we expect this
relationship to survive when we control for observable worker characteristics as well as
unobservable time-invariant worker differences (individual fixed effects).  For the same reason,
we expect the positive relationship to be reduced significantly when controlling for
unobservable time-invariant firm differences (firm fixed effects).
Second, with respect to the relationship between current firm type and wage growth,
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 The employment figures in Table 4.1 are based on firm-level information about full-time
employees. Note that part of the difference between foreign- and domestically-owned firms may be due to
the fact that some of the smaller foreign-owned firms are not classified as foreign-owned in the data, as it
requires FDI of a certain amount (see footnote above).
we expect a similar set of results: In a cross section, we should observe higher wage growth
for workers in foreign-owned and/or large firms, where the effect of foreign-ownership should
disappear (or be reduced) with the inclusion of firm size.  A positive relationship should again
survive controlling for worker differences, and be reduced significantly when controlling for
unobservable time-invariant firm differences.
Third, when it comes to the relationship between previous firm type and the current
wage level, our data only allow us to analyse the effects of previous experience from large
firms, as foreign ownership is only observed since 2000.  Thus, in a cross section, we should
observe higher wages for workers with previous experience from large firms, and this
relationship should not disappear when controlling for worker differences.  Instead, it should
increase with the amount of previous experience from a large firm.  Similarly, we should
observe higher earnings for new self-employed with a background in a foreign-owned and/or a
large firm; an effect which should increase with the amount of experience from such firms.
We test these three sets of hypotheses formally in the following section by regressing
wages and wage growth rates on worker and firm characteristics.  However, before turning to
that, we take a look at some descriptive statistics. 
Table 4.1 presents the number of firms as well as the total employment of foreign-
owned (F) and domestically-owned (D) firms in Denmark in the years 2000-2002 divided into
different size classes.  While the total stock of firms averaged approximately 245,000, only
slightly more than 1% of these were foreign owned in the years 2000-2002.  However, as also
shown in the Table, the foreign firms were considerably larger on average, which implies that
they accounted for 12-15% of total employment.6  Note that this relationship between size and
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ownership is fully consistent with the implications of our theory.
In Table 4.2, we provide a first check of the relationship between firm type, wage
levels, and wage growth.  The Table contains the average wages and average wage growth
rates for employees in foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms, respectively, as well as in
different size classes.  The income measure used is an hourly (nominal) wage computed by
Statistics Denmark.  As hypothesized, the average wages reveal a significant wage gap between
domestically- and foreign-owned firms (more than 16% in each of the three years) as well as
between small and large firms (10-12%) .
The Table also shows that average wage growth is higher in larger firms.  As an
example, the difference in wage growth rates between small (<50 employees) and large (>500
employees) firms was 1.0 percentage points in 2001-2, which corresponds to 36% higher
annual wage growth in large firms.  The difference between foreign-owned firms and
domestically-owned firms is much smaller.
While the numbers from Table 4.2 are fully in line with the predictions of our theory
model, they do not control for any background characteristics of the individuals, such as
education, age and experience.  We return to this in the next section.
Note that the Danish labor market is characterized by a high degree of flexibility as
firing costs are extremely low.  In that vein, Denmark compares better to US and UK labor
markets than to the labor markets of the larger European countries.  At the same time, the
Danish welfare state takes care of the unemployed through for example particularly high
compensation rates which is why the Danish model is often termed "Flexicurity".  Thus, Danish
labor market data seem particularly useful for analyzing productivity transfers through worker
mobility.
The data also reveal that a considerable amount of individuals flow between foreign-
and domestically-owned firms, and between small and large firms, each year.  As an example,
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around 20% of those employed in a foreign-owned firm in a given year move to another firm
the following year (see Table 4.3).  Out of these, around two thirds end up in a domestically-
owned firm. Of those employed in large (>500 employees) firms, a similar share move to
another firm, but this time only around 1/3 end up in a small firm the following year (see Table
4.4). Thus, judged from the mere amount of observed mobility, there is considerable potential
for transfers of acquired skills across firms.
5. Empirical Results
This section provides a formal test of the three sets of empirical hypotheses derived in
the previous section.  In Section 5.1, we test the hypothesis that wages are higher in large
and/or foreign-owned firms, whereas in Section 5.2, we concentrate on the hypothesis of higher
wage growth in these firms.  Finally, in Section 5.3 we turn to the hypothesis of transferability
of skills acquired in previous employments by focusing on (i) the relationship between the
current wage level and previous experience from large firms; and (ii) the relationship between
the earnings of new self-employed and previous experience from large and foreign-owned
firms. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix B.
5.1 Wage Levels and Current Firm Type
In this section, we test the hypothesis of higher wage levels in large and/or foreign-owned firms
by regressing individual wages on worker and firm characteristics.  Columns 1-4 of Table 5.1
report the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions  for various specifications of the
right hand side.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the log hourly wage.
In the first column, the individual wage is regressed only on a dummy for current
employment in a foreign-owned firm, as well as a set of year dummies.  The positive and
strongly significant coefficient confirms the relationship from Table 4.2.  In column 2, the log
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of firm size is also included.  As hypothesised, the coefficient to this variable is also positive
and strongly significant, and its inclusion reduces the coefficient to the foreign-ownership
dummy, but does not eliminate it.  In column 3, a dummy taking the value one if the worker is
employed in an exporting firm is included as an additional proxy for HP firm type.  Not
surprisingly, the estimated coefficient to this dummy is also positive, and it decreases the
estimated coefficient to firm size by approximately 1/4. 
Addition of (observable) worker characteristics in column 4, such as age, experience,
gender, region, and industry dummies, lowers, but far from eliminates, the effect of foreign
ownership and firm size.  Summarizing the OLS results in Table 5.1, the move from column 1
to column 4 reduces the foreign-ownership premium by about half (0.070 versus 0.134). 
Acknowledging that the theory presents a pure case in which the foreign-ownership premium
should be reduced to zero, we feel that these results are consistent with the theory but still
leave something of an unexplained premium.  On the other hand, the fact that adding worker
characteristics still leaves a large firm-size premium is perfectly consistent with the theory.
While the positive coefficients to firm size and foreign ownership found in columns 1-4
support the empirical predictions of our theory, namely that large and/or foreign-owned firms
pay higher wages due to unobserved productivity advantages, they could alternatively reflect:
(a) that large and foreign-owned firms pick or attract workers who are more “able” in some
unobservable way; and/or (b) that growing firms or firms taken over by foreigners increase the
wages of their workers.
To test the importance of (a), we run the regressions in columns1-4 including individual
fixed effects to eliminate any time-invariant unobservable worker differences.  The results are
contained in columns 5-8 of Table 5.1.  While this significantly reduces the coefficient to the
foreign ownership dummy from around 10% to 1%, it only slightly affects the firm size effect.
The elasticity of wages with respect to firm size is still found to be around 0.01 and strongly
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 An alternative explanation for the drop in the coefficient to foreign ownership is of course
that these firms tend to attract better (high-wage) workers. 
significant.  Thus, the effects of firm size (and to some extent foreign-ownership) survive when
controlling for all individual characteristics, including the unobservable ones, as our theory
would predict.
Note, however, that with the short panel, the individual fixed-effects regression can
only pick up the short run effects of a change in ownership status or firm size.  This may
explain why the coefficient to foreign ownership drops, as we would not expect the full wage
premium to materialize until after a couple of years in a foreign firm.7  In this light, it may be
surprising that the coefficient to firm size only drops slightly, but it could reflect either rapid
learning and/or the importance of minimum wages and/or progressive taxes.  It could also
reflect that large firms in general tend to attract less “able” workers which in itself would
exercise a negative effect on the firm-size coefficient in the ordinary least squares regression. 
In any case, the results are consistent with a wage premium in large (and to some extent
foreign owned) firms already in the short run, which is not due to a different mix of workers in
these firms.  We shall get back to the long run effects in the following sections when
considering wage growth (Section 5.2) and the effects in a longer panel (Section 5.3).
Finally, to test the importance of (b), we add firm fixed effects instead of individual
fixed effects in column 9 of Table 5.1.  Our theory predicts that if we control for firm
heterogeneity by using firm fixed effects, the estimated effect of firm size (and foreign
ownership) should be reduced significantly.  If, instead, (b) is the explanation for the positive
relationship between firm size (and foreign ownership) and wages, the estimated relationship
should not be affected by the inclusion of firm fixed effects.
From column 9, we observe that the positive coefficients to firm size and foreign
ownership do in fact disappear (they even become negative) with the inclusion of firm fixed
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effects.  This provides additional support for the hypothesis that the higher wages in large and
foreign-owned firms are indeed caused by unobserved productivity advantages. 
The result that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages is consistent with a number of
existing studies; see, e.g., Doms and Jensen (1987), Aitken et al. (1996),  Feliciano and Lipsey
(1999), Griffith and Simpson (2003), and Girma and Görg (2006).  The few existing studies
based on matched employer-employee data, as in the current study,  also find that the overall
“wage-gap” between foreign-owned  and domestically-owned firms is reduced significantly
when controlling for firm and worker characteristics; see Heyman et al. (2004) and Martins
(2004).   
The positive relationship between firm size and wages has also been documented in a
number of studies, including  Idson and Feaster (1990) and Bayard and Troske (1999).  As
opposed to our study, Abowd et al. (1999) find that individual fixed effects remove most of the
relationship.  Brown and Medoff (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989) also find that
controlling for individual heterogeneity by estimating the relationship in first differences
reduces but does not eliminate the positive effect of firm size.
5.2 Wage Growth and Current Firm Type
In this section, we test the hypothesis of higher wage growth in large and/or foreign-
owned firms by regressing individual wage growth within job spells on worker and firm
characteristics.  Using the change in log hourly wages as the dependent variable, Columns 1-4
in Table 5.2 report the results of ordinary least squares estimates for various specifications of
the right hand side. 
The results show that the coefficient to firm size is significantly positive, and robust to
the inclusion of observable worker characteristics such as age, education and experience.  The
estimated coefficients imply that, e.g., a doubling of firm size should be associated with
116
8
 An explanation for the negative coefficient to firm size in column 4 may be that expanding
firms hire workers who have less wage growth in their first years of employment than already employed
workers. This difference between new and old workers may in turn result from imperfect ex-ante
information about the new workers’ productivities and thus their potential for wage growth.
Furthermore, if firms that downsize tend to lay off the unproductive workers (those with less wage
approximately 0.2 percentage points higher wage growth.  With an annual wage growth rate of
2%, this corresponds to 10% higher wage growth.
Foreign ownership also has a positive effect on wage growth when firm size is not
included (column 1).  However, this effect disappears with the inclusion of firm size in columns
2-3, as predicted by our theory. In fact, foreign ownership appears in itself to have a negative
effect on wage growth when controlling for firm size, although the effect is much less
statistically significant than that of firm size.  In Column 3, we control for a number of
observable worker characteristics as in Table 5.1.  This in fact slightly increases the firms-size
coefficient.
As in Section 5.1, we would like to control for unobservable worker differences as well
to determine whether the positive relationship between firm size and wage growth could be the
result of a different composition of worker types in these firms, e.g., workers with higher
learning potential and therefore higher wage growth.  However, as we only observe one job
spell for each individual due to the short nature of our panel, it is not possible to include
individual fixed effects.  Furthermore, the potential problem of unobservable worker differences
seems much less pertinent when considering wage growth rates instead of wage levels.  For
example, unobservable time-invariant ability differences that affect the wage level do not affect
wage growth.
Finally, in column 4 of Table 5.2, we add firm fixed effects to test whether the positive
relationship between firm size and wage growth just reflects that growing (or shrinking) firms
increase (or decrease) their wage growth rates.  This does not appear to be the case, as the
coefficient to firm size becomes strongly negative with the inclusion of firm fixed effects.8
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growth) first, we will get a negative coefficient to firm size when controlling for firm fixed effects.
Instead, the result strongly indicates that the higher wage growth in large firms does in fact
reflect unobservable firm differences, as our theory predicts.
While a number of studies have previously dealt with the relationship between firm size
(or foreign ownership) and wage levels, much fewer studies have considered the effects on
wage growth, and the existing results are mixed.  Using cross-section data,  Pearce (1990) finds
larger effects of tenure in large firms, whereas Baron et al. (1987) using panel data (for two
years) find a negative relationship between size and wage growth.  In a somewhat different
context, Møen (2005) finds higher wage growth in R&D intensive firms using an estimation
method similar to the one we use above. 
5.3 Earnings and Previous Experience
In this section, we turn to the hypothesized relationship between previous experience from
large and/or foreign-owned firms and current earnings, which should be brought about by a
transfer of acquired skills from one occupation to the next.  This is done by extending the
estimations from Table 5.1 with measures of previous experience.  To construct such measures,
we need a longer panel, and we therefore extend it to the period 1981-2003.  This implies that
we cannot include measures of foreign ownership (and exports) as this variable is unavailable
prior to the year 2000 (1995 for exports).  Furthermore, instead of firm size, we use plant size,
as the link between plants and firms is also incomplete for the earlier years. 
Columns 1-4 of Table 5.3 report the results of ordinary least squares wage regressions
for various specifications of the right hand side, whereas columns 5-6 include individual fixed
effects.  The regressions show the same picture as in Table 5.1.  The coefficient to the log of
plant size is significantly positive in all regressions and robust to the inclusion of individual
fixed effects.  As previously, it disappears with the inclusion of firm (plant) fixed effects
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 Note that the smaller t-values in the estimations in Table 5.4 reflect the much smaller sample sizes when
considering exclusively the new self-employed.
(column 7).
Furthermore, while tenure in the current firm in general increases the wage level, there
is an additional positive effect of tenure if the current plant is large (column 3).  This supports
the finding from Table 5.2 that wage growth is higher in larger firms.  Thus, our empirical
findings are fully consistent with not only a short-run wage premium but also higher subsequent
wage growth in large (and foreign-owned) firms.
Perhaps even more interestingly, there is an additional positive effect of experience if
this experience is from a large plant.  This can be seen from a comparison of the coefficients to
“experience” and “experience from large plants”.  In fact, while each extra year of experience
initially adds around 3% to the wage (an effect which is declining to around 1.5% per year after
10 years of experience due to the quadratic term in the regressions), this effect is increased by
another 1.4 percentage points if the experience is from a large plant. This strongly supports the
hypothesis of transferable skills.  This is further confirmed by the finding that this effect is
preserved with the inclusion of plant fixed effects in column 7.  The effects of previously
acquired skills do not disappear when controlling for current plant characteristics.
An additional test of the transferability of skills is to consider the earnings of new self-
employed.  Table 5.4 contains OLS estimates of the relationship between earnings of new self-
employed and their previous experience from large and foreign-owned firms.  Specifically, in
columns 1 and 2, the log of annual earnings is regressed on a number of individual
characteristics as well as dummies for the individual being employed in a foreign-owned and/or
a large firm the year before.  While employment in a foreign-owned firm increases income as
self-employed by 13.5%, this effect is reduced to 7.3% when also controlling for the size of the
firm.9 The elasticity of firm size, on the other hand, is found to be around 2%.
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In columns 3-5, we add the amount of experience from foreign-owned and large firms -
computed as the tenure in the last job spell if that was in a firm that was large or foreign-
owned, respectively, in the final year of employment.  In the case of foreign-owned firms, this
moves the effect away from the simple dummy variable to the experience variable, indicating
that not just experience from a foreign-owned firm, but also the amount of this experience
matters for self-employment income. However, this effect is not statistically significant when it
comes to experience from large firms.
Very few papers in the literature have considered the effects of previous workplace (or
firm) characteristics on current wages and self-employment income.  Møen (2005), however,
finds that a higher  R&D intensity in previous employment increases the positive effect on
wages of previous experience.  Martins (2005) also finds some evidence of higher wages for
workers moving from foreign to domestic firms compared to their colleagues in domestic firms. 
In a developing country context, Görg and Strobel (2005), using data from Ghana, find positive
effects on self-employment earnings of previous experience from foreign-owned firms.
In sum, this section has provided considerable support for the empirical implications of
our theoretical model.  Wage levels and wage growth are higher in large and/or foreign-owned
firms, and these effects survive controlling for worker characteristics but are reduced
significantly when controlling for unobservable firm characteristics, as predicted by our model. 
Furthermore, skills appear to be transferable to both subsequent wage work and self-
employment.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The paper is motivated by the interests by both researchers and policy makers in
possible beneficial effects of foreign companies on local companies and workers.  We focus on
workers, and on the direct effects of working for a high-productivity firm on the individual’s
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productivity in subsequent wage work or self-employment.  Using a much-simplified version of
Meltiz’s heterogeneous firms model, our theory model predicts that foreign firms pay higher
average wages, their workers have higher average wage growth, and they earn more in
subsequent self-employment for workers who switch.  
However, this is due to foreign firms having a higher average productivity, in turn due
to the inability of low-productivity foreign firms to enter due to fixed entry costs.  High
productivity firms are larger, and hence our model also predicts that foreign firms are not more
productive than larger domestic firms.  In other words, most of the favorable effects of foreign
firms disappear when correcting for firm size.  
Several experiments with the model indicate that the average wage premium in foreign
firms is reduced as either (1) the productivity in MP firms of workers who switch to MP firms
from HP firms is increased or (2) the absolute expected value of self-employment earnings
when switching from an HP firm grows relative to switching to self-employment from an MP
firm.  This fall in the average wage premium is due to a decrease in the share of HP firm
workers who are experienced and also in (2) by a willingness to work for less in the first period
in a HP firm due to the higher expected payoff in self-employment.  In these cases, the HP
firms are partly performing the function of “nurseries”, training inexperienced workers who
work on the cheap and then leave for MP firms or self-employment.
On the other hand, the theory model also concludes that the wage premium is increased
by either (1) a minimum wage which prevents HP firms from paying a low initial wage and/or
(2) a progressive income tax that hits the second-period earnings of workers in HP firms (or
transiting to MP firms).   Both of these factors seem empirically relevant, and should lead to the
observation of a higher wage premium simultaneously with higher wage growth in HP firms.
Our theory model can be used to derive a number of testable empirical hypotheses
about wage levels, wage growth, and productivity transfers. These are tested using matched
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data between individual Danish workers and firms in the second part of the paper.
Consistent with our theory, we find that working for a foreign owned firm significantly
(1) increases the worker’s wage, (2) increases the worker’s wage growth, and (3) increases
subsequent earnings of new self-employed. We also find that effects (1) and (3) are significantly
reduced, but not eliminated, by controlling for firm size.  Effect (2) disappears completely when
controlling for firm size. Firm (plant) size is also in itself found to have a significantly positive
effect on subsequent earnings as wage employed (where information on foreign ownership is
not available).  Thus the empirical results are certainly close to our theoretical predictions
although, the foreign ownership effect does not disappear in all cases.
However, as also consistent with our theory, the effects of firm size and foreign
ownership do disappear with the inclusion of firm (or plant) fixed effects, while they survive
controlling for worker differences (observable and unobservable). 
There are several plausible reasons for the residual foreign-ownership effect after
controlling for firm size and observable worker characteristics.  One is simply that the top end
of the productivity distribution of foreign firms is higher than that for domestic firms and so the
average entering foreign firm has a higher average productivity than the higher-productivity
domestic firms.  This is pretty ad hoc and again, within the heterogenous-firms approach, those
higher productivity foreign firms would then have higher outputs, so the effect on wages should
disappear controlling for size.  Of course, the effect of size may be non-linear, offering a second
explanation for the residual foreign-ownership effect, and we are considering that.
Second, and perhaps related, is that foreign firms are somehow able to pick the best
workers and the characteristics in question are unobservable.   This obviously calls for fixed
effects at the worker level, but the short nature of our panel creates difficulties.  All we are able
to identify with our fixed-effects regressions is essentially the initial wage premium from
switching to a foreign firm.  We estimate this to be positive, but quite small .  But this is
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10As noted in our literature review, the alternative approach of Yeaple (2005) with ex ante
identical firms and heterogeneous workers deserves a careful and thorough examination in the empirical
context.  
perfectly consistent with the theory model, which predicts a low or negative initial wage
premium in equilibrium which balances higher earnings later on.  Thus the question of whether
or not the foreign firms have a better ability to select must await further research.10
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Appendix A: analytical solutions
This appendix gives analytical solutions to the model for the case where there is some
(but not full) transiting in equilibrium, i.e.  and .   
Wages for workers in HP firms can be solved for from (2), (3), and (9).
from (2) and (3), so using these in (9) gives (A1)
 (A2)
 where .    in the base case with no self-employment probability.
The price of a representative good from an HP firm is solved for from (3) given that we
know  from (A2). 
(A3)
And the price of a representative good from an MP firm is solved for from (4).
(A4)
The output of a representative good from an MP firm is solved for from (10) given that
we know the output price from (A4).
(A5)
The total output of a representative good from an HP firm is solved for from the
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution condition.
(A6)
Given that we know  we then have
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(A7)
We then have one remaining variable, , and parameter, I.   The expenditure-income
equation is
(A8)
All of the endogenous variables except  are now known and so this gives one
remaining equation in one unknown.  In our base case numerical solution, we chose an initial
value of  and this then calibrates, given our choice that  and the
endogenous values of prices already solved for, to a value of I = 116.6667.  This is given by the
equation
or just
(A9)
The calibrated value of I is then held constant in the subsequent analysis, and (A9) can be
inverted to give the equilibrium value of  .
To get average wages within the firm, we have to push the analysis further and must
solve for the shares in (6) and (7).  This requires us to make use of (8).  From (13), 
where    (A10)
and  by virtue of the non-negativity constraint on  .
Briefly, we have the share of transit workers in MP firms along with the equilibrium
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output per firm in (A5)
(A11)
These two equations can be solved to get  .
  (A12)
Finally, (A11), (A12), and the number of MP firms from (A9) are  inserted into
equation (8).  The only remaining variables in (8) are then  and  .  As a consequence, (8)
can be reduced to
(A13)
Equation (A13) and (A7) allow us to solve for two equations in two unknowns.
(A14)
The above equations hold as long as there is transit in equilibrium. The minimum value 
such that below this value there is no transit, is given by setting (A12) equal to zero.
(A15)
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The maximum value such that above this value all workers transit from HP firms is given by
setting the number of first-period workers who do not go into self-employment  equal to the
number of transit workers.  This is just equation (8) without the first two terms on the right
hand side. 
Using that
and that  equals (A7), we get:
(A16)
which using (A11) and (A13) can be solved to.
(A17)
With respect to the experiments conducted in the paper, note that the share of transiting
workers (or alternatively we report the share of first-period HP workers who transit) is
increasing in γ, which is the experiment in Table 3.1.   Also, β is increasing α, and ν, the
probability of a successful self-employment draw and the self-employment premium,
respectively.  The share of transiting workers is increasing in β and therefore in α and ν.  The
former is the experiment in Table 3.2, so both analytical findings are confirmed in the
simulations.
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Appendix B: Definitions of variables used in regressions:
Variables available in both panels
Variable  Definition
Hourly wage
(Continuous variable)
Wages divided by number of hours worked. The number of hours is
imputed from mandatory pension payments, which are determined by the
number of hours in employment per week. These estimates are computed
by Statistics Denmark.
Gross annual earnings
(Continuous variable)
All taxable income.
Experience:
(Continuous variable).
This variable is a continuous measure of actual labor market experience
based on the number of days in employment over the worker’s career.
Experience is measured in number of years of full time work.
Years of education
(Count variable).
Scheduled number of years of completed of education. Examples: High-
school = 12 years; Master degree = 18 years.
Variables only available in the short panel
Variable  Definition
Foreign
(Dummy variable).
Takes the value one for workers employed in firms where foreigners
ultimately own more than 50% of the firm, and FDI amounts to more
than DKK 10 million. Zero otherwise.
Firm size
(Count variable).
The average number of full-time employees (within a year) in the firm
where the individual is employed. The firm is defined as the legal entity
which employ the worker.
Exporter 
(Dummy variable).
Takes the value one for workers employed in firms with exports. Zero
otherwise.
Variables only available in the long panel
Variable  Definition
Plant size
(Dummy variable).
The number of employees in the last week of November at the workplace
(plant) where the individual is employed. A workplace is defined by its
address.  
Tenure
(Count variable)
The number of years employed at the current workplace. Tenure is reset
to zero when the individual changes workplace. 
Large
(Dummy variable)
 
Takes the value one for workers employed at workplaces with more 50
employees. Zero otherwise. The dummy variable Large is then interacted
with Experience and Tenure.
Experience from large
plants
(Count variable)
Total number of years of employment at workplaces with more 50
employees, measured from the beginning of the individual’s career to the
current date.
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Table 3.1:   increase in parameter γ ( determining rmt ), Table 3.2:   increase in the probability 
producitivty of HP firm transiting to MP firms. of a favorable self-employment draw, α
γ 0.940 0.950 0.960 0.970 0.980 0.990
rmt 1.190 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 α 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.060 0.080 0.100
WH1 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.894 0.889 0.884 0.879 0.875
WH2 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.192 1.185 1.179 1.172 1.167
average wage growth in an HP firm 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333
average wage domestic firm 1.009 1.009 1.012 1.016 1.019 1.023 1.009 1.007 1.006 1.005 1.006 1.006
average wage foreign firm 1.050 1.050 1.038 1.026 1.015 1.004 1.050 1.042 1.034 1.025 1.011 0.998
total output of an MP firm 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
total outpout of an HP firm 4.630 4.630 4.630 4.630 4.630 4.630 4.630 4.720 4.805 4.887 4.964 5.038
share of first period HP workers 0.119 0.226 0.323 0.410 0.017 0.089 0.151
   who transit to MP firms
Table 3.3:   increase in the minimum wage, Table 3.4:   progressive income tax 
 which impacts only on wh1  (tax on earnings above w = 1)
wh1 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1 tax rate 0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20
WH1 0.900 0.920 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.000 0.900 0.914 0.927 0.940 0.953 0.964
WH2 1.200 1.227 1.253 1.280 1.307 1.333 1.200 1.219 1.237 1.254 1.270 1.286
average wage growth in an HP firm 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333
take home wage growth in an HP fi 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.282 0.235 0.190 0.149 0.111
average wage domestic firm 1.010 1.014 1.018 1.020 1.023 1.025 1.010 1.013 1.016 1.018 1.019 1.021
average wage foreign firm 1.050 1.073 1.097 1.120 1.143 1.167 1.050 1.066 1.082 1.097 1.111 1.125
total output of an MP firm 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
total outpout of an HP firm 4.630 4.334 4.063 3.815 3.586 3.375 4.630 4.419 4.230 4.060 3.905 3.764
share of first period HP workers
   who transit to MP firms
Table 4.1: Firm Types and Employment
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
0-49 241,946 1,966 240,393 2,037 237,605 2,119
50-499 2,632 573 2,631 579 2,586 564
500+ 195 58 194 52 186 55
Total 244,773 2,597 243,218 2,668 240,377 2,738
0-49 551,159 23,245 543,985 23,738 537,882 24,250
50-499 302,658 84,765 304,132 88,435 299,516 86,621
500+ 322,316 74,561 321,540 75,598 298,222 84,360
Total 1,176,133 182,571 1,169,657 187,771 1,135,620 195,231
Table 4.2: Firm Types, Average Wages and Wage Growth
2000 2001 2002 2000-1 2001-2
Domestic 174.89 183.02 186.93 5.00% 3.23%
Foreign 203.77 212.33 218.32 5.01% 3.34%
Small (0-49) 167.68 175.62 178.75 4.79% 2.70%
Medium (50-499) 186.13 194.70 199.68 5.02% 3.46%
Large (500+) 185.41 193.98 199.93 5.24% 3.66%
Absolute numbers
2000 2001 2002
Firm Size
(# employees) Firms
Employment
Average wages Wage growth
Note: The table includes all full-time workers in the private sector. The division of firms into size classes is based on the average 
number of employees over the year. 
Note: The table includes all full-time workers in the private sector, aged 20-65 years. The division of firms 
into size classes is based on the average number of employees over the year. Average wages are hourly 
wages in DKK.
Status the following year
Same firm, foreign owned 107,615 63.2% 119,121 67.5%
Same firm, domestically owned 18,387 10.8% 7,191 4.1%
New firm, foreign owned 11,409 6.7% 13,779 7.8%
New firm, domestically owned 18,398 10.8% 20,293 11.5%
Self-employment 1,003 0.6% 840 0.5%
Unemployment/non-employment 9,677 5.7% 11,695 6.6%
Public sector 3,676 2.2% 3,593 2.0%
Total 170,165 100.0% 176,512 100.0%
Status the following year
Same firm, domestically owned 805,641 67.8% 820,971 69.5%
Same firm, foreign owned 21,507 1.8% 17,463 1.5%
New firm, domestically owned 205,376 17.3% 182,443 15.4%
New firm, foreign owned 31,920 2.7% 29,605 2.5%
Self-employment 11,556 1.0% 10,758 0.9%
Unemployment/non-employment 79,812 6.7% 89,129 7.5%
Public sector 32,936 2.8% 30,787 2.6%
Total 1,188,748 100.0% 1,181,156 100.0%
Table 4.4: Worker Flows, by Firm Size
Status the following year
Same firm, large 301,653 64.6% 312,685 67.6%
Same firm, small 14,129 3.0% 9,457 2.0%
New firm, large 66,526 14.2% 52,905 11.4%
New firm, small 37,796 8.1% 37,030 8.0%
Self-employment 2,623 0.6% 2,292 0.5%
Unemployment/non-employment 29,577 6.3% 33,589 7.3%
Public sector 14,968 3.2% 14,512 3.1%
Total 467,272 100.0% 462,470 100.0%
Status the following year
Same firm, small 661,659 69.4% 668,127 69.8%
Same firm, large 9,547 1.0% 7,268 0.8%
New firm, small 139,910 14.7% 134,660 14.1%
New firm, large 37,152 3.9% 35,623 3.7%
Self-employment 10,682 1.1% 9,968 1.0%
Unemployment/non-employment 67,485 7.1% 76,385 8.0%
Public sector 26,734 2.8% 25,215 2.6%
Total 953,169 100.0% 957,246 100.0%
Table 4.3: Worker Flows, by Ownership of the Firm
Workers employed in foreign-owned firms
2000 2001
Workers employed in small firms
Workers employed in domestically-owned firms
Workers employed in large firms
2000 2001
Note: The table includes all full-time workers in the private sector, aged 20-65.  A firm is considered foreign owned if foreigners 
ultimately own more than 50% of the firm, and FDI amounts to more than DKK 10 million. 
Note: The table includes all full-time workers in the private sector, aged 20-65.  A firm is considered larger if the average 
number of employees over the year is lager than 500.
Table 5.1: Effects of Current Firm Type on Wage Levels (short panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE Firm FE
Foreign 0.134 0.110 0.101 0.070 0.020 0.013 0.011 0.012 -0.006
(216.47)** (173.98)** (154.12)** (133.02)** (36.53)** (24.82)** (17.84)** (19.69)** (3.95)**
Log(firm size) 0.000 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.011 -0.021
0.00 (235.16)** (146.48)** (124.55)** 0.00 (99.38)** (91.09)** (81.74)** (22.31)**
Exporter 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.011 0.001
0.00 0.00 (109.51)** (107.57)** 0.00 0.00 (24.40)** (26.26)** (0.54)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036
0.00 0.00 0.00 (218.69)** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (231.62)**
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0004
0.00 0.00 0.00 (211.37)** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (216.38)**
Experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.015
0.00 0.00 0.00 (147.45)** 0.00 0.00 0.00 (61.19)** (163.55)**
Experience2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0002
0.00 0.00 0.00 (89.00)** 0.00 0.00 0.00 (185.28)** (102.39)**
0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045
0.00 0.00 0.00 (557.64)** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (565.46)**
Female 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.187
0.00 0.00 0.00 (515.89)** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (474.04)**
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes yes yes yes 0.000
Firm effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes
Industry effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes 0.000
Regional effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes 0.000
Observations 3,584,768   3,565,987   3,259,986   3,215,543   3,584,768   3,565,987   3,259,986   3,259,986   3,215,543   
Number of firms -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -              111,232      
-              -              -              1,449,600   1,445,909   1,341,082   1,341,082   -              
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.26
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
Years of education
Number of individuals
Note: The table is based on a panel from 2000-2002, which includes all full-time workers in the private sector aged 20-65. Foreign=1 for workers employed in 
firms where foreigners ultimately own more than 50% of the firm, and FDI amounts to more than DKK 10 million. Firm size refers to the average number of full-
time employees in the firm within a year. Exporter=1 for workers employed in firms with exports. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.
Table 5.2: Effects of Current Firm Type on Wage Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS Firm FE
Foreign 0.07 -0.19 -0.17 -1.80
(2.05)* (5.69)** (4.94)** (10.66)**
Log(firm size) 0.00 0.21 0.26 -1.80
0.00 (42.62)** (47.51)** (15.61)**
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.76 -0.77
0.00 0.00 (54.21)** (62.87)**
Age2 0.00 0.00 0.0072 0.0075
0.00 0.00 (45.12)** (52.69)**
Experience 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.10
0.00 0.00 (12.29)** (14.41)**
Experience2 0.00 0.00 0.0022 0.0019
0.00 0.00 (12.28)** (11.28)**
0.00 0.07 0.04
0.00 0.00 (12.92)** (6.73)**
Female 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.15
0.00 0.00 (14.70)** (5.44)**
Time effects yes yes yes yes
Firm Effects yes
Industry effects yes
Regional Effects yes
Observations 1,728,255      1,723,877       1,704,278       1,704,278         
Number of firms 86,794              
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Dependent variable: dlog(hourly wages)
Years of education
Note: All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The table is based on a panel from 2000-2002, which 
includes all full-time workers in the private sector aged 20-65. Foreign=1 for workers employed in firms 
where foreigners ultimately own more than 50% of the firm and FDI amounts to more than DKK 10 
million. Firm size refers to the average number of full-time employees in the firm within a year. Robust t 
statistics are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 5.3: Effects of Previous Plant Size on Wage Levels (long panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Plant FE
Log(plant size) 0.041 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.002
(294.59)** (167.70)** (110.71)** (111.03)** (117.46)** (108.87)** (2.62)**
Age 0.000 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.000 0.070 0.050
0.00 (246.29)** (245.27)** (244.98)** 0.00 (78.96)** (256.76)**
Age2 0.000 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0006
0.00 (205.42)** (204.37)** (203.70)** 0.00 (238.31)** (215.08)**
Experience 0.000 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.000 0.025 0.028
0.00 (246.55)** (211.82)** (173.76)** 0.00 (120.83)** (165.70)**
Experience2 0.000 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0008
0.00 (205.40)** (167.10)** (141.56)** 0.00 (116.88)** (127.89)**
Tenure 0.000 0.0114 0.0043 -0.0030 0.0000 0.0021 0.0058
0.00 (61.46)** (15.81)** (10.64)** 0.00 (11.48)** (20.57)**
Tenure2 0.000 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002
0.00 (57.00)** (13.23)** (3.53)** 0.00 (33.55)** (9.22)**
Female 0.000 -0.175 -0.175 -0.176 0.000 0.000 -0.157
0 0.00 (401.36)** (400.98)** (403.36)** 0.00 0.00 (343.82)**
0.043 0.043 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.036
0.00 (428.51)** (428.36)** (424.76)** 0.00 0.00 (348.20)**
0.000 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.006
0.00 0.00 (30.25)** (24.59)** 0.00 0.00 (32.04)**
0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
0.00 0.00 (20.17)** (14.45)** 0.00 0.00 (22.32)**
0.000 0.014 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.008
0.00 0.00 (40.64)** (43.43)** 0.00 0.00 (24.04)**
Large x Tenure2 0.000 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0007
0.00 0.00 (39.08)** (42.98)** 0.00 0.00 (28.81)**
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.012
0.00 0.00 (67.33)** 0.00 0.00 (64.53)**
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003
(40.78)**
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual effects yes yes
Firm effects yes
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,553,239  3,553,239  3,553,239  3,553,239  3,553,239  3,553,239  3,553,239     
Number of plants 175,413        
570,497     570,497     
R-squared 0.20           0.39           0.39           0.39           0.35           0.37           0.29              
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
Large x Experience
Large x Experience2
Experience from large plants
(Experience from large plants)2
Years of education
Large x Tenure
Number of individuals
Note: The table is based on a panel from 1981-2003. The panel includes a 50% sample of all full-time workers in the private sector 
aged 20-65 who entered the Danish labor market in 1981 or later. Plant size is the total number of employees in the last week of 
November. Large =1 for workers employed in firms where plant size > 50. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.
Table 5.4: Effects of Previous Firm Type on Earnings 
                of New Self-Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Foreignt-1 0.135 0.073 -0.044 0.067 -0.031
0 (6.11)** (3.11)** (1.07) (2.85)** (0.72)
Log(firm sizet-1) 0 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.018
0 0.00 (7.44)** (7.44)** (4.16)** (4.51)**
Age 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.62) (1.48) (1.48) (1.45) (1.45)
Age2 0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004
(0.17) (0.60) (0.60) (0.57) (0.58)
Experience 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
(14.90)** (13.98)** (13.84)** (13.85)** (13.79)**
Experience2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(11.09)** (10.52)** (10.49)** (10.51)** (10.49)**
Years of schooling 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
0 (15.41)** (14.39)** (14.37)** (14.38)** (14.36)**
Female -0.272 -0.267 -0.268 -0.268 -0.268
0 (15.39)** (14.35)** (14.38)** (14.37)** (14.39)**
Foreignt-1 x Tenuret-1 0 0 0.047 0 0.043
0 0.00 0.00 (3.05)** 0.00 (2.59)**
(Foreignt-1 x Tenuret-1)2 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
0 0.00 0.00 (2.15)* 0.00 (2.04)*
Larget-1 x Tenuret-1 0 0 0 0.012 0.006
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 (1.79) (0.88)
(Larget-1 x Tenuret-1)2 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 -0.0002 0.0000
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.67) (0.001)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 23,125         20,183         20,183         20,183         20,183         
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Dependent variable: log(gross annual earnings)
Note: The table is based on a panel from 2000-2002 which includes all new self-employed (in their first year as self-employed) 
who were employed as wage-workers in the period prior to self-employment. Only individuals aged between 20 and 65 that 
operate in the private sector are included. Foreignt-1=1 for individuals previously employed in foreign firms (the period prior to 
business start-up). Firm sizet-1 refers to size of the firm in the previous job. Larget-1=1 for individuals previously employed in firms 
with more than 500 employees. Tenuret-1 is tenure in previous job. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.
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1. Introduction
Methods for solving and estimating discrete choice dynamic programming models have
been one of the most active research areas over the last two decades1. The importance
and usefulness of dynamic discrete choice models for individual economic behavior is now
well established: First, the structural approach where parameters to be estimated are
linked directly to individual objectives or constraints in a theory model enables us to
discriminate between competing behavioral models and to draw precise inference about
individual economic behavior. In turn, a structurally estimated model can be used for
evaluation of policy proposals by means of counterfactual simulations.
However, researchers using these types of models, often face considerable computational
burdens to overcome. Therefore model specications often have to be very parsimonious in
terms of state variables. Furthermore, inference in many interesting models are precluded
by the requirement of high dimensional integration and for that reason researchers often
must restrict attention to models with a very simple - some times unrealistic - error
structure.
Rust (1988, 1989) introduced the conditional independence assumption, which dened
a class of models where the dimensions of the dynamic programming problem were sig-
nicantly reduced. As a special case, Rust considered a particular simple class of models,
where unobservables are additively separable in utility, independent across alternatives,
and extreme value distributed. These assumptions imply that the multidimensional inte-
grals in the choice specic expected value functions and conditional choice probabilities
have a simple closed form, thereby saving the cost of multi-dimensional integration over
unobserved state variables.
In this paper, I propose an estimation procedure for mixed Markov decision models of
discrete choices. The suggested approach builds on the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm
developed in Rust (1987, 1988) and ideas from the literature on mixed discrete choice
1For excellent surveys of the literature on structural estimation of dynamic decision processes, see
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989); Pakes (1994); Rust (1994); and Miller (1997). For an update of the recent
developments in the literature, see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007a).
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models with simulation (see e.g. Train (2003)). Assuming that only a part of the un-
observed state variables are additively separable in utility and multivariate iid extreme
value distributed results in a Dynamic Programming Mixed Logit (DPMXL) model.
Chebyshev polynomials are used to approximate expected value functions over contin-
uous variables and Monte Carlo integration is used to evaluate integrals in the expected
value functions and to simulate likelihood functions. The use of Chebyshev polynomials
has important spin-o¤s. First of all, it helps ameliorating the curse of dimensionality;
the well known exponential rise in computer time and storage requirements as the dimen-
sion of the state space increases.2 Secondly, it permits fast and accurate evaluation of
simulated likelihood functions, once value functions are approximated.
DPMXL obviates many of the limitations of Rusts model with additive separable,
conditional independent, extreme value distributed unobservables and can potentially
allow for i) random taste variation, ii) unrestricted substitution patterns, iii) correlation
in unobserved state variables over time, iv) lots of observed and unobserved heterogeneity,
and v) arbitrary shape of the distribution of unobserved factors. This greatly expands the
range of models that can be considered. I present two examples of di¤erent specications
of the model. First, I consider the case of observed and unobserved individual specic
heterogeneity, arbitrarily correlated across alternatives. Second, I consider the case of
serially correlated unobservables.
I evaluate the method by studying the extent to which approximation errors are trans-
mitted to conditional choice probabilities, likelihood functions and structural parameter
estimates. Doing this for various degrees of approximation, I nd that a fth order poly-
nomial provide su¢ ciently accurate approximations to the expected value function, where
approximation errors and bias in ML estimates are practically eliminated.
Finally, to illustrate the DPMXL model with unobserved individual specic heterogene-
ity, I perform a Monte Carlo experiment where I evaluate the importance of neglected
individual specic heterogeneity in dynamic programming models.
2This idea is not new. The use of exible functions (such as series of polynomials) has become increas-
ingly popular as a way of ameliorating the curse of dimensionality (see Rust (1996) for a comprehensive
treatment and evaluation of these methods and Imai and Keane (2004) and Gamba and Tesser (2006)
for recent applications)
MIXED MARKOV DECISION MODELS 141
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I briey review some of
the existing estimation procedures for dynamic structural models for discrete choices.
In section 3, I formulate the assumptions behind the behavioral model of interest and
the econometric specication. In section 4, I describe how parametric approximations
of the expected value function are implemented in the estimation procedure to obtain
maximum likelihood estimates under the conditional independence assumption. In sec-
tion 5, I present two specications of the DPMXL model. In section 6, I present some
numerical results. First, I evaluate the accuracy of the approximation methods and the
consequences for empirical inference. Secondly, the importance of heterogeneity bias in
dynamic programming discrete choice models is investigated. Section 7 concludes.
2. Existing Estimation Procedures
In this section, I review some of the existing algorithms to solve and estimate dynamic
structural models of discrete choices.
Rust (1988) introduced the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm (NFXP), which is one of
the rst and most widely adopted approaches. This procedure describes how to obtain
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates in dynamic Markov decision models. Rusts NFXP
algorithm is a full solution method. To obtain ML estimates an outer hill climbing
algorithm searches over the parameter space, while an inneralgorithm is used to re-
solve a xed point problem for each evaluation of the likelihood function. NFXP has been
extensively used for empirical applications in numerous areas: Optimal replacement of
machines (Rust (1987) and Kennet (1994)), and retirement behavior (Rust and Phelan
(1997) and Karlstrom, Palme, and Svensson (2004)).
Hotz and Miller (1993) suggested an even simpler estimator called the Conditional
Choice Probability (CCP) estimator and provided an application to a model of contracep-
tive choices.3 As opposed to NFXP, the CCP estimator does not require econometricians
to explicitly solve the xed point problem. Hotz and Miller show that value functions,
characterizing the choice specic expected future utility, can be expressed as a (closed
form) function of state variables, structural parameters and conditional choice probabil-
ities. Replacing true conditional choice probabilities by non-parametric estimates, Hotz
3The CPP estimator has also been applied to models of price and inventory decisions, see e.g. Aguir-
regabiria (1999).
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and Miller obtain a simple closed form expression for conditional choice probabilities,
which in turn is used to construct a sample criterion used in estimation.
However, although the CCP estimator is proven to be consistent and asymptotically
normal, the computational gain is followed by a cost of e¢ ciency in nite samples. This
e¢ ciency cost is likely to grow exponentially with the dimension of the state space, since
the non-parametric estimator to used estimate conditional choice probabilities is subject
to (an empirical) curse of dimensionality.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) suggested a new iterative nested algorithm, called the
Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) algorithm. They utilize the insights from Hotz and
Miller (1993) to obtain a representation of the solution to the dynamic programming
model in conditional probability space. This allows them to swap the nesting of the
two algorithms in Rusts nested xed point algorithm, such that the hill climbingalgo-
rithm that maximizes the (pseudo) likelihood over the parameter space is nested in the
more computationally expensive xed point algorithm. Successive iterations thus return
a sequence of estimators, which they call K-stage Policy Iteration (PI) estimators.
The PI estimator is shown to nest the CCP estimator (when K = 1) and to converge
to the ML estimator obtained by Rusts NFXP algorithm (as K ! 1). Hence, by
iterating on the NPL algorithm, the researcher can obtain more e¢ ciency at the expense of
computational cost asK is increased. Aguirregabiria andMira (2002) present Monte Carlo
evidence showing that NPL provides very precise estimates when K = 2 and therefore
converges much faster (5 to 15 times) than NFXP.4
The techniques developed in Hotz and Miller (1993) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)
has proven to be particularly useful in the estimation of dynamic games of incomplete in-
formation. (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007b) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007c) for
an applications of the NPL algorithm to rmsentry and exit decisions in oligopoly mar-
kets) The NPL algorithm has also been applied to single agent models (see e.g. Sanchez-
Mangas (2001)).
4When evaluating the NPL algorithm Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) consider a particular simple
class of models with unobservables which are extreme value distributed, binary choice and multiplica-
tive separability between state variables and parameters in the utility functions. Moreover, the model
considered in the Monte Carlo experiment has only a single state variable.
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So why not always use the NPL algorithm? The answer is that computational gains
come at the cost of generality. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) cite di¢ culties in dealing
with more general specications. First, the PI and CCP estimators both maintain the
conditional independence assumption, and hence they cannot handle serial correlation.5
Secondly, as mentioned above, computation of choice specic value functions in probability
space requires that the mapping from value functions to conditional choice probabilities
is inverted. For other distributions than the extreme value distribution, this mapping
does not have a closed form in the rst place and the mapping must therefore be inverted
numerically. This may imply a serious computational cost and it remains to be seen
whether CCP and PI estimators will be useful when the iid extreme value assumption is
relaxed.
Several authors have tried to deviate from Rusts model with additively separable, con-
ditionally independent, extreme value distributed unobservables. A prominent example
is the occupational choice model in Keane and Wolpin (1997). First, unobserved state
variables are not additive separeable in utility. Second, the model allows for permanent
unobserved heterogeneity in skill endowments using a nite mixture of discrete types.
When relaxing the assumptions in this direction, the integrals in the expected value func-
tion no longer have closed form. Consequently, this requires high dimensional numerical
integration over unobserved state variables at each point in the state space. To esti-
mate the model, Keane and Wolpin (1997) use the simulation and interpolation method
developed in Keane and Wolpin (1994).6
Recently, Imai, Jain, and Ching (2006) developed a procedure for Bayesian dynamic
programming estimation that solves the dynamic programming problem and estimates
the parameters at the same time. In contrast to most dynamic structural estimation
procedures, their algorithm can be readily be applied to models where observed and
5The CCP estimator has the additional di¢ culty, that it must be initialized with nonparametric
estimates of conditional choice probabilities. Hence, I applications with e.g. unobserved heterogeneity,
consistent nonparametric estimates of choice probabilities either are not available or are very imprecise.
6In Keane and Wolpin (1997), Monte Carlo integration is used to simulate expectations of the value
function at a subset of the state points. For every time period, they estimate a regression function based
on these points and use the tted regression to interpolate between them.
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unobserved heterogeneities are continuous. This is in contrast to, e.g., the approach used
in Keane and Wolpin (1997).
3. The Behavioral Framework
3.1. The General Problem. Consider a decision maker who faces a sequence of repeated
choice situations. In each discrete time period, the agent chooses between a nite number
of mutually exclusive choice alternatives, d 2 D = f1; 2; ::; Jg, in order to maximize
an innite sum of expected future payo¤s subjectively discounted by the discount factor
 2 (0; 1). In each time period, the decision maker receives a state- and choice-specic
pay-o¤according to the instantaneous utility function u (s; d), where s denotes the current
value of the state variables. Future values of the state variables, s0, are uncertain to the
agent; and the agents beliefs about future states obeys a (controlled) Markov transition
process with transition probability p (s0js; d).7
The optimal choice can be summarized by a stationary decision rule
(3.1)  (s) = arg max
d2D(s)

u(s; d) + 
Z
V (s0) p (ds0js; d)

where V (s) is the value function.
By Bellmans principle of optimality, V (s) can be found as the unique xed point of
the Bellman equation.
(3.2) V (s) = max
d2D(s)

u(s; d) + 
Z
V (s0) p (ds0js; d)

From an econometric point of view, we need to introduce an error term, since no
structural model will ever perfectly predict observed choice behavior. One reason for this
is that the econometrician only observes a subset of the state variables s: To discriminate
between observable and unobservable variables, I assume that the vector of state variables
s partitions into two components s = (x; ") where x are state variables observable for us
as researchers and " are unobserved state variables. Assume further that " have J choice
specic components " (d) : d 2 D with support on the real line. With this notation, the
7In the class of models considered here, the value function does not depend on time per se, resulting
in a stationary decision rule. We can therefore omit time subscripts and let s0 denote the state variable
in the following period.
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optimal value function V (x; "), can be expressed as the unique solution to the Bellman
equation
(3.3) V (x; ") = max
d2D(s)
fu(x; "; d) + EV (x; "; i)g
where EV (x; "; d)  R
y
R

V (y; ) p(dy; djx; "; d) denote the expected value function.
Empirical implementation of this model attempts to uncover the structural parameters,
, of the agents optimization problem given panel data on observable state variables xnt,
the discrete choice variable dnt (and possibly also permanent conditioning variables zn).
The parameters of interest are the discount factor , the parameters that index the utility
function, u(x; "; d), and the transition probability of the state variable process, p (s0js; d).
Estimates of these parameters can be obtained by maximizing the sample log likelihood
l () =
PN
n=1 ln (), where ln () is the log likelihood contribution of individual n
ln () = log Pr (dnt; xnt : t = 1; 2:::Tnj)
= log Pr (dnt =  (xnt; "nt; ) ; xnt : t = 1; 2:::Tnj)
To evaluate the likelihood function for a given value of the structural parameters, ,
we must solve for the decision rule  (xnt; "nt; ). The conventional procedure to Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML) estimation of dynamic programming models is to use Rusts Nested
Fixed Point Algorithm: The Algorithm consist of two steps. First an inneralgorithm nu-
merically computes the solution to the dynamic programming problem and subsequently
evaluates the likelihood function. Second an outer hill climbing algorithm searches over
di¤erent values of  to maximize the implied likelihood function. Thus, the inner xed
point algorithm is nested in the outer algorithm.
3.2. Rusts Assumptions. As it stands, we face a considerable computational burden
when repeatedly solving for the xed point in the Bellman equation (3.3). In many
problems the state variables are continuously distributed with unbounded support. This
introduces serious dimensionality problems and the requirement of high dimensional in-
tegration when evaluating EV (x; "; d). Furthermore, computation of conditional choice
probabilities P (djx) used for estimation and inference, requires numerical integration over
the unknown function EV (x; "; d) with respect to ". A major contribution of Rust (1987)
146 BERTEL SCHJERNING
and Rust (1988) was to introduce the conditional independence assumption that allows
us to circumvent some of these problems.
Assumption 1. (Conditional Independence Assumption (CI)): The transition density of
the controlled process fx; "g factors as
(3.4) p(x0; "0jx; "; d) = g("0jx0)f(x0jx; d)
Under assumption 1, the unobserved state variables, ", can be integrated out from the
Bellman equation (3.3) such that the unknown function, EV , no longer depends on ".
(3.5) EV (x; d) =
Z
y
Z
"
max
j2D(x;")
[u(y; " (j) ; j) + EV (y; j)] g(d"jx)f (dyjx; d)
Rust (1988) proved that the operator   () dened by the right hand side of (3.5) is
a separate contraction mapping, where EV is the unique xed point: EV =   (EV ).
This eliminates the requirement of computing the xed point V on the full state space
and allow us to restrict attention to a much reduced state space spanned by D (x; ") and
the domain of x. Furthermore, since EV (x; d) is not a function of ", conditional choice
probabilities P (djx) can be computed without numerical integration over the unknown
function EV .
(3.6)
P (djx) =
Z
"
I

d = arg max
j2D(x;")

u(x; " (j) ; j) + 
Z
y
EV (y; j) f (dyjx; d)

g(d"jx)
Under assumption 1, the observable state vector xnt is a su¢ cient statistic for the
current choice. Therefore the log likelihood contribution for individual n has a particular
simple form
ln () =
TnX
t=1
ln [P (dntjxnt; )] +
TnX
t=1
ln [f (xntjxnt 1; dnt 1; f )]
= l1n () + l
2
n (f )
where l1n and l
2
n are the partial log-likelihood contribution for a single individual n relating
to the conditional distribution of dnt given xnt and the evolution in xnt given xnt 1.
Yet a another advantage of assumption 1, is that the model can be consistently es-
timated by a two step procedure: The log-likelihood is additively separable in l1n and l
2
n
and the transition equation does not dependent on objective function parameters, once
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we have conditioned on the choice of the decision maker. Thus, we can obtain consistent
partial maximum likelihood estimates of f by maximizing the second part of the likeli-
hood function, with respect to these parameters. If we denote these partial estimates, ^
p
f ,
consistent ML estimates of the objective function parameters, u and the parameters, g
of the distribution of the unobserved state variables ", can be obtained by maximizing
l1

^
p
f ; u; g

with respect to u and g. Since the Hessian of the likelihood function is
block diagonal under assumption 1 we will not have to correct second step standard errors
used for inference.
As a special case, Rust considered a particular simple model, where i) the pay-of func-
tion u(x; " (d) ; d) is additively separable in the unobserved state variables, " (d) and ii)
the unobserved state variables are independent across alternatives and extreme value
distributed.
Assumption 2. (Additivity (AS)): The pay-o¤ function u (s; d) is additively separable in
" (d)
u (s; d) = ~u (x; d) + " (d)
Assumption 3. (Extreme value assumption): The unobserved state variables, " are as-
sumed to be multivariate iid. extreme value distributed
These two assumptions implies that the expectation operator with respect to " in the
choice specic expected value functions and the conditional choice probabilities have a
particular simple closed form. Consequently, the contraction mapping   dened by (3.5)
reduces to
(3.7) EV (x; d) =
Z
y
ln
24 X
j2D(y)
exp [~u(y; j) + EV (y; j)]
35 f (dyjx; d)
Moreover, the conditional choice probabilities are multinomial logistic
(3.8) P (djx) = exp f~u (x; d) + EV (x; d)gP
j2D(x) f~u (x; j) + EV (x; j)g
This saves the cost of multi-dimensional integration over unobserved state variables.
Rusts assumptions put severe restrictions on the behavioral model. First, assumption 1,
e¤ectively assumes that all time dependence in " is transmitted entirely through the state
variable x. This for example precludes the presence of serial dependence in ". Second,
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assumption 2 implies that marginal utility of observable state variables does not depend
on unobservables. Third, assumption 3 restricts substitution patterns in the model, since
" is assumed independent across choice alternatives. In a choice situation with several
similar alternatives this assumption may well be violated.
Several authors have estimated models that depart form these assumptions. One promi-
nent example is the occupational choice model of Keane and Wolpin (1997). They use
the interpolation and simulation method developed in Keane and Wolpin (1994) to allow
for non-additive chocks, correlation across alternatives and permanent unobserved het-
erogeneity (using a nite mixture). Stinebrickner (2000) estimate a model of teachers
occupational decisions allowing for serial dependent unobservables in the wage equation.
A comprehensive discussion of the problems that are encountered when dynamic discrete
choice models are specied with continuous, serially correlated state variables is given
here.
4. Maximum Likelihood Estimation
In this section, I describe the estimation procedure to obtain maximum likelihood
estimates under assumption 1. It builds on Rusts Nested Fixed Point Algorithm, on
the use of parametric approximations of the expected value function (see e.g. Rust,
Hall, Benítez-Silva, Hitsch, and Pauletto (2005)), and ideas from the literature on mixed
discrete choice models with simulation (see Train (2003)). In particular, I use Chebyshev
polynomials to approximate expected value functions over the continuous state variables
and Monte Carlo simulation to integrate out unobserved state variables.
Under assumption 1, solving the model is equivalent to nding a xed point of the
functional equation (3.5). However, when operating numerically on a computer, we can
only hope to evaluate the unknown function EV in a nite number of points. Hence,
if the domain for any of the state variables is continuous, the value function must be
represented in a nite number of grid points to make the evaluation operational on the
computer. Traditionally, two approaches are taken to ameliorate the consequences of this
inherent curse of dimensionality: a smooth or a discrete approximation.
Usually, the vector of observable state variables is assumed to have a discrete and nite
support and thus continuous variables are approximated with a nite number of grid
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points, such that s 2 S = fs1; :::; smg. This e¤ectively avoids the dimension of the xed
point EV to be innitely large and due to the nite domain of s, the integral in (3.5) can
be replaced by a sum of conditional value functions weighted by the probability of the
outcome of the state variable.
The discrete approximation works well for small dimensional problems: when the num-
ber of grid points m increases, the solution of the discrete approximation approaches
the xed point for the original continuous problem. However, with Q state variables,
a discrete approximation with mq grid points for the q0th dimension in the state space
requires evaluations of the value function in m =
QQ
q=1mq points and computation of a
m m transition probability matrix for the discretized state variables. Therefore, since
the number of grid points needed to obtain an accurate solution often is fairly large for
continuous variables, this approach becomes impractical even for a small number of state
variables.
A considerable amount of research has been carried out to increase the speed and ac-
curacy of the numerical techniques used. One line of research has been to use smooth
approximations of the value function, which can be represented by simple exible para-
metric functions based on evaluation in a nite number of grid points, mq. Current ap-
proximation techniques include orthogonal polynomials, splines, neural networks among
others8. Although this line of thought is not able to break the curse of dimensionality, it
adds signicantly to speeding up the process of nding an accurate solution (given the
dimension of the state space). Although the size of the xed point problem is still expo-
nentially increasing in the number of state variables, Q, it is usually much smaller in the
case where we use a smooth approximation. As we shall see later, choosing mq  6 gives
a solution so accurate that increasing the number of grid points does not a¤ect expected
precision of the model solution, ML estimates and the predictions of the model.
4.1. The Chebyshev Approximated Expected Value Function. I use orthogonal
Chebyshev Polynomials to approximate the expected value function using a nite number
of nodesmq in each of the Q dimensions of the state space. This particular approximation
method, was chosen for its ability to t smooth functions, its e¢ ciency in spanning the
8See Judd (1998), Rust (1994), Santos (1999) and Rust, Hall, Benítez-Silva, Hitsch, and Pauletto
(2005) for comprehensive surveys of these methods.
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state space (guaranteed by the orthogonal basis), and its ability to t functions dened
over multiple dimensional state spaces, and most important its simplicity. As we shall
see in the following sections, this choice has several important spin-o¤s that have not yet
been fully utilized.
Let T denote a full set of Chebyshev polynomials up to order n; evaluated in a set of
Chebyshev nodes, xi, i = 1; ::;m. Let further EV (x;d) denote the choice specic set of
Chebyshev coe¢ cients, such that the polynomial, TEV (x;d) approximates the expected
value function, EV , evaluated in these nodes. Finally, let T (x) denote a matrix of
Chebyshev polynomials evaluated at x. If we replace the unknown continuous expected
value function EV in (3.5) with its Chebyshev approximated counterpart, dEV (x; d) =
T (x)dEV (x;d) and denote the implied approximated contraction operator by  ^ we can
write
(4.1)  ^
dEV  (x; d) = Z
y
Z
"
max
j2D(x;")
h
u(y; " (j) ; j) + T (y)dEV (x;d)
i
g(d"jx)f (dyjx; d)
Since polynomials are linear in parameters, the coe¢ cients can be expressed as least
squares coe¢ cients of EV (x; d) on T . That is dEV (x;d) = PTEV (x; d) where PT =
(T 0T ) 1 T 0 is referred to as the Chebyshev Projection matrix. We can then express  ^ as
(4.2)
 ^
dEV  (x; d) = Z
y
Z
"
max
j2D(x;")
nh
u(y; " (j) ; j) + T (y)PTdEV (x; d)i g(d"jx)o f (dyjx; d)
Note that even though the size of the xed point problem has become nite due to nite
number of Chebyshev nodes, we can now evaluate the expected value function in any point
in the state space. This has one important spin-o¤:. Since we can evaluate the expected
value function in any point of the state space, Monte Carlo integration is particularly well
suited for evaluating the expectation. We can write the simulated counterpart of (4.2) as
(4.3)  ^
dEV  (x; d) = 1
R
RX
r=1
max
j2D(x;")
h
u(x0r; "
0
r (j) ; j) + T (x
0
r)PT
dEV (x; j)i
where "0r and x
r
j are draws from the distribution for the state variable processes g ("
0jx0)
and f (x0jx; d), respectively.
Under assumption 1, the expected value function EV , summarizing the solution of the
model, can be approximated by the xed-point of the contraction mapping  ^
dEV  (x; d) =
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dEV dened by the functional equation (4.3) and the simulated conditional choice proba-
bilities, P^ (djx), are given by
(4.4) P^ (djx) = 1
R
RX
r=1
I

d = arg max
j2D(s)
h
u(x; "r (j) ; j) + dEV (x; j)i
In the following section, I describe the solution algorithm used to nd the xed point
of the functional equation (4.3). It is instructive to go a bit into details to make it
transparent where the use of Chebyshev polynomials gives computational gains.
4.2. The Fixed Point Algorithm. There are several ways to compute the xed pointdEV . In Rusts NFXP software, a combination of successive contraction iterations and the
Newton-Kantorowich algorithm is used.
For a su¢ ciently precise Chebyshev approximation, the contraction mapping property
for the operator   carries over to the approximate operator  ^.9 This allows us to obtain
the unique xed point dEV by successive iterations on the contraction mapping, dened
by
(4.5) dEV k =  dEV k 1 =  k dEV 0
The idea behind the Newton-Kantorowich algorithm is to convert the problem of nding
a xed point of the contraction mapping EV =   (EV ) to nding a xed point for the
nonlinear operator F = I  , since the contraction mapping implies F (EV ) = 0: Taking
a rst order Taylor approximation of [I    ] (EVk+1) = 0 around the current xed point,
EVk =   (EVk)
0 = [I    ] (EVk+1) ~ [I    ] (EVk) + [I    0] (EVk+1   EVk)
Solving this equation with respect to EVk+1 gives the Newton-Kantorowich iteration
EVk+1 = EVk   (I    0) 1 (I    )EVk
= EVk   (I    0) 1 (EVk   EVk+1)
Computation of the Newton-Kantorowich iteration requires computation of the Fréchet
derivative of the contraction mapping  . For the parametrically approximated operator
9If the EV is su¢ ciently smooth, the approximation error can be made arbitrarily small by increasing
the degree of the approximating polynomial.
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 ^
dEV  (d; x),  ^0 takes the form of a J mJ m matrix of simulated partial derivatives,
where the l; kth block equals a m  m matrix of derivatives of contraction mapping
 ^
dEV (x; d = l) di¤erentiated with respect to EV (x; d = k)0. It can be shown that the
l; kth block can be formulated as
(4.6)
@~ 
dEV  (x; l)
@dEV (x; k)0 =  1R
RX
r=1
P^ (kjx0r)T (x0r)PT
where P^ (kjx0r) is the approximated choice probability conditional on a draw x0r from
f (x0jx; l) and based on the valuedEV evaluated at the Chebyshev nodes.
While contraction iterations guarantee convergence due to the contraction mapping
property, they slow down when the approximation errors
dEV k  dEV  become small
(in particular for  close to 1). In contrast, Newton-Kantorowich iterations are not
guaranteed to converge, but converge in a quadratic rate in the neighborhood of the
solution. The resulting xed point algorithm, known as the poly-algorithm, combines
these two algorithms in order to balance robustness versus speed of convergence. That
is, it uses contraction iterations until the approximated value function gets within the
domain of attraction and then switches to Newton-Kantorowich iterations to obtain fast
convergence to the solution.
It is useful to highlight a number of computational shortcuts. First, the nodes for the
Chebyshev approximation are xed for each contraction iteration (and Newton-Kantorowich).
Therefore, once the Chebyshev projection matrix PT = (T 0T )
 1 T 0 has been computed
we will not have to compute it again. Moreover, since Chebyshev polynomials are or-
thogonal, T 0T is a diagonal matrix which is very fast to invert. In fact, T 0T can be
expressed analytically: The q0th block in T 0T referring to the q0th continuous variable is
T 0qTq = diag (
Qq
i=1m
i;
Qq
i=1m
i=2; ::;
Qq
i=1m
i=2). Hence, we only need to store a couple of
scalars on the computer, rather than computing (and inverting) an m m dimensional
matrix.
Secondly, if also the same draws from the state variable process are used at each it-
eration, the Chebyshev Polynomial evaluated at these draws, T (x0r), are constant too.
Therefore, it is also su¢ cient to compute the matrix product T (x0r)PT once. Hence,
repeated multiplication of an Rm  m matrix with an m  m matrix is circumvented
when solving the model. This feature really speeds up the algorithm. Moreover, if the
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parameters of the variable process are estimated using partial ML, T (x0r)PT does not
have to be updated during the second step of estimation.
4.3. Maximizing the Likelihood. In Rusts NFXP algorithm, BHHH is used to max-
imize the likelihood function. This algorithm is convenient for two reasons. First, since
BHHH approximates the Hessian by the outer product of the gradient, it avoids numeri-
cal calculation of second derivatives of the likelihood function. Moreover, since the outer
product of the gradient by construction is positive semi-denite, the BHHH algorithm
will always move in the direction of the gradient - even in convex areas of the likelihood
function.
A BHHH iteration is dened as
k+1 = k +
 
NX
n=1
rln (k)rln (k)0
! 
NX
n=1
rln (k)
!
whererln (k) is the gradient of the log likelihood contribution for individual n evaluated
at current the value of the parameters, k. The likelihood function for the state variable
process, l2n (f ), does not depend on the value function parameters and can therefore
usually be expressed in closed form.
However, the derivative of l1n () is a function of the conditional choice probabilities
P (djx), simulated by P^ (djx). As it stands in equation (4.4), the conditional choice
probabilities are simulated by a crude accept-reject (AR) simulator. This raises two
numerical issues. First, P^ (djx) can be zero for any nite number of draws R. That is,
if none of the R draws of "r result in alternative d being the optimal choice for a given
value of x, P^ (djx) can actually be zero. This is problematic when estimating the model
with Maximum Likelihood, because if P^ (djx) = 0, then log P^ (djx) is undened.
Secondly, the choice probability is a step function in the structural parameters, . Since
simulated probabilities are not smooth in the parameters, the likelihood function is non-
di¤erentiable. This makes gradient based estimation infeasible and derivation of standard
errors nonstandard.
For some modeling choices it is actually possible to obtain smooth choice probabilities.
One obvious example is Rusts model with additive separable, conditionally independent,
extreme value distributed unobservables. As we have seen, this result in closed-form logit
probabilities. Another example is when " is multivariate normal, the model reduces to a
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dynamic programming version of the multinomial probit model. In this case, the GHK
(Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) recursive simulator can be used to obtain smooth choice
probabilities.
One way to mitigate the di¢ culties with the crude AR simulator is to replace the
indicator function in equation (4.4) with a smooth, strictly positive function. In the
context of static multinomial probits, McFadden (1989) suggested the use of a logit kernel
as smoother. The resulting simulator is referred to as the logit-smoothed AR simulator and
the simulated probabilities have a form similar to the mixed logit model (Train (2003)).
In the next section, I discuss how this simulator can be utilized in the present context.
5. A Dynamic Programming Mixed Logit Model
The logit-smoothed AR simulator used in the present context can be seen as a Dynamic
Programming Mixed Logit (DPMXL) model. That is, a model where conditional choice
probabilities are the integrals of standard logit probabilities. This model can be obtained
by assuming that part of the unobserved state variables are additively separable in utility
and multivariate iid extreme value distributed.
DPMXL is a highly exible model that obviates many of the limitations of Rusts
model with additively separable, conditionally independent, extreme value distributed
unobservables. It can potentially allow for random taste variation, unrestricted substi-
tution patterns, and correlation in unobserved state variables over time. Moreover, the
distribution of unobservables is not restricted to, e.g., the normal distribution as in the
dynamic programming Probit. In fact, McFadden and Train (2000) show that any discrete
choice model derived from random utility maximization has choice probabilities that can
be approximated as closely as one pleases by a mixed logit model.
In the following I present two examples of how di¤erent specications of this model
can be used to allow for more exibility. In example 1, I consider the case of individual
specic heterogeneity - observed as well as unobserved. In example 2, I consider the case
of serially correlated unobservables.10 Both cases allow for correlation across alternatives
in unobserved state variables.
10In the appendix, I describe in more detail how to obtain the simulated likelihood and corresponding
gradients.
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5.1. Example 1: Individual Specic Heterogeneity. Obviously, heterogeneity can
both enter in utility and in transition rules. For illustrative purpose, I rst focus on how
to implement individual specic heterogeneity only in utility, and then briey discuss the
issues involved when implementing heterogeneity in the transition rules.
Assume that the unobserved state variables, " partitions into two components " =
f; g, where both  and  have J choice specic components f (d) ;  (d) : d 2 Dg with
support on the real line.  (d) is assumed to be multivariate iid. extreme value distributed
and  (d) is a permanent (agent specic) component randomly distributed in the popu-
lation according to the (mixing) distribution g (jx1; z) ; where z are observable agent
specic components and x1 is the initial observation of x. The introduction of individual
specic heterogeneity, violates assumption 1, since x is no longer a su¢ cient static for ".
However, conditional on , " is conditionally independent. Moreover, since the additional
unobserved factors introduced in the model is due to heterogeneity rather than uncer-
tainty, the formulation of the dynamic optimization problem faced by a single decision
maker, remains unchanged given .
Assume further that, utility is additively separable in  (d), such that the utility factors
as u(x; " (d) ; d) = ~u(x;  (d) ; d) +  (d), where  is a (smoothing) weight on  (d) chosen
by the researcher. I discuss the choice of  later.
 can be given many interpretations. For example  can be a particular coe¢ cient
in the model which we want to be heterogenous among agents. Alternatively,  can be
seen as a choice specic error component arbitrarily correlated over the alternatives. In
both cases, lots of heterogeneity can be obtained by letting  be a function of observed
individual characteristics, z; initial conditions, x1, and appropriate mixtures of (discrete
or continuous) random components. This allows the distribution of  to have almost any
shape.
Under the assumptions made so far, the choice probabilities conditional on x and  are
multinomial logistic
(5.1) P (djx; ) = exp f[~u(x; (d); d) + EV (x; (d); d)] =gP
j2D(x) exp f[~u(x; (j); j) + EV (x; (j); j)] =g
where EV can be computed as the unique xed point to the contraction mapping
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(5.2)  (EV ) (x; ; d) =
Z
y
ln
24 X
j2D(y)
exp

~u(y; (j); j) + EV (y; (j); j)

35 f (dyjx; d)
To solve the model, EV is approximated with Chebyshev polynomials over x and  for
each value of d.
(5.3)
 ^
dEV  (x; ; d) = 1
R
RX
r=1
ln
X
j2D(y)
exp
"
~u(x0r; (j); j) + T (x
0
r; (d))PTdEV (x; (j); j)

#
The expected value function EV can now be approximated by the xed point of the
contraction mapping  ^
dEV  (x; ; d) = dEV dened by the functional equation (5.3).
Again, we obtain the xed point using a combination of contraction iterations and Newton-
Kantorowich iterations.
Given the solution of the approximated value functiondEV , we can express the choice
probabilities conditional on  evaluated at the data
(5.4)
P^ (dntjxnt; ) = 1
R
RX
r=1
exp
nh
~u(xnt; (dnt); dnt) + T (xnt; (dnt)) pTdEV (x; ; d)i =oP
j2D(x) exp
nh
~u(xnt; (j); j) + T (xnt; (j)) pTdEV (x; ; d)i =o
The structural parameters consist of  = f; u; fg, and the parameters, g, of the
mixing distribution, g (jx1; z; g). We can now express the likelihood for individual n
conditional on n
Li (; n) =
TnY
t=1
h
P^ (dntjxnt; n; )
i TnY
t=1
[f (xntjxnt 1; dnt 1; f )]
= L1i (; n) + L
2
i (f )
Note that likelihood still factors into two components similar to Rusts model. How-
ever, since (d) varies randomly in the population, we will have to integrate it out using
simulation. The use of approximation methods is particularly convenient for models with
lots of heterogeneity. Once we have solved for the expected value function, simulation
of the likelihood is very fast, since we then have a closed form for P^ (dntjxnt; n).11 The
11Alternatively, the model can be repeatedly solved for given values of sn. This does not multiply
the problem by the number of draws, since small changes in sn has a small e¤ect on EV . Thus if the
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simulated likelihood is
(5.5) li () = ln
1
S
SX
s=1
L1i (; 
s
n) + lnL
2
i (f )
where sn is a simulation draw from g (jx1; z; g).
The likelihood is still additively separable when permanent unobserved factors only
enter in the utility function. The state variable process can therefore still be consistently
estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood lnL2i (f ). However, if we want to allow for
heterogeneity in the transition rule for x, the likelihood function is no longer additively
separable and structural estimation must be carried out using Full Information Maxi-
mum Likelihood (FIML). Moreover, when approximating the expected value function,
the integral over the observable state variable, x; has to be computed conditional on the
permanent component.
5.2. Example 2: Serially Correlated Unobservables. Serial correlation in unob-
served state variables has important implications for behavior. If a shock has a persistent
e¤ect, not only current utility is altered when the shock occurs, also the expected future
value. In the previous example the sums of permanent and transitory unobserved factors,
n+nt were in fact serially correlated. However, with this formulation, time dependence
is transmitted entirely through the permanent component, n. Hence, from the agents
perspective, there is no serial correlation. In the following, I discuss how to implement
serial correlation of unobserved state variables in the DPMXL framework.
As before, we assume that the unobserved state variables, "; partitions into two com-
ponents, " (d) = f (d) ;  (d)g where  (d) is assumed to be multivariate iid. extreme
value distributed. We also assume that utility is additively separable in  (d). However,
 (d) is no longer a permanent component, but varies over time, is subject to uncertainty
and serially correlated. We also allow  to be arbitrarily correlated with observable state
variables x. Hence, the (mixing) distribution is g (0j; x0). Since  is uncertain from the
agents perspective, the serial correlation in  alters the dynamic optimization problem
faced by the decision maker, even conditional on :
simulation draws are properly sorted, solution will typically require a single Newton-Kantorowich step.
However, this will not work if  is serially correlated as in example 2.
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Again, if we condition on x and , choice probabilities, P (djx; ) ; are multinomial
logistic and therefore similar to the expression in equation (5.1). However, since  is now
uncertain to the agent, the expected value function must be integrated over  to form
expectations about future utility. Hence, EV is now determined as the unique xed point
to the contraction mapping
(5.6)
 (EV ) (x; ; d) =
Z
w
Z
y
ln
24 X
j2D(y)
exp

~u(y; w(j); j) + EV (y; w(j); j)

35 g (dwj; dy) f (dyjx; d)
As before, we approximate EV with Chebyshev polynomials over x and  and integrate
over  and x using Monte Carlo integration.
(5.7)
 ^
dEV  (x; ; d) = 1
R
RX
r=1
ln
X
j2D(y)
exp
"
~u(x0r; 
0
r(j); j) + T (x
0
r; 
0
r(j))PT
dEV (x; ; d)

#
where 0r(j) is the j
0th component of a draw from g (0j; x0). Given the solution of dEV ,
there is conceptually no di¤erence to the example above. Aside from the fact that  has
to be sampled from a di¤erent distribution, everything remains unchanged. The expres-
sion for choice probabilities conditional on , P^ (dntjxnt; ) ; is equal to the expression in
equation (5.4). The likelihood function is identical to the expression in equation (5.5),
except from  being drawn from the distribution g (0j; x).
Note that the current formulation of  allows for both rst order serial correlation
and contemporary correlation across alternatives. Hence,  (i)nt can be correlated with
 (i)nt 1,  (j)nt, and  (j)nt 1. Moreover, we can allow for a great deal of exibility in
the shape of g (0j; x0). If for example  follows an AR (1) process nt = nt 1+ nt, we
can specify nt as mixtures of several multivariate distributions.
5.3. Identication and the choice of . Given that the use of mixtures allows for
a lot more exibility in the model, it is relevant to ask: To what extent is the model
identied? Rust (1994) has proven generic nonidentication of dynamic discrete choice
models. Hence, some identifying restrictions have to be imposed in order to identify the
primitives of the model. Recently, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have shown that the
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degree of underidentication consists of the discount factor, the distribution function for
the unobserved state variables and preferences in a reference alternative.
Since we only observe sequences of discrete choices for which the level and scale of
the value function is irrelevant, we can never hope to identify parameters that index the
level or overall scale of the value function. Since the extreme value assumption is the
identifying assumption with respect to the overall scale of the value function, the choice
of  in example 1 does not have any empirical content and can be set arbitrarily. If,
for example,  is individual specic and additive in utility, changing  will just scale the
variance of .
However, in example 2,  is time varying. In this case, we might want to think of
g (0j; x0) as being part of the behavioral model, whereas  is a convenient smoothing
device. Hence, we should therefore lower  as we get more and more observations in
the sample, since simulated probabilities then get smoothed out across individuals. As 
approaches zero, we will eventually approximate the behavioral model of interest. In this
case, we need instead to restrict the g (0j; x0) to obtain identication. At least one of
the components of  must x the scale of the value function by normalizing the variance,
while another component must x the level by normalizing the mean (usually set to zero).
Hence, the remaining factors are measured relative to the normalized components.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show that the degree of underidentication is even larger
in the case with unobserved heterogeneity. They show that additivity in utility of in-
dividual e¤ects is a powerful identifying restrictions. However, as we shall see in the
numerical example in subsection 6.2, other parametric assumptions can be used to obtain
identication. In particular, unobserved heterogeneity in coe¢ cients to state variables are
parametrically identied.
6. Numerical Results
6.1. Performance of the Algorithm. The estimation procedure applied in this paper
makes use of numerical approximations in many dimensions: First, evaluation of the ex-
pectations in the Bellman equation is approximated by Monte Carlo integration. Second,
the expected value function is approximated by Chebyshev polynomials. Third, condi-
tional choice probabilities used for maximum likelihood estimation, are also approximated
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by the use of simulation methods. It is therefore relevant to ask: What are the implications
for statistical inference of the use of approximated likelihood functions?
The implications of simulation errors that originate from simulating the choice prob-
abilities, are studied extensively in the literature on simulation assisted estimation.12
However, little is known about the consequences for inference of the approximation er-
ror that originate from solving the dynamic programming model. Fernandez-Villaverde,
Rubio-Ramirez, and Santos (2006) study the properties of the likelihood function when
the value function is approximated numerically. They establish conditions for which con-
vergence of the likelihood is obtained as the approximated policy functions converge to
the exact policy. The implications of their results are depressing: Approximation errors
in the policy function are amplied when evaluating the likelihood function: It is shown
that the upper bound on the approximation error in the likelihoods is increasing linearly
in the sample size. They also present an application based on simulated data that docu-
ments substantial biases in likelihood functions and parameter estimates when continuous
state variables are approximated by a nite number of grid points. However, parameter
estimates are shown to converge as the number of grid points is increased.
Still, our understanding of the consequences of approximation errors for empirical in-
ference is limited. To the best of my knowledge, the case where continuous state variables
are approximated by polynomials and integrals are evaluated using Monte Carlo simula-
tion has not been investigated specically. Hence, it remains to be seen how polynomial
approximations perform. In particular, how many nodes are required to obtain reasonably
precise ML estimates?
To evaluate the approximation approach, I use Rusts well known bus replacement
model and data set.13 Since the expected value function inherits some of the curvature
from the specication of the utility, I adopt a non-linear specication of the cost function
12See e.g. Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996) and Train (2003)
13See Rust (1987). Rusts model has been extensively used in other studies to evaluate the performance
of alternative algorithms and estimators, e.g., Hotz, Miller, Sanders, and Smith (1994) and Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2002).
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TABLE 1
APPROXIMATION ERROR IN CONDITIONAL CHOICE PROBABILITIES
ALTERNATIVE APPROXIMATIONS
10 20 50 100 5000
2 6.31 6.31 6.31 6.31 6.31
4 1.26 1.16 1.20 1.20 1.17
6 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10
8 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13
10 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02
50 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00
10 20 50 100 5000
2 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87
4 1.19 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95
6 0.34 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.11
8 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03
10 0.23 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.02
50 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00
Based on ML estimates for R =5000 and m =50
Based on ML estimates for alternative approximationsNumber of
nodes, m
Note: All figures are measure in percentage points. Approximation error is measured as the
maximum absolute deviation between the approximated choice probability and the “exact” choice
probability. The “exact” solution was based on R=5000, and m=50. In the top panel, the choice
probabilities were based on ML estimates based on using the alternative approximations. In lower
panel, parameter estimates are held fixed at the ML estimates for the exact solution.  In both cases, the
choice probabilities were based on an approximation over the interval [0;500], and evaluated at the
range of the state variable in a fine uniformly distributed grid (10000 points).  The range of the
observed state variable, xt is [0;387]
to rightfully access the performance. Therefore, the cost function is specied as C(x) =
c
p
x.14
Since Rusts model does not have closed form value functions, I approximate the "exact"
solution with 50 Chebyshev coe¢ cients, m = 50, and 5000 Halton draws were used to
evaluate integrals, i.e. R = 5000. This approximation is supposed to be very close to the
exact solution; a 49 order polynomial is a very exible function.
In Table 1, I have computed the approximation error obtained as the maximum ab-
solute di¤erence in conditional choice probabilities between the "exact" solution and the
14Specically, the utility unction can be written as u (x; d) =  I (d = 1)C (x)   I (d = 2)RC where
RC is a xed cost of replacing a bus engine and C (x) = c
p
x is maintenance operating costs as a function
of elapsed mileage for the engine. The distribution for state variable; x; is a regenerative random walk
f (xtjxt 1; d) = h (xt   I (d = 1)xt 1). Hence, by replacing the engine the state variable regenerates to
zero.
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approximated solution. This is done for various combinations of R and m. To obtain the
gures in the top panel of Table 1, the model was solved and estimated for each value of
m and R. Hence, these gures also include the bias from the ML estimation associated
with a given approximation. In the lower panel, choice probabilities are based on the ML
estimates obtained using the "exact" model. Hence, the gures in the lower panel, mea-
sure pure approximation error in the conditional choice probabilities and are not a¤ected
by the approximation bias in the ML estimates.
The results are striking: With only 6 Chebyshev nodes, choice probabilities can be esti-
mated with an negligible approximation error (less than 0.2 percentage points). Moreover,
the di¤erence between the top and the lower panel is very small for m  6, indicating
that potential bias (if any) does not a¤ect predictions from the model substantially.15
TABLE 2
BIAS IN ML ESTIMATES FOR ALTERNATIVE APPROXIMATIONS
RUST’S ENGINE REPLACEMENT MODEL
COST FUNCTION: xc=C(x)
R 10 20 5000 10 20 5000
2 -3.59 -3.59 -3.59 3.83 3.86 3.86
(0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (8.06) (8.07) (8.07)
4 0.70 0.64 0.64 0.38 0.75 0.73
(1.73) (1.72) (1.72) (3.84) (3.95) (3.94)
6 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.19 -0.04 -0.05
(1.60) (1.57) (1.57) (3.86) (3.90) (3.90)
8 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.05
(1.60) (1.58) (1.58) (3.84) (3.90) (3.89)
10 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.01
(1.59) (1.57) (1.57) (3.83) (3.88) (3.87)
50 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.01 0.00
(1.59) (1.56) (1.56) (3.81) (3.85) (3.85)
Paramter estimate ("exact" solution) 11.14 16.49
Engine replacement costs, RCNumber of
nodes, m
Cost function parameter, c
Note: The table presents the bias in the structural estimates induced by approximation error.
Bias is measured as the difference between the partial ML estimates using an approximated and
the “exact” solution. The “exact”solution was based on R=5000 and n=50.
15I have tried to assess magnitude of the approximation error for various specications of utility (linear,
logarithmic, inverse hyperbolic sine and power functions). I have also evaluated performance on the basis
of simulated data. Specically, I have specied models with 2 continuous state variables, di¤erent state
variable processes, correlated unobservables etc. The results are very stable: If m  6, approximation
and bias is negligible.
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TABLE 3
LIKELIHOOD RATIO
ALTERNATIVE APPROXIMATIONS AGAINST “EXACT”SOLUTION
10 20 50 100 5000
2 -7.10 -7.10 -7.10 -7.10 -7.10
4 1.04 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.99
6 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18
8 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
10 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
50 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Likelihood ("exact" solution) -298.57
Based on ML estimates for alternative approximationsNumber of
nodes, m
Note: The table presents the log-likelihood value under alternative levels of approximation,
differenced against the “exact” solution. The “exact” solution were based on, R=5000, and
n=50.
Table 2 reports the bias in partial ML estimates of the parameters, c and RC of Rusts
engine replacement model with cost function C(x) = c
p
x. As before, the bias is measured
as the di¤erence between the estimates from the approximated model and the estimates
from the exactmodel. The results point to very fast convergence in the ML estimates
as the numerical approximation is improved. In fact, setting m  6 eliminates the bias
for all practical purposes.
As documented above, the approximation errors in choice probabilities and ML esti-
mates are very small - for a reasonably small number of Chebyshev nodes. But what
are the consequences for the likelihoods? This has important implications for modeling
choice, since LR tests are often used to discriminate between competing models. If the
likelihoods are subject to substantial approximation error, it may result in misleading
inference and modeling choice.
In Table 3, I present approximation error in the log likelihood function. I.e. the approx-
imated log-likelihood, di¤erenced against the exactlog-likelihood. Hence, the gures in
Table 3 can be interpreted as a likelihood ratio test between the approximated and the
exact model. When m  6, the LR delivers a solid answer of non-signicance of approx-
imation errors: the likelihood ratio test between the approximated model and the exact
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solution is smaller than 0.2 in absolute value.16 Compared to the ndings in Fernandez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Santos (2006), the approximation error presented here is
very small, indicating that the use of Chebyshev polynomials is a very e¢ cient tool when
solving and estimating dynamic discrete choice structural models.
One additional advantage of the polynomial approximation approach is that we are
able to treat the state variables as continuous. If the model was solved using conventional
discretization methods we also discretize the data, and important variation is lost. In
Table 4, I have computed the mean and the variance of the approximation error that
arise when discretizing state variables in Rusts bus data. From the last three columns
of Table 4, it is clear that the discretization removes important variation in the data
and induces substantial approximation error. Since the range of grid points must be
determined by the state variable in levels, discretization has severe consequences for the
di¤erenced data; as the range of the di¤erenced data is much lower. If the state variable
is discretized with say 50 grid points, the standard deviation of the approximation error
(the lost variation) is larger than the average per period change for the continuous data.
For an approximation with say 90 grid points, the di¤erenced data takes on only three
values. I have tried to discretize the di¤erenced data and then afterwards constructed the
levels. As seen in the last column of Table 4, this amplies the measurement problem.
16Vuong (1989) has derived the asymptotic distribution for this statistic when applied to non-nested
models. Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Santos (2006) suggest using the test developed by
Vuong (1989) to choose the degree of accuracy in the model. Using this test, I cannot reject the null that
the log likelihood for models approximated with m  4 is equal to the exact likelihood.
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TABLE 4
BIAS AND APPROXIMATION ERROR DUE TO DISCRETIZATION
RUST’S ENGINE REPLACEMENT MODEL
COST FUNCTION: xc=C(x)
Number of
grid points c RC LR x t (m) x t (m)-x t-1 (m) dx t (m)
2 -10.55 -4.21 -29.85 25.55 -1.85 327.43
(1.02) (0.36) (62.26) (18.18) (37.83)
4 -5.26 -1.99 -3.34 5.84 -1.01 162.05
(2.57) (1.14) (32.30) (15.94) (18.66)
6 -4.68 -1.67 -4.38 2.89 -0.66 106.93
(2.33) (1.03) (21.34) (13.81) (12.28)
8 -3.55 -1.08 -2.27 1.55 -0.53 79.37
(2.93) (1.33) (16.04) (12.16) (9.11)
10 -2.46 -0.68 -0.32 0.94 -0.34 62.83
(2.98) (1.32) (13.01) (11.11) (7.21)
25 -0.90 -0.11 -0.23 0.20 -0.12 23.14
(3.57) (1.54) (5.26) (6.75) (2.80)
50 -0.18 0.06 0.17 0.07 -0.04 9.92
(3.77) (1.59) (2.62) (4.10) (1.59)
75 0.10 0.10 0.35 0.02 -0.02 5.60
(3.87) (1.61) (1.74) (2.64) (1.35)
90 0.06 0.07 0.29 0.04 -0.02 4.59
(3.85) (1.59) (1.45) (2.05) (1.37)
100 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.01 4.27
(3.85) (1.59) (0.26) (0.36) (0.27)
Likelihood
Continuous 16.39 11.14 -298.56 115.91 3.32 3.32
data (3.83) (1.57) (84.77) (1.42) (1.42)
Parameter Estimates
(Standard error)
Bias
(Standard error)
Mean approx. error
(Standard deviation of approx. error)
Mean of variable
(Standard deviation of variable)
Note: Bias is measured as the difference between parameter estimates, based on discretized and
continuous data, respectively. The estimated standard errors of the parameter estimates are given in
parenthesis. The likelihood ratio test statistic (LR) measures the difference in likelihood between models
estimated on discretized and continuous data respectively. When estimating the parameters, the model was
solved using 50 Chebyshev nodes and 5000 Monte Carlo draws. Approximation error is measured as the
difference between the original continuous data and the discretized data. The lower part of the table
presents parameter estimates and likelihood value for the model based on continuous data along with mean
and standard deviation for levels and differences of the variables xt and dxt. The grid points were uniformly
distributed between 0 and 450. The range of the data, xt, is [0;387]
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Table 4 presents parameter estimates of Rusts model using discretized data, but still
treating the state variables as being continuous when solving the model. Here I used the
exactsolution of the model, i.e. R = 5000 and m = 50. This allows me to isolate the
e¤ect from approximation error due to discretization of the data.
The consequences of discretizing the data are severe: If for example, m = 6, i.e. the
data is truncated to the midpoint in 6 uniformly sized intervals, the bias in estimated
replacement cost, RC; is approximately 2 standard errors from the estimate where the
original data was used. This will indeed lead to misleading inference. For the same level of
discretization, the di¤erence in log-likelihood is  4:38. Suppose we want to test whether
the model could be simplied to a competing (misspecied) model for which we have a
closed form and therefore not would have to discretize the data. In this case, we could
erroneously fail to reject the model, simply due to the presence of discretization error.
But how ne should the grid be? A least 100 grid points are needed to match the
precision we obtain when solving the model with Chebyshev polynomials using m = 6
andR = 20. In terms of the computational complexity involved, the di¤erence in using the
two di¤erent approaches is moderate for Rusts model since it only has one continuous
state variable. However, consider a model with four continuous state variables. If the
state variable are discretized into 1004 = 100:000:000 points for each continuous variable,
we would have to solve the model in 100 million points to obtain reasonably precise ML
estimates. This involves computing a 100 million by 100 million transition matrix - and
then we have to invert that matrix. This requires 1250 terabytes in storage. In contrast,
only 64 = 1296 points are needed when approximating with polynomials and the transition
matrix T (x)PT is 1250R 1250 and requires only 20:9 mega bytes of storage if R = 100.
This has an enormous e¤ect on computer time for moderately sized problems. There-
fore, when I adopt the suggested approach, I can estimate models with up to 5 state
variables - on a three year old laptop.17 Figure 1 presents the CPU time used to solve
various discrete dynamic programming models as a function of the number of state vari-
ables. The model with 5 state variables took less than 3 hours to solve and a couple of
days to estimate (using simulated data). Hence, using the suggested approach, it is for
17IBM thinkpad T41 with a 1.6 GHz Pentum M processor and 2 GB RAM.
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FIGURE 1
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Note: When the models were solved, I used 100 Halton Draws to calculate integrals and 6
Chebyshev coefficients in each dimension of the state space for the models with up to 4 state
variables. For the model with 5 state variables, I used only 5 Cebyshev coefficient in each
dimension of the state space.  The models were solved using a IMB ThinkPad T41 with a 1.6
GHz Pentium M processor and 2 GB RAM.
example possible to estimate a model with one observable state variable and three choice
alternatives, where we allow for both individual specic heterogeneity with correlation
across alternatives and serial correlation in the unobserved state variables.
6.2. Unobserved heterogeneity: Monte Carlo Evidence. In order to illustrate the
model in example 1 and to evaluate the impact of potential heterogeneity bias, I carry
out a Monte Carlo experiment based on a model similar to Rusts bus engine replacement
model, where engine replacement costs, RC, are assumed to be bus specic and randomly
distributed in the population of busses. Specically, RC is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean RC and variance 2RC .
If unobserved heterogeneity is introduced in a static discrete choice model where the
random utility function is linear in the parameters, we will in general be able to estimate
the mean of the coe¢ cients up to a scale factor - even if we neglect the presence of
heterogeneity.
I assume a linear cost function C (x) = cx, where the slope of the cost function, c;
and the population mean of the replacement costs, RC, are set roughly equal to the
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TABLE 5
MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENT
FIXED AND RANDOM COEFFICIENTS
Statistic σRC
dgp RC c μRC σRC c
Mean Bias 0 0.05 0.01 0.19 0.41 0.03
1 -0.52 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.01
2 -1.96 -0.28 0.10 0.08 0.01
Mean Absolute Error 0 0.35 0.06 0.43 0.41 0.07
1 0.57 0.08 0.43 0.29 0.06
2 1.96 0.28 0.46 0.30 0.07
Monte Carlo 0 0.44 0.074 0.51 0.38 0.082
std. dev 1 0.42 0.066 0.54 0.37 0.080
2 0.51 0.075 0.57 0.38 0.084
Mean std. Error 0 0.45 0.073 0.46 0.13 0.071
1 0.41 0.068 0.52 0.08 0.079
2 0.28 0.053 0.56 0.06 0.080
σRC
dgp
Mean Bias 0 -0.7%
1 0.2%
2 0.2%
-0.3%
2.4%
12.1%
Monte Carlo Distribution of ML and MSL estimates
Random Coefficients
RC/c μRC/c
Bias in estimated coefficients ratios
Fixed Coefficients
Note: The Monte Carlo experiment is based on 1000 Monte Carlo samples of sample size N=100,
T=250. The model was solved using 5th order Chebyshev polynomials in each dimension of the state
space. In the random coefficients model, two continuous variables were approximated (the observed state
variable, x, and unobserved heterogeneity in RC). To evaluate integrals in the expected value function, I
used R=50 Halton draws. The number of simulations for each bus were set to S=100. The bias in the
ratio RC/c and μRC/c is measured as the percentage discrepancy to the true value.
ML estimates from one of the linear specications of Rust (1987).18 For sample sizes of
N = 100, T = 250, I draw 1000 Monte Carlo samples, and for each of them, I obtain
partial ML estimates for models estimated with and without unobserved heterogeneity.
18Rust (1987) report ML estimates for bus groups 1,2 and 3 as RC = 11:7270 and c = 0:001  4:8259.
However, the unit of measurement for c is in units of the discretized state variable, xdt = 1; 2; ::; 90. With
the chosen dimension of the grid for mileage, the coe¢ cient to the discretized variable xdt must be divided
by 5; since the interval length corresponds to 5000 miles in continuous measurement. I therefore set c = 1
and RC = 1
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FIGURE 2: MONTE CARLO DISTRIBUTION OF ML ESTIMATES
FIXED AND RANDOM COEFFICIENTS
Note: See the note in Table 5 for a description of the experimental design.
In Figure 2 the distribution of the Monte Carlo estimates are displayed and Table 5
presents the summary statistics for this experiment. The parameters from the model
that neglect unobserved heterogeneity are as expected substantially downward biased -
and the bias is increasing in the heterogeneity. Moreover, due to the misspecied error
structure, the estimated standard errors are substantially lower than the simulated Monte
Carlo standard errors. In contrast, the model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity,
provides unbiased parameter estimates and standard errors. The standard deviation of
the heterogeneity can be estimated (and thus identied) when it is present, and in absence
of heterogeneity the over parameterization comes at a very low e¢ ciency cost.
As mentioned above, it is well know from static discrete choice models that neglected
heterogeneity only has a scaling e¤ect on the parameter estimates. In a dynamic model,
however, it is not necessarily the case, since the coe¢ cients of the utility function, u,
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appear nonlinearly in the expected value function. Consequently, the threshold value of
the state variables that makes the decision maker indi¤erent between the two alternatives
will be non-linear in the coe¢ cients of the model - even when they enter linearly in the
utility function. Therefore, we will in general not estimate the mean of the structural
parameters in the model. The lower panel in Table 5 shows that this is not the case
in the dynamic model with xed coe¢ cients: The discrepancy between RC=c anddRC=c^
increases as the heterogeneity becomes more signicant. Hence, not only the scale of the
parameters are altered also their relative size. In contrast, the model with unobserved
heterogeneity estimates the ratio without bias.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I develop, implement and evaluate a continuous approach to Rusts
Nested Fixed Point Algorithm, where orthogonal Chebyshev polynomials are used to
approximate the value function in the dynamic programming problem. This strategy
has several important spin-o¤s. First, it helps ameliorating the curse of dimensionality;
Second, the approach permits very fast simulation of likelihood functions for mixture
models, once value functions are approximated. Third, we do not need to discretize the
data.
The applied approximation methods combined with ideas from the literature on mixed
discrete choice models with simulation provides a useful framework for estimating very
exible models. Specically, I assume that a part of the unobserved state variables are
additively separable in utility and multivariate iid extreme value distributed. This as-
sumption leads to the Dynamic Programming Mixed Logit (DPMXL) model.
DPMXL is a highly exible model that obviates many of the limitations of Rusts
model with additively separable, conditionally independent, extreme value distributed
unobservables. DPMXL can potentially allow for i) random taste variation, ii) unre-
stricted substitution patterns, iii) correlation in unobserved state variables over time, iv)
lots of observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and v) arbitrary shape of the distribution
of unobserved factors. I present two examples of di¤erent specications of the DPMXL
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model. First, I consider the case of observed and unobserved individual specic hetero-
geneity, arbitrarily correlated across alternatives. Second, I consider the case of serially
correlated unobservables.
The applied approximation method performs well for the DPMXL model. Since, the ex-
pected value functions are integrals over the continuous state variables and since they are
choice specic, the approximated objects are very smooth. Therefore, polynomial approx-
imations are particularly well suited for this problem. When evaluating approximation
bias for alternative levels of approximation, I nd that a fth order polynomial provide
su¢ ciently accurate approximations to the expected value function. Moreover, the ap-
proximation error, transmitted to conditional choice probabilities, likelihood functions and
structural parameter estimates, are practically eliminated at this level of approximation.
The approximation method has the additional advantage that data on continuous state
variables does not have to be discretized. To evaluate the impact of approximation error
induced by discretizing the data, I estimate the model using discretized data, but still
treating the state variables as being continuous when solving the model. This allows
me to isolate the pure e¤ect from approximation error due to discretization of the data.
Discretizing data is clearly ine¢ cient and results in substantial approximation error and
variation loss in state variables. This is transmitted to signicant bias in parameter
estimates. When comparing to the suggested approximation approach, I nd that at
least 100 grid points are needed to match the precision we obtain when solving the model
with a fth order approximating Chebyshev polynomial. Hence, Chebyshev polynomials
are a powerful tool in ameliorating the curse of dimensionality and mitigating the problem
with approximation error associated with discretization of the data.
At the end of the paper, I present Monte Carlo evidence based on Rusts engine re-
placement model with unobserved heterogeneity, and analyse the relative performance of
estimators with xed and random coe¢ cients. Even when heterogeneity enters linearly
in the instant utility function, in general we do not estimate the mean of the coe¢ -
cients. Parameters are heavily biased and the bias cannot entirely be attributed to the
usual neglected heterogeneity problem also know from static models. Conversely, the
random coe¢ cient model performs quite well: parameter estimates and standard errors
are unbiased and we are able to estimate the standard deviation of the heterogeneity
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when its present. In absence of heterogeneity, the over-parameterization comes at a very
low e¢ ciency cost. This accentuates the future role for mixture models in dealing with
unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic models. Furthermore, the results highlights the im-
portance of heterogeneity bias in dynamic programming models and adds to the debate
about unobserved heterogeneity in microeconometrics.
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8. Appendix: Simulated Likelihood and Gradients
In this appendix, I show how to compute simulated likelihood and analytical gradients
for the models derived in section 5. I will carefully go through the procedure to obtain sim-
ulated likelihood and gradients for the model with individual specic heterogeneity from
example 1. At the end, I briey discuss the di¤erences to the case of serially correlated
unobservables from example 2.
For illustrative simplicity, consider the case where heterogeneity enters the utility func-
tion only. In this case, we can obtain consistent estimates for f , by maximizing the
partial likelihood l2 (f ); we label these estimates ^
p
f . I also assume that  is known
and xed. Hence we are interested in the parameters, u; that indexes xed coe¢ cients
in the utility function, and the parameters, g that index the population distribution of
. Given  and ^
p
f , partial maximum (simulated) likelihood estimates can be obtained
maximizing the partial likelihood, l

u; gj; ^pf

. The procedure to obtain the simulated
partial likelihood can be summarized as follows
Algorithm 1. Simulation of the partial likelihood
(1) For a given set of structural parameters, , and an appropriate choice of the
smoothing parameter , solve the model as the xed point dEV  (x; ; d) for the
contraction mapping dened by the functional equation (5.3).
(2) Given data on individual characteristics zn, take S individual and choice specic
draws from g (jzn; g) and label them sn = (sn (1; zn) :::; sn (J; zn))0 ; s = 1; ::; S;
n = 1; :::; N . To obtain identication, set sn (J) = 0 for a reference alternative J
and normalize the variance of the rst component in sn.
(3) Given, i) the expected value function,dEV (x; ; d; ) evaluated at Chebyshev nodes,(x; )
for each alternative, d = 1; ::; J , ii) panel data on discrete choices dn = (dn1; ::; dnTn)
and observable state variables, xn = (xn1; ::; xnTn) and iii) S simulated values of the
latent variable, sn , s = 1; :::; S, we calculate the partial likelihood for the observed
sequence of choices conditional on these data. The contribution of individual n to
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the simulated partial likelihood is
l^1n () = ln L^
1
n () = ln
1
S
SX
s=1
L^1n (jsn)
= ln
1
S
SX
s=1
TnY
t=1
P^ (dntjxnt; sn) , n = 1; :::; N
where
P^ (dntjxnt; sn) =
exp
nh
~u(xnt; 
s
n(dnt; zn); dnt) + T (xnt; 
s
n(dnt; zn)) pT
dEV (x; ; d)i =oP
j2D(x) exp
nh
~u(xnt; sn(j; zn); j) + T (xnt; 
s
n(j; zn)) pTdEV (x; ; d)i =o
s = 1; :::; S
To obtain maximum simulated likelihood estimates for u and g, the BHHH algorithm
is used to maximize the simulated partial likelihood function l^1 () = 1
N
PN
n=1 l^
1
n (). For
each BHHH iteration we need to compute gradients in u and g for the log likelihood
contribution of individual n. One immediate advantage of the smoothing approach is that
it is relatively simple to derive analytical gradients of the likelihood function.
The gradient is just a sum of gradients of the simulated likelihood conditional on simu-
lation s, divided by the simulated likelihood. Due to the extreme value assumption, both
of these entities can be expressed analytically.
r l^1n () =
1
L^1n ()
1
S
SX
s=1
rL^1n (jsn)
To simplify notation, let P (d) denote the conditional choice probability given xnt and
simulation draw, sn, i.e. P (d)  P^ (djxnt; sn). Let further v^ (d) denote the choice
specic value function associated with alternative j evaluated at the same data, i.e.
v^ (d) 
h
~u(xnt; 
s
n(d; zn); d) + T (xnt; 
s
n(d; zn)) pT
dEV (x; ; d; )i =. Using Leibnizrule
for products of di¤erentiable functions we obtain
r l^1n (; sn) =
TnX
t=1
rP (dnt)
P (dnt)
TnY
t=1
P (dnt)
=
TnX
t=1
 
rv^ (dnt) 
X
j2D
P (j)rv^ (j)
!
L^1n (; 
s
n(zn))
This gradient is similar to the gradient for the conventional mixed logit used for panel
data. The only thing that di¤ers from the conventional mixed logit is the derivative of the
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choice specic value function, rv^ (d). We can write the gradient of the value function
associated with alternative d as the following expression
rv^ (d) =
h
r~u(xnt; sn(d; zn); j; u) + T (xnt; sn(d; zn)) pTrdEV (x; ; d; )i =
For most functional forms for ~u () it will be a trivial task to come up with an analytical
expression for r~u(xnt; sn(dnt; zn); dnt; u). However, to compute the last term in the
bracket, we need to di¤erentiate the unknown value function. We can write the xed
point asdEV =  dEV  and use the implicit function theorem to obtain
rdEV (x; ; d; ) = [I    0] 1 @ =@0
Note that [I    0] 1 is a by-product of the solution algorithm. Recall that we have to
compute the Fréchet derivative,  0, of the contraction mapping when using the Newton-
Kantorowich algorithm. The last term,  =@0, is a vector with the following elements
@ =@u = ru~u(xnt; sn(dnt; zn); dnt; u)
@ =@g = r~u(xnt; sn(dnt; zn); dnt; u)rgsn(dnt; zn)
The gradient of the simulation draws will in many cases be very easy to derive. For
expositional simplicity, I here present a simple example where sn is J   1 dimensional
multivariate normal distributed. Let for example, sn(d; zn) = znd+u
s
nd for d = 1; ; :J 1,
where usnd is a choice specic simulation draw from a J   1 dimensional multivariate
normal with covariance matrix 
u and alternative specic mean u = (u1; ::; uJ 1)
0. Let
sn(Jnt; zn) = 0 for the reference alternative. In the case of normals, it is convenient
to re-parameterize the model so that the covariance matrix 
u is decomposed into lower
triangular Cholesky matrices Cu. When maximum likelihood estimates for these Cholesky
factors are obtained, the covariance matrix can be derived as 
u = CuC 0u.
The re-parameterisation to Cholesky factors o¤ers a simple way to simulate e.g. the
multivariate normal distribution and ensures that the covariance matrix is positive denite
since it is calculated as the square of the Cholesky matrix. A draw usn =
 
usn;1; ::; u
s
n;J 1
0
fromN (u;
u) is obtained by taking S(J 1) draws from a standard normal for each indi-
vidual. Label these draws sn =
 
s1n; :::; 
s
J 1;n
0
and calculate usn = u+Cu
r
n. With this pa-
rameterization the structural parameters are g =
 
1; ::; J 1; u1;:::;uJ 1; cl;k : 8l; k  l  J   1

.
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We now express the elements of the gradient for a particular simulation draw
rjsn(dnt; zn) = znI (j = dnt) ; j = 1; ::; J   1
rujsn(dnt; zn) = I (j = dnt) ; j = 1; ::; J   1
rcl;ksn(dnt; zn) = skn ,8l; k  l  J   1
Note that at least one element of 
u must be normalized to ensure identication. This
can be done by setting the top left element of Cu equal to one , i.e. c1;1 = 1.
The simulated partial likelihood in example 2 can be derived following very similar steps.
There are two important di¤erences, however. First, when computing dEV (x; ; dj),
we must take expectations over  as indicated in equation (5.7). Secondly,  is drawn
from g (0j; x0) and is not constant over time. Hence each simulation s consist of a Tn
dimensional sequence of serially correlated simulation draws rather than one permanent
component. Subject to these di¤erences, simulated likelihoods and gradients are identical
to the ones derived above.
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